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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The impact of residential security measures is the main focus of this report. 
 
The incidence of residential burglary also focuses on business burglary, house robbery and 
armed robbery due to the findings that emanated from the victim interview phase. In addition, a 
security risk management approach was applied to the findings in order to assess the risk 
(impact of crime) on either the absence or non-compliance to installed security measures so 
that recommendations (advice) could be formulated for the implementation of supplementary 
or additional security measures at the residences that had been victims of burglary. 
 
The research project was conducted with the primary purpose of determining the possible 
impact that an array of security measures, active/in place or non-existent at the time when the 
burglary was committed would have in terms of deterrence, prevention or even amelioration of 
the severity (extent, loss, injury etc.). Furthermore, to make recommendations of what security 
measures could be implemented to prevent future burglaries and to improve the security and 
safety of the occupants of the burgled residence. 
 
Two northern suburbs of Johannesburg, namely Westcliff and Parkhurst, were chosen as the 
target areas, with Westcliff being a more upper income area with valuable heritage foundations 
and large properties, while Parkhurst is an area having high density (cluster dwellings) with 
smaller properties, but also very upmarket, cluster houses and a very popular area for 
development. 
 
Dockets on residential burglaries were drawn from the dockets stored at the Parkview Police 
Station for the period 1 January 2001 till 31 December 2002 with a sample of 70 being drawn 
from the total of 256 residential burglary cases recorded for the period under review.  
 
Two samples from each street were selected and in cases where residents were burgled more 
than once had higher priority for being chosen. 
 
As further validation and collection of supporting information for the docket analysis a total of 
twenty (20) interviews were undertaken with victims of burglary (as identified from the sample 
of dockets). These interviews varied from one-on-one interviews to telephone interviews. 
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Some of the interviews were conducted at the victim’s workplace during working hours so as 
not to inconvenience them and to accommodate their time preferences. 
 
The specific cases were then further analysed by means of the application of physical 
residential security audits, using a performa audit checklist/sheet, which followed immediately 
after the interview with the victim owner/resident of the identified property where the burglary 
had occurred. 
 
Finally, in order to contextualise (spatially) the occurrence of the burglaries and to try and see 
if certain environmental factors impacted on the incidence (frequency) of burglaries in the area 
(specific linkages with certain physical attributes or characteristics of the area) a simplified 
form of descriptive mapping was applied to the collected information. The descriptive mapping 
was done on both the areas where all 256 cases were plotted on a map. Street names were 
removed from both maps to ensure that ‘client’ (victim) confidentiality would be protected. 
The Parkhurst area was subdivided into 55 map grids and the Westcliff area into 17 grids.  
 
The location of victim residences, in terms of geographical information, was compiled and 
sampled according to the grid volume. 
 
From this analysis it was found that the majority of the victims experienced one burglary over 
the two-year time frame. Additionally, that the average burglary rate for each grid was three 
(3). The majority of the victims were located within the same grid area having a main access 
road. The majority of the victims were also located about three to four properties away from 
corner properties. 
 
In brief some of the main findings emanating from the docket analysis of the selected dockets, 
the interviews and the residential security audit were the following: 
 
· There was no significant proof that victims were burgled where the house was left 
alone for more than one day at a stretch.  
· Furthermore, the majority of the victims (in the sample) were burgled during the week, 
i.e. not over weekends and largely on weekdays (the working days of Monday to 
Friday). The popular days for the occurrence of the burglaries (as revealed in the 
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sample) were either a Friday followed by Mondays as the second most popular day of 
the week. 
· The main entry points to a residential property or residence were either by means of 
forcing doors open or forcing window burglar proofing open. 
· Of most interest, from a prevention and security measures perspective, was the fact that 
the docket analysis also indicated that about half (almost 50%) of the victims did not 
have intruder alarms installed in their homes at the time of the first burglary.  
· Moreover, in a majority of the cases, neighbourhood watch initiatives were also not 
present in the immediate area. 
· The majority of the victims did not work from home (i.e. were not self-employed) and 
were therefore fulltime employees absent during working days. 
· Building contractors were also present in the majority of the victim’s immediate 
residential property blocks. 
· Closed circuit television (CCTV) was not used at any of the victim houses. 
· All the victims (in the sample) had a brick wall enclosing their entire property. 
· But the majority did not have any electrified fencing (on top of walls/barricades). 
· The minority with electrified fencing did not receive any calls from the armed response 
companies (for an activation of electrified fencing alarms in the particular cases where 
the fence was bridged). 
· Motorised vehicle gates appeared to be present in a majority of the cases and were also 
not connected to the intruder alarm systems of the house on the property. 
· None of the victims had electronic keypad access for the armed response companies 
and this is also applicable with regards to the electrical locks on the pedestrian gates. 
· Security floodlights were present in the majority of the cases, but the way in which they 
were switched on was, in the majority of the cases, done manually. 
 
· In the majority of the cases infra-red detection beams were not present either within the 
garden or inner perimeter areas. 
· In addition, also in a majority of the cases, windows were left open with either curtains 
not being closed, especially during daytime, no curtains at all or only net curtains 
covering the open windows (i.e. visibility not prohibited and persons can see easily into 
rooms). 
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· The majority of the victims had intruder alarms but half of them did not bother to arm 
their alarms at night or when they went out.  
 
In terms of enhancing existing security measures or implementing new ones (post-incident 
enhancement) at the burgled residence the majority of the victims did the following: 
· Implemented or hired foot patrols and became involved in (or became part of) 
establishing of other types of neighbourhood security initiatives. 
· Changed door locks. 
· Installed burglar proofing. 
 
The focus of these additional or new security measures was, in the main, on enhancing existing 
physical and procedural security measures. 
 
From the victim interviews the following main points were noted:  
· Access to the victim’s property was sometimes gained via a neighbour’s property. 
· Victims suspected their own children of being involved in the burglary due to their 
children/s’ drug-related problems. 
· Windows were most often used as entry points. 
· In a significant number of cases victims suspected their armed response company of 
being involved in the actual burglary. They ascribed this suspicion to the fact that even 
while the panic button had been activated an extremely poor and slow response by the 
company had occurred. 
 
· Electrified fencing not in use (properly activated) since it was at the time of the 
burglary either faulty or malfunctioning. 
· Electrified fencing not set up properly and accordingly when activated did not make 
proper activation, i.e. alarm signal was not received in the armed response company 
control room. 
· Intruder alarm was not activated because the operating procedures (instructions) for it 
were too complicated.  
· Path of infra-red beams not cleared of vegetation and shrubs; activation often bypassed 
due to the irregular routines of children and domestic help (in the burgled house). 
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· Dogs get locked up, i.e. not allowed to roam freely throughout the property when 
owners leave to go to work or go on vacation. 
· Homeowners or occupiers (victims interviewed) sometimes suspect that employees 
(domestic workers or gardeners) at the home might be involved. This suspicion is often 
aroused by modus operandi used to remove the stolen articles or goods, namely taken 
out through windows out of reach of passives while doors not used because of door 
monitors – accordingly suspect this was an employee or done on employee-supplied 
information. 
· Victims also tended to suspect the presence of building contractors in their immediate 
vicinity (neighbourhood) and based this suspicion on the fact that there had been no 
burglary incidents for at least six years prior to contractors starting to make an 
appearance in their immediate neighbourhood.  
· Many victims opted rather for having a neighbourhood security initiative in place 
instead of installing additional measures at the residence, such as an intruder alarm with 
perimeter security. An example here would be supporting the implementation of public 
space patrols. 
· Robbers (as opposed to burglars) appeared (to the victims) to come from all over –
through various windows simultaneously i.e. multiple entry points – before tying up the 
victims. 
 
All of the above indicated poor outer perimeter security or alternatively inner perimeter 
security not complying with the basic accepted security principles, namely: 
· Deter 
· Detect 
· Delay 
 
The outcomes (research findings) focussed on providing security solutions in order to manage 
security crime risks such as residential burglary and that adhere to the principles of: 
· Determining the best and most cost effective way of implementing and choosing a 
security system  
· Enhancing the security system’s deterrence factor 
· Improving the security system’s detection capabilities 
· Enhancing the ability of the security system to delay a threat 
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· Developing efficiency by regular use, continual upgrading, provision of effective 
training, and having constant maintenance in place.   
 
Overall these security solutions need to incorporate some of the following basic principles (of 
security): 
 
· Firstly, the most cost effective way of implementing a security system is for it to be 
properly designed by a security professional, integrating a cost effective system in 
relation with the latest crime trends and modus operandi but all designed to fit the needs 
and wants of a client; 
· Secondly, the system should have deterrent value to minimise the risk factor of being 
exposed to possible unauthorised intrusion of one’s privacy; and 
· Thirdly, the system needs to have detection value by warning the user or homeowner 
well in advance so as to ensure (or enhance the probability of detection i.e. the risk 
factor to the perpetrator) that the perpetrator will be apprehended within the average 
response time frame by armed reaction companies. The latter can also be achieved by 
increasing (hardening) barriers so as to further delay perpetrators (in the commission of 
their crime). 
 
However, any system is only as good as its implementation, its regular use, constant or 
frequent maintenance and its periodic upgrading. 
 
Finally, the provision of operating training to the homeowner or security system users is vital 
in order to ensure that these complex security devices will be properly and fully utilised and 
thereby function at optimal effective levels. 
 
All of this is drawn together in the concluding section of the research report accompanied by 
practical solutions for the implementation of additional security measures available to 
homeowners who have been the victims of burglaries or house robberies. 
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Chapter 1 
PROBLEM STATEMENT, AIMS AND RATIONALE  
FOR THE RESEARCH  
 
INTRODUCTION  
Often, by the very nature of crime in South Africa, and public pressure to do something about 
violent crime, police stations across South Africa tend to prioritise the crime that occurs in 
their precinct in terms of national priorities, levels of violence and public and media attention 
on these specific crimes, namely murder, vehicle hijacking, cash-in-transit heists, rape etc. A 
reasonably innocuous (in terms of profile and no violence generally associated with it) crime 
such as burglary, even if high incidence occurs in a particular precinct or policing district, 
hardly ever becomes listed as a particular police station’s high priority crime. This situation has 
arisen even though burglary, in terms of numbers and economic loss associated with it, is often 
statistically within the top three reported crimes in South Africa (see later section on reported 
crime statistics). 
 
By not being listed as a priority crime, burglary therefore gets ‘sidelined’ or ‘marginalised’ in 
terms of the allocation of police time, resources, investigations, manpower etc. Accordingly, 
most residents have come to the conclusion (which may not necessarily be absolutely accurate) 
that when they experience a burglary or house robbery, the chances of it getting solved and 
their stolen possessions recovered are slim since the crime they have just experienced is not 
given any priority attention and has to wait in line for attention behind higher prioritised 
violent crimes. As a result residents have also come to realise that it is often up to their own 
devices in terms of domestic security measures or the services of a private security 
practitioner/company to firstly, possibly prevent such a crime from happening; secondly, to 
minimise the extent/impact when such a crime occurs (i.e. armed response disturbing the 
burglary in progress); and thirdly, to get it solved (i.e. making an arrest at a later stage and the 
solving of the crime for the police by handing over a docket of evidence for their further 
actions, e.g. prosecution in a court of law). Within all these perceptions central and crucial to 
the whole situation is often the level and sophistication of existing security measures installed 
at a residence or the lack (absence) thereof. Allied to this would be the security measures 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  2 
 
implemented and installed after the fact. The impact of this aspect of any burglary in the 
Parkview and Westcliff neighbourhoods forms the core focus of this study.  
RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES 
The homeowner faces various challenges in that he or she needs to have residential security 
measures in place in order to fortify ones property through various layers of defence. 
 
Each layer can be covered with one or more security measures. In this research report 
residential security measures have been categorised into: 
· Physical measures; 
· Technological measures; and 
· Procedural measures. 
 
Each of the above-mentioned categories can be implemented individually or as a combination 
in order to protect the various layers of the fortified property. An example of physical measures 
on the perimeter of a property can be electrified fencing. 
 
In this study the researcher explored the protective and preventative ability of these security 
measures by establishing whether the various security measures were present – or not – at the 
selected burglary scenes and the method of implementation and usage. As an ancillary issue 
whether procedures were not applied or neglected i.e. not implemented at the time of the 
burglary, were also looked at. 
 
Generally from the researcher’s personal experience and as a consultant providing advice on 
security measures to homeowners, the researcher found that homeowners with security systems 
experienced the following problems: 
· Will the installer connect the hardware correctly and with minimal exposure to possible 
tampering and that might affect other security devices connected to the same network; 
· Will external factors, such as routine, be considered with regard to the homeowner 
having tenants on the property who also have access to arming and disarming the 
external beams on entry and exit?  
· Will the armed response company respond to an alarm violation signal, i.e. within a 
short space of time? 
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· Will the suggested armed response company be proactive and regularly implement 
security awareness programs?  
· Will the user be able to and know how to use (operate) the security system effectively? 
· Will the user maintain (get it serviced, regular maintenance and replace, e.g. back up 
battery) the security system on a regular basis? 
· Will the armed response monitoring service monitor the security systems effectively 
and advise the client immediately on any deficiencies and react immediately to any 
irregularities? 
 
The following is a summary of the principles regarded by the researcher as being vital in order 
to ensure an effective security system: 
· The cost effective design thereof; 
· Accurate implementation thereof; 
· Effective and correct use thereof; 
· Regular maintenance of the security system; and 
· Regular upgrade and enhancements of the security system. 
RATIONALE/MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
The research motivation for this research project was to determine whether the above-
mentioned summary will be applicable with a focus on residential burglaries in two selected 
neighbourhoods with reference to security measures at the burgled residence. 
 
The research motivation is also to determine whether any of the above-mentioned had any 
impact after the occurrence of the residential burglary (here in after referred to as the 
‘incident’). 
 
An example would be to establish whether the way the electronic keypads on the vehicle gate 
automation and pedestrian gate striker lock had any deterrence, delay or detection on the 
incidence of residential burglary. 
 
The researcher was also interested in establishing to what extent each security discipline should 
be integral and dependent on each other in order to form a complete and effective residential 
security system as a holistic approach. 
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An example of such integration exploration would be the intruder alarm monitoring device and 
how it is connected with the intruder alarm to report on a dedicated intruder alarm violation 
condition or a panic condition. 
 
Another focus of the research was to establish what residential security measures were in place 
at the time of the residential burglaries. 
 
This approach enabled the researcher to compile a security checklist that not only reported on 
how security measures can be implemented, but also which security measures should be in 
place in order to avoid or minimise the incidence of residential burglary. 
 
Furthermore, the researcher was also interested in establishing, by means of conducting 
residential security audits, of how these residential security measures were being implemented. 
 
Overall this approach enabled the researcher to advise, for example, on how the electronic 
keypad at the vehicle gate automation system should be installed to minimise any attempts to 
tamper with it.  
 
As a final intention and outcome of the study the researcher aimed to provide accurate and 
practical advice based on the research results that would assist private security companies and 
the Private Security Industry Regulating Authority (PSIRA) to enhance existing security 
working procedures and methods and approaches in the sphere of domestic/residential security. 
Hopefully this will contribute towards minimising the number, extent and impact of residential 
burglaries. 
 
The report starts by introducing the research problem and question followed by the researcher’s 
motivation for undertaking and completing this project. 
 
Chapter Two (2) focuses on the current views regarding residential security and residential 
burglary. 
 
Chapter Three (3) focuses on the research methodology describing the research approach 
(design), methods and data/information collection tools used. In addition, it outlines and 
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discusses the practical applications with regard to research problems experienced and 
encountered.  
 
Chapter Four (4) focuses on technical descriptions and the concepts used throughout the 
research report. This chapter provides the reader with a broad understanding of the concepts 
and terms without having to have any specific technical experience, knowledge or expertise. 
 
Chapter Five (5) defining technology and how it integrates within the residential security 
environment. 
 
Chapter Six (6) contextualises residential burglary in the Parkhurst and Westcliff, northern 
residential suburbs, in Johannesburg. 
 
Chapter Seven (7) examines and details the research findings resulting from the following 
data/information collection processes:  
· Docket analysis; 
· Victim of burglary interviews ; 
· Residential security audits; and 
· Descriptive mapping. 
 
Chapter Eight (8) provides the reader with possible security-related solutions to the problem of 
burglary based on the research findings and the researcher’s own personal and professional 
experience. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The researcher made use of several sources in order to determine what studies on residential 
security and residential burglary have been completed locally in South Africa. From this 
starting point the literature search extended to include any relevant international studies. The 
focus at the time was to get any studies broadly dealing with residential burglaries from 1995 
onwards.  
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
In a research study by Tilley et al, (1999: 7) the following reference system was used to list the 
elements of a burglary in the making (chemistry of): 
· The dwelling should have a possibility of  high value valuables;  
· There should be nobody present to prevent the burglary from taking place; 
· The burglar should have access to a market where the stolen goods can be disposed of 
and in return receive a monetary incentive for the stolen goods; and 
· The dwelling should have insufficient security hardware to provide it with any 
reasonable level of perceived guardianship (protection). 
 
In the research study for this research report the researcher focused specifically on the last 
point in order to provide practical answers and recommendations dealing with what security 
hardware would be perceived to provide an acceptable level of guardianship (protection) to 
residences and victims. 
 
In 2004 Wim Bernasco and Paul Nieuwbeerta, of the Netherlands Institute for the Study of 
Crime and Law Enforcement (NSCR), in conjunction with the Haaglanden Police Force in the 
Netherlands, published a study, which analysed how burglars select target areas and what their 
motivation/s were for actually targeting those areas (Bernasco & Nieuwbeerta, 2004: 297-298).  
According to Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta (2004: 297), it may be that burglars target specific 
areas with the aim of maximizing their revenue by selecting such targets for the following 
reasons: 
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· Minimal effort is required when the premises or property is entered; 
· The premises/property appear to have valuable items; and  
· The burglars feel (perceive) that they will not be apprehended or disturbed while 
conducting the burglary (low risk of being detected and apprehended). 
 
The following criteria, resulting from the above-mentioned reasons, were formulated by 
Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta (2004: 297-298): 
· The burglar would look at the affluence level of the property; and  
· The possibility (likelihood) of the successful completion of the burglary.  
 
Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta also posed the question of whether a burglary attempt is profitable 
if successful and whether the absence of a guardian like a neighbourhood watch will also 
ensure a successful burglary (Bernasco & Nieuwbeerta, 2004:297-298). 
 
In summary the Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta report indicated, through hypothesis testing, that: 
· “Affluence of the neighbourhood increases the odds of the neighbourhood being 
selected for burglary”; and 
· “When the neighbourhood attributes are controlled, burglars do not show a specific 
preference for wealthy neighbourhoods” (Bernasco & Nieuwbeerta, 2004: 208). 
 
In this researcher’s own study the presence of a neighbourhood watch is a variable that was 
tested in the victim interviews. 
 
A distance matrix was also used by Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta (2004: 307) whereby the 
distance between the burglar’s resident neighbourhood and his/her target neighbourhood was 
measured and coded accordingly. 
 
The researcher made use of a similar concept using descriptive mapping to focus on the two 
suburbs selected for the study and their geography (environment) in relation to the victim’s 
property. Both the selected residential areas were divided into a grid system, with a grid 
representing two (2) residential blocks. (These results are discussed in Chapter Seven.)  
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In their study Bernasco & Nieuwbeerta (2004: 311) refer to the ‘spatial choice approach’ and 
more specifically to the ‘choice of target’ and possible relationship to area affluence, escape 
routes and presence of security measures at target residence and in neighbourhood. 
 
The current study similarly tried to evaluate whether there was any impact i.e. presence or 
otherwise, of residential security measures by means of victim conducting interviews and 
residential security audits.  
CURRENT VIEWS ON RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY 
The previous police station commander at the Parkview Police Station, Snr. Supt Ian Loubser, 
in discussions with the researcher about the impact of residential burglary on the victim, stated 
that this specific crime considerably traumatises the victim due to the fact that the victim does 
not usually come face-to-face with the perpetrator (except when it is a house robbery), but that 
the perpetrator nevertheless intruded the personal space of the victim and the victim usually 
fears (expects) a repeat in the near future of such an incident. According to Snr Supt Loubser 
burglary is the invasion of one’s privacy like any other crime, directed at one’s person. It is, 
therefore as traumatic as any other crime (Loubser, 2003). In essence then a burglar has the 
opportunity to go through one’s personal belongings and also to take possession of one’s 
personal belongings, without one’s permission. 
CONCLUSION 
With regard to the literature review, the research project was adapted to previous studies on the 
topic with specific reference to research problems and results achieved. 
 
Accordingly this project is a first of its kind in South Africa that focuses on the impact of 
residential security measures and not just on residential burglary per se as the core crime 
problem. 
 
Residential burglary stills remain problematic in terms of frequency and although there has 
been a reduction in the latest (2006/7) SAPS police statistics, it remains on average still within 
the three highest reported crimes both nationally and at the provincial level. (See comparisons 
done by the researcher in the chapters to follow.) 
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The research methodology aims to provide as much as possible information via the findings in 
order to provide recommendations, which can be integrated into the security risk management 
model, and thereby adding value to residential security risk audits. 
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The researcher made use of a combination of a qualitative and a quantitative research approach 
throughout this study.  
 
The researcher aimed at gaining a full understanding – in the course of the research - of the 
‘objective’ of the study1 and to interpret it in practical terms for future use in his profession2 
(Welman & Kruger, 1999:  189).  
 
The researcher tried to maintain a professional and objective approach to the collection of the 
research information by adhering to the following approach:  
· Avoiding, as far as possible, being unduly influenced or becoming biased by being 
drawn in too close to what interviewed victims were saying; 
· Making use of one-on-one interviews, security audits (checklist and survey sheet), 
descriptive mapping and docket analyses as opposed to using (and relying solely on) 
participant observation as a method of collecting information; and 
· Examining, interpreting and gaining an insight into the relationships, impact and effect 
between residential security measures and the incidence of residential burglary (see 
Welman & Kruger, 1999: 189, for a more detailed exposition of this research 
approach). 
 
RESEARCH AIMS 
The objectives of this research project are to: 
· Establish what security measures were in place at the time the residential burglaries 
(selected cases from the two target areas3) occurred;  
· Determine if the incidence of burglary had any contributing impact on implementing or 
upgrading existing or non-existent residential security measures post-burglary;  
                                               
1 The impact of residential security measures on the incidence of burglary. 
2 The researcher designs and project manages security systems integrations.  
3 Westcliff and Parkhurst residential areas in Johannesburg. 
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· To develop a residential security audit form that can possibly be used by local law 
enforcement agencies, the private security industry and a resident owner or lessee in 
order to minimise any potential security vulnerabilities (in security systems on or at a 
residential property) that could be exploited by burglars;   
· Furthermore to determine what impact existing security measures might have had on 
residential burglary in terms of what security measures were absent, what security 
measures were a deterrent (barrier) and what security measures were circumvented or 
breached during the actual burglary incidents; 
· Establish by means of descriptive mapping (matrix plotting) what other variables were 
present at the time of the burglary and add value to existing SAPS crime prevention 
strategies and crime trend analyses;  and 
· Ancillary to all these aims would be the formulation of recommendations for 
homeowners dealing with suggested improvements to existing security measures.  
 
Overall then, the researcher aimed at identifying practical solutions to the identified research 
problems by means of the research project (Welman & Kruger, 1999: 12). Accordingly, as a 
practical research outcome, the researcher would therefore aim to establish what security 
measures should be in place in order to minimise the incidence of residential burglary. 
 
To meet this aim the researcher aimed at identifying the residential security measures which 
were in place at the time of the residential burglary and how these security measures were 
implemented, i.e. operationalised. 
 
It is therefore hoped that the research findings will assist and be of value to the following 
organisations and individuals:  
· The Department of Security Risk Management of the School of Criminal Justice in the 
College of Law at the new (merged) University of South Africa (UNISA), who, 
hopefully, will be able to use (and input into course material) the results obtained 
(specifically the integrated approach to the security risk management module with its 
focus on residential security measures); 
· The South African Police Service (SAPS) for use in strategic and tactical operations 
planning for the combating of residential burglary; 
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· The South African private security industry for advising homeowners on recommended 
security measures to be implemented (inclusive of a situational analysis) and not 
specifically certain makes of security equipment or products;  and 
· Neighbourhood security forums, neighbourhood watches and community security 
initiatives for the planning of safer neighbourhoods and the implementation of more 
proactive policing. 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
Units of analysis 
The units of analysis were victims of residential burglary cases for the period 1 January 2001 
till 31 December 2002, drawn from two groups within the population area (Parkview Policing 
area). The Parkhurst and Westcliff residential areas were the two chosen target areas. 
 
Tilley et al (1999: 15) explains the problem faced by researchers in finding the right approach 
in choosing the correct area with reference to residential burglary. 
 
The approach of this research was to make use in the research of members of the community 
security initiatives, who were familiar with the research target areas and to agree to their view 
of whether or not a specific area had a higher incidence of burglary than another (Tilley et al, 
1999: 15).  
 
The police were approached for their views on both the areas selected and their views on the 
incidence levels of residential burglary. 
 
At the time this turned out to be the best approach, because of time constraints and limited 
resources in automated analytical tools (Tilley et al, 1999: 15). 
 
The researcher has experience in doing residential audits in the mentioned residential areas. 
 
The researcher also had access to the internet and the local police in order to establish which 
areas in the Parkview policing area had the highest incidence of residential burglary. 
    
Additionally, the researcher had work responsibilities, within the organisation he worked for, at 
the time the field research was undertaken, to look after the safety and security of this 
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organisation’s expatriate and staff members at their homes (many of whom live in the research 
target residential areas of Parkhurst and Westcliff).  
 
The selected research areas were also close to the researcher’s place of work thereby 
contributing to reduced research expenses in terms of travelling for the audits and interviews. 
 
Other research selection factors included the fact that the Parkview SAPS has jurisdiction over 
the two mentioned target areas. This contributed to the centralising of residential burglary 
cases, which in turn assisted in the retrieval of case numbers and dockets with minimal 
disruption and complications. 
 
Finally, the researcher was, and is still currently, involved in the management and operational 
planning for the Westcliff Community Security Forum4 – which was initiated in June 2003 – 
and was also centrally involved in its planning and operations.5  
 
The establishment of this security forum contributed to the enhancement and reinstating the 
heritage value of Westcliff. Furthermore, the researcher’s close involvement in its activities 
also ensured that the researcher had a point of reference to work from during his physical 
security audits and interviews with the selected residential burglary victims. 
Parkview Police 
Parkview Police Station, hereafter referred to as Parkview SAPS, is situated within the 
Northern suburbs of Johannesburg, Gauteng.  
 
The following areas are within the Parkview Policing area: 
· Craighall; 
· Craighall Park; 
· Emmarentia;  
· Greenside; 
· Greenside East; 
 
                                               
4 This concept has been adapted by major private security companies and is being used in other suburbs of Johannesburg. 
5 Currently is still involved with this security forum and managing the security concept in order to decrease and minimise the 
level of various crimes which occurred in the area prior to June 2003. 
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· Parkhurst; 
· Parktown; 
· Parktown North; 
· Parktown West; 
· Parkview; 
· Roosevelt Park; and 
· Westcliff. 
 
The total area the Parkview SAPS covering, is 45 square kilometres  
 
The Parkview SAPS area also has a population of 50 000 and 8 766 stands (Parkview Police 
Information: 1)  
Parkhurst 
Parkhurst has a population of 9 900 and 2 232 stands and is the most densely populated (mostly 
residential) area within the Parkview SAPS service area (Parkview Police Information: 1).  
 
Business premises are situated along 4th Avenue. There are public recreation facilities, i.e. 
swimming pool and tennis courts, along 5th Avenue at the Verity Park Centre, while 4th 
Avenue, 6th Street and 1st Avenue east are the main routes into Parkhurst. (Parkview Police 
Information: 1).  
Westcliff  
Westcliff has a population of 1 900 and 285 stands (Parkview Police Information: 1). Westcliff 
is mainly residential with two business premises situated on the corner of Jan Smuts Avenue 
and The Valley roads. 
 
Recreational facilities, i.e. The Dale Lace Bowling Club, tennis courts, soccer field and a park, are 
situated in Lawrence and Carlow Roads (Refer to Annexure 1: Westcliff Area).  
 
DATA COLLECTION SOURCES AND MEASURING INSTRUMENTS 
The researcher’s main research focus was to assess the impact of residential security measures 
on the incidence of residential burglary (the construct), which in turn would encapsulate all the 
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various residential security measures, e.g. infra-red beams etc., (the indicators) (Welman & 
Kruger 1999:  133). 
 
The researcher further used the following measurement tools on the one construct (impact of 
residential security measures on incidence of burglary): 
· Docket analysis; 
· Victim interviews; 
· Residential security audits; and 
· Descriptive mapping. 
 
The field observation notes made when doing the residential security audits were compared 
with the victim interviews. For example the researcher would compare the interview notes with 
the field notes to verify if some of the hardware was in place at the time of the burglary. 
Another example using this comparative method of substantiating of facts from different 
information sources would be to establish (in the physical check done in the security audit) if 
there was an anti-theft bracket on the vehicle gate motor and then crosscheck this information 
with the interview where the victim might have reported that there was no additional security 
hardware on the vehicle gate motor. 
 
Docket analysis 
Dockets combine all the complainant details, case information relating to the victim(s), crime 
scene and investigative notes. 
 
The researcher had to first draw all the residential burglary cases, which occurred within the 
time frame of 1 January 2001 till 31 December 2002 and also within the Westcliff and 
Parkhurst areas respectively. 
 
This was done with the help of the Parkview Police Crime Intelligence Department. 
 
Each case then had to be opened, inputted separately in the database to find the case number, 
physical address of where the crime occurred and to determine if the case was in fact one of  
residential burglary and occurred within the mentioned residential areas (Parkhurst or 
Westcliff). 
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The case numbers with physical addresses were then listed according to streets and suburbs, 
which then constituted a sample of 70 cases drawn. 
 
The police dockets per se were the primary source of information and where the information 
collection for this research project started. The nature of the measurement in this regard was 
the actual docket and the contents of the statement and cover letters that were used to compile 
the digital information form.  
 
The apparatus that was used to gather information from the dockets, was a form designed by 
the researcher in digital format to be used in this regard to capture all the data (standardised 
information retrieved from each docket) without overlooking any important details (Welman & 
Kruger, 1999:  191). The process also ensured that the information collected from the docket 
was immediately saved to a database – this was done automatically with every single entry. 
From this electronic database data can be selected and used for various purposes, i.e. compiling 
interview and audit schedules, compiling a victim response schedule of questions after an 
interviews has been scheduled etc. 
 
This contributed to the construct validity of the measuring instrument (please refer to annexure 
5: Docket Digital Survey Form) because provision was made for all possible data and/or 
information that could be found in a docket. 
 
Nominal measurement was implemented with the dockets to note units of analysis in terms of 
burglary frequencies experienced (the attribute) within the selected time frame6 (Refer to 
annexure 10). 
 
In undertaking the docket analysis the first step was to obtain the approval from the South 
African Police Services who duly approved the collecting of information from dockets7. The 
second step was to sort the streets alphabetically and in descending street numbers.  
 
                                               
6 1 January 2001 till 31 December 2002. 
7 Approval received from the Head of Strategic Research, SAPS – Reference 3/34/2, dated 29 May 2003 and an 
approval in writing from the Parkview Police Station Commander, Supt Ian Loubser. 
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The next step was then to note units of analysis in terms of burglary frequencies (one, two, 
three and more). In the collected data there were no cases where units of analyses experienced 
more than three cases within the mentioned time frame. 
 
The reliability of the measuring instrument (docket digital survey form), the measurement 
occasion (during the December time frame of 2003) and measurement user (the researcher 
himself) ensured a reliable measurement instrument to adhere to the measurement instrument 
characteristics as outlined in Welman and Kruger (1999:  143). 
 
Docket analysis is a typical unobtrusive measuring instrument where the victim (of a burglary) 
is unaware at the time of the docket analysis (extracting information from the cases the victims 
reported and dockets as a result opened) that they have become objects of research (Welman & 
Kruger, 1999:  147-149). It is only at the time of an interview with a victim identified in the 
docket analysis where it becomes necessary (research ethics) to ask their permission for a 
voluntary interview and where they then become part of the research study per se. 
Docket measurement instrument 
The researcher completed a course in Introduction to Programming and also did self study into 
Microsoft Access 2000 so as to design the digital forms and databases for the analysis of the 
dockets. The researcher was therefore competent to identify any new information and the 
integration thereof into the existing form.  
 
The form was designed according to the docket format, cover letters and questionnaires and 
took into account any possible contents of a typical residential burglary statement and 
investigative officer diary notes to be found in a police docket. 
 
The form was designed for use in Microsoft Access, which ensures a stable environment for a 
database where there is the facility for the designing of various reports with queries. This 
database also stores all captured information and makes it available for any kind of query. The 
form also ensured that the researcher collected all possible information for the dockets. 
Enhancements were made to the form with any new and important information collected from 
the dockets, i.e. what was the purpose of reporting the incident to the police, being inputted 
directly and immediately. 
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The digital form was loaded on to a notebook in order for the researcher to capture data more 
easily and quicker at the police station research site. A report was then designed to compile the 
information gathered into a hard copy for further analyses. The report was also used to print 
hard copies of information to store in case the softcopy was destroyed or lost. The following 
information was used from the dockets to identify the victims and to arrange interviews and 
security audits with them: 
i) Case number; 
ii) Complainant title; 
iii) Complainant name; 
iv) Complainant identification number; 
v) Complainant occupation; 
vi) Complainant street number; 
vii) Complainant street name; 
viii) Complainant suburb; 
ix) Complainant work telephone number; and 
x) Complainant home telephone number. 
 
The researcher also reported on other variables, namely: 
i) reason for lodging report with police; 
ii) possible time of occurrence that might be used by the police; 
iii) any presence private security companies, and 
iv) other interest groups. 
 
The data collected from the dockets were primary data. No statistical analysis undertaken by 
the Police on the same cases was used by the researcher.  
Docket analysis measurement occasion 
The docket analyses occurred during December 2003 when the dockets were drawn and data 
capturing was done at the Crime Intelligence Centre of the Parkview Police Station.8 
 
There was minimal disruption and personnel at the police station were able to assist the 
researcher by issuing the dockets and taking them back for safe keeping during normal 
working hours. 
                                               
8 Parkview SAPS 
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The time frame was also accurate in that most of the week day staff took leave (in that 
December) and a time schedule was drawn up for the use of the office which had minimal 
impact on the daily routine of the remaining office staff on duty during that period.  
Sampling 
Probability sampling techniques were used for selecting the dockets drawn for analysis. The 
Crime Intelligence Centre at Parkview SAPS assisted the researcher in this regard.9 
 
The sampling frame consisted of 255 residential burglary cases within the Westcliff and 
Parkhurst areas combined. This made it impractical for the researcher to investigate all the 
dockets and also to do residential audits and victim interviews at each of the residences. 
Therefore the researcher decided to draw a simple purposive random sample whereby each 
member of the sample (residential burglary cases) would have the same probability to be 
drawn from the sample frame (Welman & Kruger, 1999:  48). 
 
The following schedule will illustrate the amount of residential burglary cases reported within 
each street in Parkhurst and Westcliff respectively between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 
2002.  
                                               
9 Prior approval to access the dockets at the police station was obtained from the station commander at Parkview 
SAPS via form SAPS 612(n). 
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Table 1:  All residential burglary cases reported within the Parkhurst and Westcliff  
     residential areas between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 2002 
Street Name Suburb 
Number of 
cases reported 
1st Street Parkhurst 5 
2nd Street Parkhurst 2 
3rd Avenue Parkhurst 1 
3rd Street Parkhurst 8 
4th Avenue Parkhurst 1 
4th Street Parkhurst 11 
5th Street Parkhurst 9 
6th Street Parkhurst 6 
7th Street Parkhurst 6 
8th Street Parkhurst 4 
9th Street Parkhurst 6 
10th Street Parkhurst 9 
11th Street Parkhurst 14 
12th Street Parkhurst 10 
13th Street  Parkhurst 6 
14th Street Parkhurst 8 
15th Street Parkhurst 9 
16th Street Parkhurst 10 
17th Street Parkhurst 12 
18th Street Parkhurst 16 
19th Street Parkhurst 11 
1st Avenue Parkhurst 2 
1st Avenue West Parkhurst 1 
20th Street Parkhurst 5 
21st Street Parkhurst 6 
22nd Street Parkhurst 11 
c/o 11th and 4th Streets, 11th Street Parkhurst 2 
C/O 6th and 17th Street Parkhurst 1 
c/o 8th and 13th Streets Parkhurst 1 
Holt Street Parkhurst 1 
Parkhurst Street Parkhurst 1 
c/o The Valley and Jan Smuts Westcliff 2 
Carlow Road Westcliff 1 
Crescent Drive Westcliff 6 
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Street Name (Cont.) 
Suburb 
(Cont.) 
Number of  
cases reported 
(Cont.) 
Escombe Road Westcliff 1 
Hillcrest Road Westcliff 1 
Jan Smuts Drive Westcliff 6 
Lawrence Street Westcliff 12 
Palala Road Westcliff 1 
Pallinghurst Road Westcliff 3 
The Valley West Road Westcliff 5 
Tyson Road Westcliff 1 
Waterfall Road Westcliff 2 
Westcliff Drive Westcliff 11 
Wexford Road Westcliff 4 
Woodview Road Westcliff 2 
Woolston Road Westcliff 2 
Total  255 
 
A simple purposive random sample was drawn from the sample frame of all residential 
burglaries which occurred within the Parkhurst and Westcliff areas between 01 January 2001 
and 31 December 2002. 
 
To ensure that the sample drawn from the sample frame was representative, the researcher 
followed the following procedure:  
· Drew one case from each street; and 
· Drew one case from each address where burglaries occurred more than once in respect 
of two or three cases.  
 
The following schedule shows the final sample drawn from all the residential burglary cases 
reported to the Parkview Police Station between 1 January 2001 till 31 December 2002: 
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Table 2:  Final sample residential burglary cases 
Street Name Suburb 
Number of cases 
drawn for 
sample 
1st Avenue Parkhurst 1 
1st Street Parkhurst 2 
2nd Street Parkhurst 1 
3rd Avenue Parkhurst 1 
3rd Street Parkhurst 3 
4th Avenue Parkhurst 1 
4TH Street Parkhurst 3 
5th Street Parkhurst 2 
6th Street Parkhurst 1 
7th Street Parkhurst 1 
8th Street Parkhurst 1 
9th Street Parkhurst 1 
10th Street Parkhurst 4 
11th Street Parkhurst 3 
12th Street Parkhurst 2 
13th Street  Parkhurst 1 
14th Street Parkhurst 1 
15th Street Parkhurst 1 
16th Street Parkhurst 2 
17th Street Parkhurst 1 
18th Street Parkhurst 5 
19th Street Parkhurst 2 
20th Street Parkhurst 1 
21st Street Parkhurst 1 
22nd Street Parkhurst 3 
c/o 11th and 4th Streets, 11th Street Parkhurst 1 
C/O 6th and 17th Street Parkhurst 1 
c/o 8th and 13th Streets Parkhurst 1 
Parkhurst Street Parkhurst 1 
Holt Street Parkhurst 1 
c/o The Valley and Jan Smuts Westcliff 1 
Carlow Road Westcliff 1 
Crescent Drive Westcliff 2 
Escombe Road Westcliff 1 
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Street Name (Cont.) 
Suburb 
(Cont.) 
Number of cases 
drawn for 
sample (Cont.) 
Hillcrest Road Westcliff 1 
Jan Smuts Drive Westcliff 2 
Lawrence Street Westcliff 4 
Palala Road Westcliff 1 
Pallinghurst Road Westcliff 1 
The Valley Road Westcliff 2 
Waterfall Road Westcliff 1 
Westcliff Drive Westcliff 2 
Wexford Drive Westcliff 1 
Woodview Road Westcliff 1 
Woolston Road Westcliff 1 
Total  72 
 
The final sample was as follows: 
N = 255 
n = 72. 
 
The units of analysis in this regard refers to the events (dockets on residential burglaries) and 
this was used as the same sample throughout the interviews with victims, residential security 
audits and descriptive mapping processes (Welman & Kruger, 1999:  50) 
Design 
A quantitative research design was used in this regard. Accordingly, the non-experimental 
research approach and design was used due to the non-assignment of subjects (residential 
burglary dockets) to the levels of the independent variable (incidence of burglary) (Welman & 
Kruger, 1999:  84). 
 
The researcher defined the phenomenon under investigation as the impact of residential 
security measures on the incidence of burglary committed in two Northern suburbs of 
Johannesburg over the period 1 January 2001 till 31 December 2002. 
 
The researcher defined the sampling technique as units of analysis on all residential burglary 
incidents within the Parkhurst and Westcliff areas over the period 1 January 2001 till 31 
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December 2002 to ensure that every case will have the same opportunity to be selected into the 
sample. 
 
In order to familiarise himself with the variables (various residential security measures) the 
researcher did the following: 
· Completed the basic and advanced levels of the DSC intruder alarm system installer 
course; 
· Completed a course in Basic Electronics; 
· Completed the installers course in Controlsoft Access Control System; 
· Developed a high level of expertise in project management for security installation, 
domestic as well as commercial, through his assignment as a security consultant to an 
international company having a branch in Johannesburg, later being appointed as a 
permanent staff member;10  
· Attended a briefing session where the compilation and contents of a docket was 
illustrated to him by SAPS personnel; 
· Completed the advanced project management programme at Unisa Business School of 
Leadership; and  
· Completed the Quantitative Methods and Statistics for Decision Makers at UNISA. 
 
The design suitability is important in that it should be able to have an answer or answers to the 
research problem (Welman & Kruger, 1999:  98). In this regard it was important that the 
researcher have contact information whereby he would be able to schedule interviews with the 
victims and undertake security audits at the homes of those victims who agreed to be 
interviewed. 
 
The number of groups (in this study residential areas) used was two (2). The Parkhurst and the 
Westcliff residential areas were used as the two population groups in this regard. 
Statistical techniques 
According to Welman & Kruger (1999: 201) the decision on which statistical techniques to be 
used should be based on the research design and measurement instruments. Furthermore, 
                                               
10 Since August 2000 the researcher was assigned to JPMorgan as a security consultant, and was appointed by 
JPMorgan as a permanent staff member in April 2003. 
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statistical techniques are important in order to make justifiable decisions (and conclusions 
from the results) on the research question/s (Welman & Kruger, 1999: 212). 
 
The researcher quantified the following variables through the docket analysis: 
· Time frame for burglaries measured in days; 
· Week days and weekends on burglary occurrences; 
· Day of week for burglary occurrence; 
· Method of access into immediate house area; and 
· Victims with intruder alarm systems. 
 
The researcher then coded the variables and quantified them in terms of frequency.  The coding 
process was formulated in terms of themes and frequencies (Welman & Kruger, 1999:  203). 
The data from the docket digital analysis form was categorised into themes and then coded to 
achieve the process of quantification of data in the form of frequencies. (The coding schedule 
on docket analysis is provided in Annexure 10: Coding schedule:  Docket analysis.) 
 
The rater reliability increased due to the fact that the researcher himself captured and rated this 
information. The reliability of the statistical techniques were analysed by a qualified statistician 
employed by UNISA.11 
 
The following categories were used as indicators to the construct, incidence of burglary: 
· Time frame for burglaries measured in days; 
· Week days and weekends on burglary occurrences; 
· Day of week for burglary occurrence; 
· Method of access into immediate house area; and 
· Victims with intruder alarm systems. 
 
Nominal measurement to the data obtained in the dockets with the aim to establish whether 
there might be any other indicators or independent variables, i.e. day of week of incident 
detection, that might have a relationship with the construct or dependant variable, incidence of 
burglary. 
 
                                               
11 Daniel Mokalapa at the Department of Mining & Engineering at UNISA. 
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This also applies to multivariate analysis to establish if there is any independent variable from 
the docket that has a direct relationship to the dependant variable, incidence of residential 
burglary. 
 
Overall, with the docket analysis, the researcher’s main objective was to get contact details of 
residential burglary victims within the Parkhurst and Westcliff areas. However, descriptive 
statistics were used to summarise the themes and their frequencies obtained through the docket 
digital survey form on residential burglary cases within the Parkhurst and Westcliff areas from 
1 January 2001 till 31 December 2002. (See Annexure 3:  Picture 1:  Docket Digital Survey). A 
hard copy of this docket digital survey form was used as a backup to the digital format to 
capture data in cases where the digital format was operational.  
Integrated measuring instrument and reliability 
In order to make the application of triangulation (comparing different data sets and collected 
information using different research methods and measuring instruments, interchangeable 
versions of the measuring instrument (parallel-forms reliability) were implemented 
(integrating information from the docket analyses, interviews with victims, residential security 
audits and descriptive mapping) in order to more comprehensively to describe the construct 
(impact on residential security measures on incidence of residential burglary) (Welman & 
Kruger, 1999:  144). 
 
Furthermore, the same representative sample was used with each of the various measuring 
instruments. 
Research problems 
The following problems were experienced by Tilley (1999: 6) in his research and in some of 
these problems also experienced by the researcher himself:  
· The computer system, they used to was limited in terms of database capacity and 
applications in obtaining all information over a period of three years; 
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· The changes in policing boundaries also made it hard to obtain information for a 
particular area over the three-year period of the research. This would be applicable to 
the researcher’s experience where residential burglary wasn’t the case in all the 
interviews and where some were house robberies and some were business burglaries. 
This had an influence on the sampling in that the sample drawn for the interviews was 
not only residential burglary victims, but included business burglaries and robberies; 
and 
· The inclusion of business burglaries into the residential burglary statistics, contributed 
to not obtaining the correct information for a particular area over the mentioned period. 
This was also the case with the research conducted in that there were robbery and 
business burglary cases included within the same sample drawn by the researcher. 
 
The researcher experienced the following in the docket analysis: 
· The Parkview police crime intelligence computer system had days where it could not 
access the central database due to unknown reasons and possible networking problems 
or PC system inadequacies such as outdated PC hardware, and therefore meetings had 
to be rescheduled with the PC operator; and 
· The burglaries reported on the database as residential burglaries and found during 
victim interviews to be either business burglaries or robberies, contributed to the victim 
interview sample focussing not only on residential burglary victims, but also victims of 
other types of burglaries. (Please refer to Bar chart 1: actual crimes recorded based on 
victim interviews.) 
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Bar Chart 1: Actual crimes recorded based on victim interviews 
Victim Interviews - Actual crimes according to interviews
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Interviews with residential burglary victims 
The second component in the collection of information for this research study were the 
interviews with the victims identified in the selected dockets. The focus of the victim 
interviews was to determine what security measures were or were not in place at the time of the 
incident. 
 
The information collection instrument used was a structured interview schedule consisting of 
95 questions. Eighty-nine of the questions were based around the time of the incident, i.e. 
about factors and security measures at the time the burglary occurred. Six questions were open 
ended and based on possible improvements done as a result of the burglary incident. 
 
The researcher explained to the respondents (identified victims) the purpose of the interview in 
order to obtain their permission to conduct the interview, to seek their co-operation and 
voluntary participation. 
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The respondent was also asked to complete and sign the interview agreement12 which basically 
assured the respondent that their anonymity would be protected in the research report in terms 
of their personal details and exact location of the burglary. 
 
The estimated length of the interview (time taken to complete) was also mentioned to the 
respondent. On average most interviews took between forty-five and sixty minutes. This was 
followed by the residential security audit which on average took another twenty-five minutes.  
 
There were a number of instances where the interviews were conducted at the victim’s 
workplace, at their new houses (i.e. moved residences in the interim) or a telephonic interview 
was conducted. Please refer to pie chart 1: Interview locations 
Pie Chart 1:  Interview locations 
 
The respondents were also advised that they may feel free not to answer any questions if they 
want to, but if they chose not to answer a particular question to provide the researcher with a 
reason in each instance. This did not occur in any of the interviews and all the questions were 
answered by all respondents. Furthermore, the respondents were also advised that they may 
feel free to share any additional answers or questions if they needed to add to the interview 
information. If this happened the researcher then made foot notes next to the questions. An 
example of this was where only a ‘yes’ response was required to a question. For instance for a 
question like: “Was the intruder alarm armed?” The response to such a question could then be 
‘yes’ but a respondent would report further that the alarm code had not been changed after 
taking ownership of the house, although the alarm was armed. This is crucial to ensure that a 
                                               
12 See Annexure 6: Victim interview schedule. 
Victim responses - Quantifying victim interview locations  
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proper audit trail will exist when the owner wants to investigate alarm activities, i.e. when was 
the alarm armed or disarmed and by which user. 
 
In such a case one can note that alarm code changing can also be a possible variable. 
 
In the interviews the researcher allowed all respondents to feel free to express their feelings, 
but also respected their wishes if for any reason or circumstance a respondent might reject any 
question or refuse to answer due to the crime experienced and associated trauma. 
 
The researcher therefore tried to ensure that the revealing and passing on of information by 
respondents were facilitated (creating a relaxed atmosphere of sharing and being sensitive to 
the feelings of the respondent) without intervening, prompting, badgering or forcing any issue. 
This form of interviewing was an effort to fulfil the strictures for therapeutic research as 
outlined by Welman & Kruger (1996:  197). 
 
The researcher also allowed for the respondents to voluntarily expand on their answers and 
provide more information to questions, which and in some instances covered the next question 
without interfering with their response. 
 
Construct validity of the measuring instrument (the interview schedule) was taken into 
consideration in that provision was made for all possible external variables whereby all the 
various security measures were listed and the researcher made notes on any possible external 
influences that normally influence the effectiveness and reliability of these security measures. 
The researcher therefore made allowances for any extra information which was also used to 
enhance, refine or expand the existing questionnaire and to add any issues not covered in the 
first interview schedule. 
 
The essence of capturing the re-occurring themes was always the main aim during the 
interviews in order to contribute to effective and accurate report writing. 
 
The interview schedule will now be discussed in more detail in terms of its use as the 
measurement instrument. 
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Measurement instrument 
The researcher completed a course in Quantitative Methods and Statistics for Decision Makers 
in 2004 at the New Unisa to form a better understanding of what is needed to provide useful 
information (data input) to a statistician allowing for the best possible results and interpretation 
on the given data. 
 
The measurement instrument during the victim interviews was a questionnaire with a 
combination of short and open-ended questions. 
 
The short questions were designed in a manner to provide for ease of coding and still left 
opportunity for any new variables to be noted. 
 
The design of the questionnaire was very time consuming, but ensured the ease of effective 
interviewing in covering vital aspects and not to leave any questions or responses unattended. 
The draft interview schedule of questions was tested and piloted with colleagues in the 
workplace before finalisation.  
 
The open-ended questions were placed at the beginning and end of the interview schedule, in 
an attempt to give the respondent, where possible, the opportunity to provide more information 
about the various variables. In addition, the responses were categorized and grouped into 
themes and frequencies. The themes were also coded accordingly. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire was designed not only as a hardcopy but also as an electronic version (for 
laptop/notebook use) on a database package. This was more reliable due to data that could be 
immediately stored in a database, and ensured a more speedy process with the analysis of the 
interviews.  
 
While the researcher felt the electronic version to be very “impersonal” it also tended to have 
the following disadvantages: 
· The researcher experienced the possibility of overlooking detail and responses from the 
respondents, which normally get noted if one focuses one’s full attention on the 
response, reaction and body language of the respondent;  
· The researcher felt that the respondent tended to lose interest if the researcher had to 
focus on the laptop screen and type in the responses; and 
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· The laptop was a risk in either failing due to highly possible errors, i.e. sudden battery 
failure or hard disk error. 
 
As a result of the above the researcher used the digital version only to capture data after the 
interviews had been done which then had the benefit that the data was captured onto an 
electronic database, was secure and readily available to be analysed through coding and 
calculations to formulate statistical information. 
 
The questionnaire covered the following aspects: 
· Summary of the project; 
· Confidentiality; 
· Definitions; and 
· Additional information. 
 
· Section A: 
o Residence description; and 
o Respondent description. 
 
· Section B (Focused on what was in place during the residential burglary): 
o Neighbourhood watches or community security initiatives; 
o Perimeter security; 
o Inner perimeter; 
o Immediate house area; and 
o Incident details. 
· Section C (Focused on whether any enhancements were made after the residential 
burglary had occurred) 
o Neighbourhood watch or community security initiatives; 
o Perimeter; 
o Inner perimeter; and 
o Immediate house area. 
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The summary of the project 
The summary of the project aimed to give the respondent more background information to the 
actual study. 
 
Confidentiality 
This clause was designed to give the assurance that the respondent’s identity, any personal 
details and exact address of the burglary would be protected, be treated as confidential and 
remain anonymous to anyone else besides the researcher. 
 
Definition 
The definitions were only used where the respondents were not sure of the meaning of a 
specific security measure. 
 
An example would be where the researcher had to explain to the victim that a keypad is not 
only applicable in arming or disarming an intruder alarm system, but can also be used to 
activate the automation system on a gate for the specific gate to be opened remotely. 
 
Additional Information 
The researcher’s aim was to guide the respondent to basic rules when responding to questions 
and that the respondent would be allowed to provide additional information, but this should be 
restricted to the topic only. 
 
In many instances this was not the case and the researcher also did not stop the respondent 
from adding information not related to the question, but then mentioned the response in 
questions where the information provider was applicable to allow for the respondent to either 
decline or confirm the response. 
 
An example would be where the respondent explained to the researcher that the alarm was not 
working due to lack of knowledge in using it and where the question only required either a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer or if there was an intruder alarm installed at the time of the incident. 
 
The researcher then reminded the respondent of the fact that the alarm was not in used in the 
question about whether the alarm was used or not. 
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The respondent was also informed that a written approval had been obtained by the South 
African Police Services to access docket information prior to the interview. 
 
Section A 
Section A covered the following: 
· Resident description; 
· Respondent description; 
· Type of dwelling; and 
· Employment history of the respondent at the time of the incident. 
Section B 
This section focused on possible residential measures with: 
· The suburb; 
· Perimeter; 
· Inner perimeter (garden area); and 
· Immediate house area. 
Section C 
This section focused on what equipment or security measure had been improved in terms of the 
previous section: 
· The suburb; 
· Perimeter; 
· Vehicle gate; 
· Pedestrian gate; 
· Inner perimeter; and 
· Immediate home security. 
 
Section A 
The main aim in this section was to determine what part of the premises had been burgled. 
 
The cottage was interesting area of note in that some of the incidents the cottage was burgled 
and not the main residents building. 
 
The areas investigated did not have much in terms of security villages and flats and mostly 
stand-alone houses and properties. 
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The section also covered background on the victim in terms of employment and to establish the 
victim’s working status at the time of the incident. 
 
Section B 
The suburb 
The main aim of this section was to determine what was in place at the time of the incident in 
terms of suburb or community security initiatives. 
 
The researcher has experience in initiating and managing community security initiatives in the 
Illovo Boulevard business community and Westcliff residential area. 
 
Another aim was to determine if there was any building or civil contracting works present in 
the suburb at the time of the incident in order to determine if there is any correlation between 
residential burglary and the presence of civil or building contract projects. 
 
The perimeter 
In the perimeter section, the researcher covered the following: 
· Electrified fencing; 
· Motorised vehicle perimeter gates; 
· Perimeter fence/boundary and 
· Pedestrian gates. 
 
Electrified fencing 
In terms of this question the researcher tried to determine whether any electrified fencing was 
present at the time of the residential burglary. 
 
The researcher also aimed, in determining whether electrified fencing was present, how it was 
used, monitored and managed and if the responses might have had a correlation with the 
incidence of residential burglary. 
 
During the course of the research, the researcher had also responded in his capacity as security 
consultant to various residential burglary scenes and wanted to determine whether his 
observations and focus on possible variables were accurate in this regard.  
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Examples would be to determine whether the fence heights were similar to other burglary 
scenes or for instance whether the pedestrian door was used as in other residential burglaries in 
neighbouring areas. 
 
Motorised perimeter vehicle gates 
Here the researcher was trying to determine whether a vehicle gate motor/gate automation 
system was in use and/or present at the time of the residential burglary. 
 
An ancillary aim was to determine how the gate motor was opened and closed and who had 
access to the devices activating the vehicle gate motor/gate automation system. 
 
Perimeter fence/boundary 
The perimeter fence/boundary was another area where the researcher’s aim was to determine 
what fence or boundary was in place at the time of the residential burglary. 
 
There were additional areas where the researcher would then confirm the response of the 
respondent, for example the height of the fence or boundary would be compared with the notes 
from the victim’s interview. 
 
Pedestrian gates 
The pedestrian gates were another area where the researcher’s aim was to determine how many 
pedestrian gates were present at the time of the incident, how they were locked and who had 
access in locking and unlocking these devices. 
 
The inner perimeter 
This is also known as the garden area and is mainly the area between the immediate house and 
perimeter boundary. 
 
The researcher’s aim here was to gather information on the following security measures: 
· Infra-red external beams; and 
· Floodlights. 
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Infrared external beams 
The researcher’s aim was to determine whether the respondent had any infrared external beams 
installed at the time of the residential burglary. 
 
The researcher would then also make any additional notes with the residential security audit 
regarding the positioning of the above equipment and how it functioned13. 
 
The researcher also aimed in determining how the infra-red beams were monitored and armed. 
 
An example would be to determine if the beams were armed with a remote transmitter and if 
the beams were connected to a radio frequency device on a dedicated zone on a key pad and 
labelled as infra-red beams and whether an activation would be transmitted to an armed 
response control room. 
 
Floodlights 
The researcher’s aim here was to determine if there were any floodlights present at the time of 
the residential burglary. 
 
Another aim was to determine whether the operating procedures, i.e. whether the floodlights 
were regularly activated, had any correlation with the incidence of the burglary. An example 
would be to determining how many of the reported cases the floodlights were switched on 
manually. 
 
Immediate house area 
The immediate house area includes the external walls, doors and windows adjacent to the 
immediate house structure. 
 
The following areas and security measures were covered by the researcher: 
· Doors; 
· Door keys and locks; 
· Windows; 
· Window burglar bars; and 
                                               
13 The external infra-red beams can either be transmit-receive or infra-red passive. 
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· Intruder alarm. 
 
Doors 
This section was added in addition to the list of areas since the researcher aimed to determine 
what doors were in place at the time of the residential burglary and whether they were covered 
with any additional security features such as security gates.  
 
The type of door and security gate would then be noted in the residential audit phase and this 
information would be added to the analysis. 
 
Door keys and locks 
The researcher’s aim here was to determine whether the doors leading to external areas had 
been locked at the time of the burglary and who had access to the keys at the time of the 
residential burglary. 
 
Windows 
The aim was to determine if there was any open view (visibility of inside contents) into the 
house by any possible bystanders from the external or unsecured side of the immediate house 
area. 
 
An example would be a clear view from the neighbours or main street area into the house 
rooms. 
 
The researcher aimed to determine whether routine and internal house movements might have 
a correlation to the residential burglary in this regard. 
 
Window burglar bars 
This section was also added as an addition to the initial questionnaire. 
 
The researcher’s aim was to determine if window burglar proofing and what type were present 
at the time of the residential burglary incident. 
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Intruder alarm 
The researcher has four years experience in various intruder alarm systems in the system 
design phase of projects and managing the projects.  
 
The type of intruder alarm and setup would also then be noted with the residential security 
audit and additional information in this regard would then be added to the analysis. 
 
The researcher’s aim was to determine if the respondent had an intruder alarm at the time of 
the residential burglary. 
 
The researcher was also interested in establishing how the intruder alarm was armed and 
disarmed and who had access to this function. 
 
Section C 
Security enhancements 
 
The aim of this section was to determine whether any security improvements had been 
implemented, and in what areas after, the incident. 
 
The researcher focused on covering all the issues mentioned or indicated in Section B, but 
made provision for additional information which in many cases had victims sharing 
information of the actual incident. 
 
Neighbourhood 
The researcher was interested in determining whether any security initiatives have been 
implemented in the neighbourhood. 
 
The researcher related this to his experience with the upper Westcliff Security initiative area 
where residents implemented this initiative due to the crime in the immediate area.14 
 
 
 
                                               
14 The researcher has 7 years experience in various intruder alarm systems, in the system design phase of projects 
and management of projects. 
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Perimeter 
The researcher was interested in determining whether any improvements were made to the 
perimeter in terms of implementing a deterrent, i.e. barb wire, or a deterrent and detection 
combination such as electrified fencing. 
 
Vehicle gate 
The vehicle gate is one area of concern to the researcher. 
 
High walls and it’s robustness in many cases supercedes the height of the vehicle gate and the 
level of robustness it can provide. 
 
Often walls are much higher than the gate an in some cases the wall is well covered with 
electrified fencing, but there is poor or non existent coverage by electrified fencing on to of the 
vehicle gate. 
 
The researcher was also interested in determining whether any improvements had been made in 
this regard. 
 
Pedestrian gate 
The researcher aimed to determine whether any improvements were implemented with regards 
to pedestrian gate(s). The researcher noted from personal experience that pedestrian gates and 
in particular wooden pedestrian gates are often used as entry points by burglars15. 
 
Inner perimeter 
The inner perimeter is the second layer of defence in the researcher’s opinion. Early detection 
is crucial before the burglar breaks a window or forces a safety gate open. The average 
response from an armed response company varies from 5 to 10 minutes and in many cases 
takes longer16. 
  
 
 
                                               
15 The researcher has experience the over last seven years in responding to burglary scenes of his colleagues and 
company employees an attempt to assist them with trauma management. 
16 The researcher found that if one has an armed response vehicle that only needs to cover an area with a radius of 
three kilometres, the average response time is between three and five minutes. 
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Immediate house area 
The immediate house is vulnerable if the perimeter and inner perimeter (garden) areas did not 
detect any intrusion through means of intruder detection infra-red beams as an example. 
 
The researcher’s objective was to establish whether any enhancements were made in terms of 
the immediate house area by means of adding security measures in terms of procedures, 
hardware or maintenance. An example would be the changing the intruder alarm codes. 
 
Another aim was to establish what was regarded as necessary in terms of improvements in 
relation to the modus operandi experienced by the victims. An example would be where the 
victim would focus on implementing burglar proofing because the perpetrator gained access 
through a window, where the first point of entry was actually over the low perimeter wall. 
Measurement occasion 
The interviews occurred during the daytime and were based on the dockets selected and 
information extracted from these dockets. 
 
There was minimal disruption due to the letter drafted by the researcher and signed by the 
SAPS as back-up support to the research. 
 
The researcher’s approach was his involvement with the Westcliff Security Initiative Forum 
which increased his chances of getting interviews and in particular within the Westcliff 
residential area.  
Measurement user 
The researcher designed the interview schedule and therefore personally familiar with the 
contents thereof.  
 
Any improvements could be done instantly and without any hesitance and as previously 
mentioned, doors and window burglar bars were added as an example. 
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The interview schedule was designed based on the practical experience the researcher gained 
through the implementation and utilisation of various residential security projects17 and their 
impact on burglary instances. 
 
The implementation of certain infra-red detection beams on the outside of the house gets 
regarded as more effective than others, because burglars used in one specific residential 
burglary case laundry from the washing line to cover the beams in order to bridge the beams. 
This indicated that the burglars knew how the beams worked and how to bridge the beams. 
 
The data collected from the interviews were the researcher’s primary data. No statistical 
analysis from other studies on the same topic was used by the researcher. 
 
The apparatus that was used to gather information was an interview schedule18, designed and 
based on the researcher’s experience responding to residential burglary scenes, project 
manages residential security measures implementation and also courses the researcher 
completed in technological security measures implementation. 
 
The process also ensured that the measuring instrument was reliable and valid in that it covered 
variables as far as possible and measured those issues that were supposed to be measured in 
terms of what the researcher perceived as crucial and affordable by the middle and upper class 
residential owner. 
Sampling 
Probability sampling techniques were used in this regard and based on the same sample as with 
the docket analysis. 
 
The units of analysis in this regard refer to the victims of residential burglary and this was used 
as the same sample throughout the victim interviews, residential security audits and descriptive 
mapping process. 
                                               
17 The researcher has the responsibility for looking after executive protection at the company he worked for at the 
time of the research and the majority of the focus within the residential domain. The researcher was also involved 
with assisting normal employees within the same organisation with audits, recommendations and project planning 
and implementation. 
18 The technical requirements for the interview schedule were completed with the assistance of Prof. Anthony 
Minnaar. 
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Design 
Both a qualitative and quantitative research design was used in this regard with semi-structured 
and in-depth interviews and where open-ended question were categorized and grouped 
according to visible themes. Short questions with multiple choices were also coded for 
statistical purposes. (Welman & Kruger 1999:  196) 
 
The research was in essence explorative of nature, where the researcher aimed to identify the 
impact of residential security measures (the presence and durability of these independent 
variables) on the dependant variable, i.e. incidence of residential burglary. 
 
To formulate questions on whether the possible residential security measures were present and 
if so, how were they bridged or penetrated and also to generate hypotheses for further 
investigation.  An example would be how electrified fencing was bridged by the perpetrators 
and if the height of the electrified fencing strands had a correlation with the bridging of the 
perimeter. 
 
Although the research approach in this regard is qualitative, the research topic is not totally 
unfamiliar and therefore the researcher could formulate semi-structured interviews and 
formulate questions within the semi-structured interviews (Welman & Kruger, 1996:  196) 
 
In the interviews the researcher was cautious not to use any leading questions in the semi-
structured interviews. 
 
The researcher’s objective was to determine what measures were in place at the time of the 
burglaries and not to lead the interviewees into giving their interpretation of what measures 
should have been in place and what measures were effective. 
 
Where the victims gave more or additional information on what they believed was the gap in 
their security systems that increased the possibility of perpetrators entering their properties, 
these responses were also recorded.  
 
In this manner one would be able to determine in some instances what other third variables 
were also present at the time of the incident for example rainy weather might contribute to 
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false alarms, which in turn could cause a possible backlog with the computer systems in armed 
response company control rooms. As a result having more than expected alarm activations 
would contribute towards adding more responses to an armed response vehicle. 
Statistical techniques 
The statistical techniques were chosen in relation to the measurement instrument and research 
design. 
 
The phenomenon under investigation is what security measures were in place at the time of the 
incident. 
 
The coding process was based on the semi-structured interview schedule where coding could 
be done prior to the analysis and additional information and open-ended questions were 
categorized into themes and frequencies and coded accordingly. 
 
Rossouw defines measurement as” the assignment of numbers or numerals, according to fixed 
rules, to persons or objects in order to reflect differences between them in the attribute or 
characteristic of interest” (Rossouw, 2003: 118). It is therefore of importance to describe the 
various variables and determine their relationship through comparison (Rossouw, 2003: 118) 
 
The researcher used the coding schedules (Refer to Annexure 6: Coding schedule on victim 
interviews to view the schedule used to code responses from residential burglary victims) in 
the various measurement instruments to identify the various variables, describing them and 
explaining the relationship(s) between them. 
 
The rater reliability increased due to the fact that the researcher himself captured and rated his 
information. 
 
The reliability of the statistical techniques was tested by a qualified statistician.  
 
The researcher compiled the data and manipulated it through various statistical techniques, 
which were discussed beforehand with a qualified statistician in order to ensure the correct 
model would be used with the particular data. 
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The coding schedule for example, had to be changed by removing the zero and the questions 
had to be shortened to be adapted to the statistical package SPSS. 
 
An example is where the researcher asked: 
 
“Since the incident, what has been enhanced within the immediate house area in terms of 
security measures at the immediate house area?” which was shortened to: 
 
“Additions to immediate house after incident” 
 
These changes were only made to ensure the questions would be accepted by the statistical 
package used. 
 
In the majority of the cases the researcher made use of the Excel software package to do his 
statistical analysis. 
 
In qualitative research, Rossouw (2003: 119) describes measurement as” collecting data and 
reflecting the quality and nature of the phenomenon in a form of description”. 
 
The researcher collected data to determine whether the independent variable, residential 
security measures, have a relationship (an impact) on the incidence of residential burglary - the 
dependant variable. 
 
Nominal measurement is applicable in this study where the various residential security 
measures are grouped according to their various categories. 
 
The reliability of the measurement instrument is achieved when the same result occurs when 
the same respondent is approached again and if it is measuring what it is supposed to measure 
(Rossouw, 2003: 123). 
 
Follow-up research in this regard will indicate the reliability of the victim interview schedule. 
One should consider the possibility of modus operandi changes to the new technology in 
residential security measures. 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  46 
 
Nominal measurement is applicable to the data obtained in that the incidence of burglary is 
measured in terms of what type of security measures were in place or absent at the time of the 
incident. 
 
The following questions were not applicable to the coding schedule: 
· Questions 24 – 28 (No electronic keypads connected to the vehicle gate automation 
systems); 
· Question 34 (Nobody had electronic keypads connected to their vehicle gate 
automation systems and therefore the backup battery supply in case of power failures 
and enabling the keypads still to activate the gate automation system, do not  have 
relevance for this study); 
· Question 41 - 43 (The topic has already been discussed in Question 39); 
· Question 45 and 46 (Nobody had this facility on their electrical striker lock facilities); 
· Question 49 – 53 (Nobody had this facility on their electrical striker lock facilities); 
· Question 59 (This have been covered in question 58, because nobody bypassed or 
isolated their exterior infra-red detection beams); and 
· Question 88 (This has been discussed in question 87 where it was indicated that nobody 
bypassed or isolated any zones on their intruder alarm systems). 
Research problems 
The following chart quantifies the various reactions from the victim’s scheduling interviews: 
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Pie Chart 2:  Quantifying victim responses to the interview scheduling process 
 
Residential security audit 
Measurement instrument 
The main focus of the residential security audit was to establish how the security measures, 
which were present at the time of the residential burglary, were implemented. 
 
The nature of the measurement was a residential security audit which normally followed 
immediately after the victim interviews. 
 
There were instances where the researcher could only do the victim interview and not the 
security audit because the victim already relocated to another house. (Please refer to chart 3:  
Interview locations) 
 
Victim interviews - Victim responses to scheduling interviews 
10% 
13% 
26% 
8% 
23% 
3% 
4% 
1% 
12% 
Not answering phone call 
Relocated 
Took part in the interview 
Do not want an interview 
Phone number does not exist 
Person does not exist with
phone number
Not recalling the incident 
Researcher lost contact details 
Wasn't called again after first 
attempt 
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Pie Chart 3: Interview locations 
 
Only fifty percent (ten out of the twenty interviews) of victim interviews where residential 
audits were also completed. 
 
The apparatus was a schedule which provided guidance to the researcher in research areas to be 
covered during the residential audit, but still gave the researcher the ability to make notes on 
any additional observations and comments made by the victims. (Please refer to Annexure 7: 
Victim residential security audit schedule)  
 
Here is an example where the researcher did an audit on the perimeter using the residential 
audit schedule: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Victim responses - Quantifying victim interview locations  
15% 
25% 
50% 
5% 5% 
Telephone Interview 
At workplace interview 
At home interview 
At researcher 
Interview at new house 
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PERIMETER 
Walls  
[I will make notes on the following:] 
Height: 
Drain areas: 
Deterrence: 
…………………………………………………………………………………............ 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Electrified fencing 
[I will need to make notes on the following:] 
· Joule capacity: 
· Earth strands earthing method: 
· Connection to the RF Radio on dedicated zone: 
· Connection to a siren: 
· Arming and disarming method: 
· Energiser location: 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
The questionnaire covered the following aspects: 
· Summary of the project; 
· Confidentiality statement; 
· Definitions; 
· Additional information; and 
· Perimeter: 
o Walls; 
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o Electrified fencing; 
o Vehicle gate; 
o Vehicle gate motor; 
o CCTV; 
o Lights; 
o Palisade; 
o Pedestrian perimeter gate; and 
o Electronic keypad to the vehicle gate motor and/or the pedestrian gate 
magnetic/striker lock. 
· Inner perimeter (garden area): 
o Infrared beams; and 
o Floodlights. 
· Immediate house area: 
o Door locks; 
o Safety gates; 
o Windows; and 
o Intruder alarm system. 
Measurement Occasion 
The residential security audits were completed immediately after the victim interviews. 
 
The researcher normally started inside the house where the victim interview was completed 
and then moved to the garden and perimeter areas. 
 
Furthermore, the residential security audits with the victim interviews were normally 
completed after hours when the victims were at home. Alternatively, the audits and interviews 
were done early mornings or on weekends in cases where the victims already relocated. 
 
The interviews at victim work places constituted to no residential security audit afterwards. 
 
In instances where the victim had already relocated and the residential security audit was not 
applicable anymore, the researcher still made use of the opportunity to get the victim to go 
through the process again and to comment on the scheduled areas. Here an example would be 
where the victim commented on the height of their perimeter. 
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This was also applicable where victims were interviewed at their work place. (Refer to pie 
chart 3: Interview locations where twenty-five percent of the victim interviews were completed 
at the victim’s workplace) 
Measurement User 
The researcher designed the audit schedule personally and was familiar with the contents, as 
well as with the victim interviews mentioned earlier. 
 
Any additional information observed, and not fitted into any additional provisional categories, 
was incorporated to the residential security audit schedule. 
 
The example of burglar proofing in front of windows (as discussed previously in the victim 
interview section of this chapter.) 
Sampling 
The same sample applied as with the victim interviews. 
Design 
Qualitative research design was used in this regard with a semi-structured residential security 
audit schedule where themes were categorized and grouped according to observation notes. 
 
These notes were then used to supplement the victim interview notes and verify whether there 
were any changes. An example would be where the victim reported that they had a swing gate 
system and with the audit it became apparent that it was actually a sliding vehicle gate. 
 
Another objective was to determine how security measures were implemented (and only those 
that were in place at the time of the residential burglary). Observation notes were then 
summarised according to their categories/themes in the report to provide the reader with an 
overall view of the various categories. 
 
The summarisation of the audit notes can not be generalised but were used to supplement the 
findings from the victim interviews. 
 
The researcher also made notes on the areas of intrusion.  
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This approach is qualitative with an explorative. 
Research problems 
The researcher was able to undertake ten residential security audits and therefore used this data 
only as supplementary to the victim interview responses. 
 
Residential audits were not conducted where the victim interview was done: 
· At the victim’s new house; 
· At the victim’s work place; and 
· Through a telephone interview. 
 
Please refer to pie chart 3 to note the interview locations and methods and to read this in 
context with the research problems experienced. 
 
The researcher also had to have a copy of his identification document, Technikon SA student 
card, research approval letter from Parkview police and letter of approval from the South 
African Police Service with reassure the respondents concerning the validation of the research 
project and the positive identification of the researcher and his association with the university. 
 
In some instances the researcher also had to mention his involvement with the Westcliff 
Security Forum in the Upper Westcliff area especially where victims resided within the 
Westcliff area. 
 
Some of the victims also confirmed the researcher’s involvement with the Westcliff security 
forum in this regard. Westcliff is one of the population areas being investigated. 
 
Descriptive mapping 
Descriptive mapping focused on the suburb and geography in relation to the victim’s property. 
 
A distance matrix was one of the methods used by the researcher and similar to the methods 
used by Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta (2004:  307) where the distance from shops, open fields, 
river etc were measured and coded.  
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The researcher divided the residential areas into a grid system which will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
 
The researcher aimed to determine if there were any other variables, other than the security 
measures that might have had a relationship with the incidence of residential burglary. 
 
The location of the victim’s house in relation to the rest of the neighbourhood was variables 
under investigation in this phase of the research project. 
Measurement occasion 
The descriptive mapping exercise was done throughout the process of the victim interviews. 
 
The researcher though had to advise the Parkview Police Commander again that such a 
mapping exercise was underway to ensure that both the police and the community were aware 
of it and if the community were to report this to the police directly or through their community 
policing forums. 
Measurement user 
The researcher personally did the survey to ensure that there was consistency in taking field 
notes. 
 
The researcher was also familiar with the areas19 of the mapping exercise and therefore could 
include as much as possible field note information on potential variables. 
Sampling 
The nature of the measurement was a physical visit to every victim’s property as per the 
sample drawn20. 
The sample drawn was also compared with the sample of victim interviews. 
 
The initial sample drawn was from all the residential burglaries between 1 January 2001 till 31 
December 2002 was used. 
                                               
19 The researcher is involved with the operational management and initiated the Westcliff Community Security 
Forum and also has undertaken many security audits in the Parkhurst area and adjacent suburbs. 
20 Refer to the table on page 20: All burglary cases reported within Parkhurst and Westcliff residential areas 
between 2 January 2001 and 31 December 2002.  
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Design 
A qualitative research design was used in this regard by taking field notes and where this was 
noted clustered into themes and categorized and grouped according to these field notes. 
 
The researcher took field notes with each property and also prepared a matrix of the area 
without indicating any street names or street numbers. This matrix was designed with the 
intention of minimising the possibility of victim’s names or place of residence being revealed 
exposed. This was done by drawing up a matrix as per the following illustration: 
Drawing 1:  Matrix example to illustrate the plotting of victim locations in relation to 
                        various area variables and victim descriptions 
 
 
 
The example of a matrix used above illustrates the victim location with a circle and with a 
reference number (not the victim’s physical address number), the victim’s description (in this 
case a green circle illustrating that the victim was burgled twice), main access roads into the 
suburb (indicated with a red line), victims location in relation to dead-end roads (indicated with 
a green line) and the neighbourhood security barriers implemented on the mentioned dead-end 
roads (in this example a red information sign indicating an occupied property). 
 
The researcher then removed the roads and clustered the victim locations into a grid reference 
system and started grouping the various grids into: 
· Quantifying burglaries committed at victims place of residence within a grid ; 
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· Total burglaries committed within a grid; 
· Grid location in relation to community entertainment places, business property and 
open unoccupied property; 
· Quantifying victim location in relation to other victims within a grid; 
· Grid location in relation to main access roads; 
· Grid location in terms of dead-end roads; 
· Dead-end road descriptions within grids with dead-end roads ; and 
· Quantifying victim location in relation with street location within a grid 
Drawing 2: Matrix example illustrating grouping the target areas into smaller grids to  
                        note variables in relation to victim locations 
 
 
Each grid focussed in overlapping residential blocks to ensure consistency of victim location in relation 
to neighbours directly opposite across a residential street. 
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Drawing 3: Matrix example illustrating grouping the target areas into smaller grids to  
                        note variables in relation to victim locations with intention to also include  
                        the immediate area across the road from the victim’s position  
 
 
The researcher also formulated statements from his field notes in the findings and 
recommendations of the report. 
 
The researcher also designed a matrix without naming streets or indicating street numbers to 
establish whether the location of a property, in relation to the rest of the suburb, has a 
relationship with the incidence of residential burglary. 
 
The researcher also used a quantitative approach where the field notes clustered in their 
themes, coded and statistically analysed. 
Statistical techniques 
As with both the victim interviews and the residential security audits, the researcher had to 
ensure that the selected statistical techniques should be in line with the measurement 
instrument, field notes and the matrix. The researcher therefore had to ensure that the field 
notes were categorized into themes first and only thereafter coded. 
 
Porkess (2004: 48) refers to coding as “data which have been translated from the form in which 
they were collected to the one that is more convenient for analysis”. 
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The numbers in a coding schedule are used for analysis and therefore the researcher 
categorised the data and grouped it according to the various variables/categories. 
 
The researcher collected, captured and coded the data himself to ensure that the rater reliability 
ensured. This was also detected when victims properties were plotted and found that property 
numbers not recorded (in some cases where the victim stayed in a corner property) or the 
property number was recorded wrong (cases where the property number does not exit). 
 
The statistical techniques were validated by a qualified statistician and thereby this also 
increasing the reliability of the statistical techniques used. 
 
The researcher made use of both areas in terms of quantifying results. The Parkhurst area being 
divided into fifty-five grids and the Westcliff area into seventeen grids. 
 
The latter could therefore not be compared with the Parkhurst area in terms of quantity of grids 
and therefore will not be statistically acceptable largely due to the big difference in grid 
volumes (fifty-five of Parkhurst straight comparison between the two areas versus the 
seventeen of Westcliff). 
 
The size of properties in Westcliff is also on average bigger than the properties in Parkhurst. 
Research problems 
Research problems experienced in the descriptive mapping can be used as a guideline for any 
future research, the South African Police Service and private security companies. 
 
The chart below quantifies addresses recorded on the descriptive maps. 
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Pie Chart 4: Addresses recorded on maps 
 
 
Eighty-four percent of the addresses according to the docket sample drawn, were accurately 
recorded in terms of street numbers. 
 
The rest of the street numbers (twelve percent) could not be found due to the recorded street 
number not existing or street names being wrongly recorded (two percent) or  addresses being 
recorded as two streets or a combination of a street and a road where the victims resided on 
corner properties. 
CONCLUSION 
The chapter covered all the methods used to collect data. The methods were: 
· Docket analysis; 
· Victim interviews; 
· Residential security audits; and 
· Descriptive mapping. 
 
The main objective of docket analysis was collecting contact details of the residential burglary 
victims. The process allowed also collecting the following information: 
· Time frame for burglaries measured in days; 
· Week days and weekends on burglary occurrences; 
· Day of week for burglary occurrence; 
· Method of access into immediate house area; and 
· Victims with intruder alarm systems.  
Descriptive mapping results - address recording accuracy 
12% 
2%
2% 
84% 
Not found 
Not within suburb boundary 
Streets wrongly recorded 
Accurate results 
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There were 255 residential burglary cases reported between January 2001 and December 2002. 
Seventy (72) dockets were then drawn as a sample. 
 
The main objective of the victim interviews was to determine: 
· What residential security measures were in place at the time of the residential burglary 
incident; 
· How was the security measures in place, managed and maintained prior to the 
residential burglary incident; and 
· What improvements were made to the existing residential security measures after the 
residential burglary incident. 
 
A total of 20 interviews were completed and not all done at the victim’s homes where the 
residential burglary incident occurred. This was due to work pressure and interview could only 
be conducted at the victim’s workplace or where the victim already relocated to a new house. 
Supplementary information was provided through the residential security audits. This was only 
applicable where victims were interviewed at their residential environments and the residence 
was still the same property where the residential burglary has taken place. 
 
A total of 255 Cases were plotted using the descriptive mapping method. This method allowed 
for the researcher to collect data in order to draw conclusions on victim residential location in 
relation to: 
· Quantifying burglaries committed at victims place of residence within a grid ; 
· Total burglaries committed within a grid; 
· Grid location in relation to community entertainment places, business property and 
open unoccupied property; 
· Quantifying victim location in relation to other victims within a grid; 
· Grid location in relation to main access roads; 
· Grid location in terms of dead-end roads; 
· Dead-end road descriptions within grids with dead-end roads ; and 
· Quantifying victim location in relation with street location within a grid 
The process collecting data had some challenges due to house numbers not recorded correctly. 
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The data collection also had challenges in describing security concepts to the victims in order 
for the victims to give accurate and true responses in the victim interviews. The various 
concepts in residential security measures will also allow for recording data correctly, categorise 
the data properly and provide findings and recommendations accurately benefiting all and not 
only those with the necessary technical knowledge. 
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Chapter 4 
DEFINING CONCEPTS, TERMINOLOGY  
AND TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter aims, firstly to define some of the terminology (specific to the area of research) 
used in this study; and secondly to describe in detail some technical aspects and features of 
physical residential security measures. This is done in order to formalise it into content for the 
provision of a basic understanding to the novice without sacrificing any vital technical 
description and meaning of any of the mentioned devices. This background information is of 
importance when it comes to the analysis of the research information provided by the security 
audits and interviews for each of a variety of security measures (technical equipment, strategies 
and processes), and therefore provides the conceptual framework for understanding the 
research context (residential security measures at residences of victims of burglary). 
 
Simplifying the concepts will provide clear and understandable findings and results which can 
contribute towards accurate interpretation and implementation. Moreover, the terminology 
used and defined here has been adapted from the researcher’s own experience with security 
installers and of the terminology they use when referring to various hardware and 
methods/measures. 
 
An example would be earth loops on electrified fencing. This device is discussed later in this 
chapter by means of drawings and definitions simplifying its purpose and method of operation 
to the novice reader. Furthermore, in this example non-related terminology is also defined even 
where there is no specific physical technical motions involved which will require the same 
principle as mentioned with earth loops. 
DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY USED 
In defining the parameters and research framework reference was made to the following broad 
terms and definitions. These also further conceptualise technical descriptions of processes, 
measures and equipment used in this specialised industry. 
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Burglary 
Burglary (sometimes (incorrectly) known as housebreaking21) is the breaking into and entering 
of a residential property, where there is no personal threat or physical harm involved to the 
occupants and the occupants were not present at the time of the breaking and entering or when 
the perpetrators exit (Myerson, 1995: 17) 
 
The following categories of burglaries are identified: 
· Burglary of residential premises; and 
· Burglary of business premises22. 
 
Community Policing Forums (CPFs)  
At the time of the research, and in the initial stages of 2003, SCF was the known to the 
researcher. This was then changed and the common term now used is Sector Crime Forum 
(SCF). 
 
A forum, chosen by the community, will be representing the community in a defined sector. 
The sector forum members meet with a designated sector commander, at the Station Crime 
Forum (SCF) and exchange information on: 
· Action plans to manage crime; 
· Initiating community initiatives to prevent crime; 
· Creating cooperation between police and community; and 
· Accepting responsibility and issue information how to safe guard one self (Sector 
Crime Policing:  2007). 
 
Immediate house area 
For the purposes of this study, the immediate house area refers to the immediate vicinity of the 
house building and outside buildings. 
 
Outer perimeter 
Outer perimeter in this study refers to the most outer boundary of a property, usually 
demarcated by means of some sort of barrier, e.g. fence, steel palisade or brick wall etc. This 
                                               
21 Housebreaking is in fact the literal translation from the Afrikaans term ‘huisbraak’. 
22 Parkhurst and Westcliff do have both properties where the properties are converted from residential use to 
business use. 
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area is normally adjacent to neighbours’ properties/residences, public walkways, streets/roads 
or other open properties or metro council areas, e.g. public parks. 
 
The different perimeter types are discussed below in the technical concepts section. 
 
Inner perimeter 
The inner perimeter in this study refers to the area between the outer perimeter and the 
immediate house building, external buildings in the garden and the vehicle garage. 
 
The inner perimeter consists in the majority of the cases of a garden, and/or paved areas and 
garden features. Garden features can include a swimming pool, tennis court etc. 
 
Intruder 
A person who intrudes, breaches the security of a residence, and irregularly (illegally) enters a 
property. An intruder can also be a burglar, i.e. a person with intent to break and enter and steal 
household goods (Pollard & Liebeck, 1994: 420). 
 
Neighbourhood watch 
A neighbourhood watch is a security concept where members of a community establish a 
security forum and implement security initiatives such as a SMS alert network, neighbourhood 
patrols, CCTV in street areas, boomed-off areas, etc. 
 
A neighbourhood watch can be either where the community conduct the patrols themselves in 
the public spaces within a pre-defined residential boundary or where the community contract a 
private security provider to do visible patrols in the public spaces either on foot, with a vehicle 
or on bicycles. 
 
The more defined explanation of neighbourhood is mentioned above within the CPF 
description. 
 
Physical obstructions 
Physical obstructions are defined as installations (e.g. perimeter fencing or other barriers) used 
clearly and unambiguously to seal off or provide protection for a particular area or structure 
(Naudè & Stevens, 1988: 188). 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  64 
 
Robbery 
When property of a person is taken through either force or intimidation, it is regarded as 
robbery of that person. (Robbery defined:  2007) 
 
Symbolic (Psychological) obstructions 
Such obstructions are not necessarily security barriers per se but seal off an area while not 
actually designed to restrict unauthorised entry, e.g. a flower bed, low wall, etc. (Naudè & 
Stevens, 1988: 189). 
 
SAPS 
South African Police Service 
 
SAPS 612(n) Form 
Official application form for requesting access to records and information of the South African 
Police Service, e.g. contents of dockets.   
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS FOR SECURITY HARDWARE 
The technical concepts that will be discussed below are the following: 
· Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) systems;  
· Perimeters;  
· Electrified fencing; 
· Motorised vehicle gates; 
· Electronic keypads; 
· Pedestrian gates and locking mechanisms; 
· Power supply units; 
· Infrared beams; 
· Security floodlights; 
· Door keys and locks;  
· Windows; and 
· Intruder alarm systems and monitoring devices. 
 
Close circuit television systems (CCTV) 
CCTV is an integrated camera system which can provide each of the following or a 
combination of them: 
· Live view footage; 
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· History on footage; 
· Voice with movement footage; 
· Black-and-white footage and view; or 
· Colour footage and view. 
 
The following will be discussed to put the reader into perspective of what CCTV can provide 
and also the benefits in having this security system installed on or at a residential property or 
house: 
· CCTV camera; 
· CCTV recorder; and 
· CCTV monitor. 
CCTV camera 
This abbreviation refers to a closed circuit camera and is the device on the one side of the 
entire CCTV system. This is the device which converts the movement or actions that it views 
to either analogue or digital format and transmits these images back to the CCTV video 
recorder via cabling or micro wave signal. 
CCTV recorder 
This is the abbreviation for a closed circuit television video recorder that records footage in 
various formats. Digital format is one of the formats currently used. 
CCTV monitor 
This abbreviation refers to the closed circuit television monitor screen which enables the 
homeowner to view the real time (at the moment) images sent by the camera to the recorder or 
to view recorded footage via a television monitor at a later stage (after the fact). 
 
Perimeter types 
In this study perimeter fencing refers to the physical barriers which encircle a property 
boundary. The following definitions for different possible perimeter barriers were used in this 
study. 
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Steel palisade 
This is a fence made up of lengths of angle iron/steel and comes in various lengths and heights. 
The lengths of steel can be differentiated from each other on the top end of the fence in 
different forms, i.e. forked or single spike.  
Picture 1:  Example of a steel palisade fence partition 
 
Wooden balustrades 
These are fences made from lengths of cut wood and not steel. The fence varies in size and was 
very popular before the 1980s.  
Picture 2:  Example of a wooden balustrade partition 
 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  67 
 
Pre-cast cement slab walling 
This is a perimeter fence or barrier consisting of vertical cement support pillars and guides and 
made mainly from cement, usually pre-cast. The cement slabs are inserted down the vertical 
cement guides. The cement slabs fill the vertical cement pillars from top to bottom. Such pre-
cast cement walls can vary in size and height.  
Picture 3:  Example of a pre-cast cement slab walling  
 
Diamond mesh wire fence 
This type of fence consists of either wooden, metal or cement uprights supporting a wired 
mesh fence structure.  
Picture 4:  Example of a diamond mesh wire fence partition 
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Electrified fencing 
Electrified fencing was initially used on game farms to prevent wild game from moving from one area 
to another. This type of barrier fencing was only later (the late 1980s) used for domestic and 
commercial purposes. Strands of electrified wire are usually erected on top of other types of fencing 
barriers (i.e. can be on top of a brick wall or cement barricade or as the top extension of a steel palisade 
of mesh fence). Electrified fencing and the integration thereof can be seen from the following drawing.  
Drawing 4:  Basic drawing of an electrified fence and primary devices 
 
The components and terminology of an electrified fence system are as follows: 
Fence energiser 
This is a device which generates electrical current through a fence infrastructure specifically 
designed to transfer the current from the fence energiser, through the connected wires and back 
to the fence energiser. Below is a picture example of electrified fencing fence energiser. 
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Picture 5:  Example of an electrified fencing fence energiser 
 
The electrified fencing infrastructure 
This usually comprises of vertical support pillars (also referred to as uprights), fixed to the 
perimeter infrastructure. The uprights can vary from five strands to more and it depends on the 
height above the perimeter infrastructure that needs to be safeguarded or if it needs to be used 
as the perimeter barrier itself. This usually comprises of vertical support pillars (also referred to 
as uprights), fixed to the perimeter infrastructure. The uprights can vary from five strands to 
more and it depends on the height above the perimeter infrastructure that needs to be 
safeguarded or if it needs to be used as the perimeter barrier itself. Below is an example of 
electrified fencing fence uprights on an existing perimeter. 
Picture 6:  Example of electrified fencing fence uprights on an existing perimeter 
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The example below of an electrified fencing as the perimeter barrier shows a different use from 
the usual way it is used on top of an existing fence/wall.  
Picture 7:  Example of electrified fencing as the perimeter 
 
Arming and disarming the fence 
This can be done through an input device. A typical input device would be a key switch where 
a key gets inserted into a slot and either turns the fence energiser on and off. 
Output device 
An alarm violation condition, i.e. activation or breach of the system occurs, can be made 
known to the homeowner through an output device. This output device can be a siren, radio 
transmitter, a SMS reporting device (also referred to as a SMS communicator) or a remote 
keypad, etc. 
Fence earthing method 
The following two drawings are basic illustrations of how the electrical current is transmitted 
through the fence and back to the electrical fence energiser (Drawing 5) and also how the fence 
would go into an alarm violation condition (Drawing 6).  
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  71 
 
Drawing 5:  Drawing illustrating normal operation of an electrified fencing fence  
                     energiser  
 
Drawing 6:  Drawing illustrating alarm violation condition with an electrified fencing  
                     fence energiser  
 
When the current goes from the Life In (LI) to Life Out (LO) connection without any earthing 
interference, we refer to normal fence operation (refer to Drawing 5).  
 
When the current gets interfered by an earth connection, then we refer to this situation as an 
electrified fencing alarm violation condition (refer to Drawing 6). 
 
For example, if a person touches an electrified fence strand while standing on the ground or 
connected, for instance, via a ladder, the current makes a deviation through the person and is 
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‘earthed’ to the ground. This in effect ‘diverts’ or ‘breaks’ the current (normal continuous 
current flow) and this activates an alarm signal (in the various ways described above). 
 
The earth link can be either an earth spike connected to the electrified fencing strands, earth 
loops between the life wires, palisade fencing or any metal device on the perimeter touching 
the electrified fencing wire strands (see Picture 8)  
Picture 8:   Example of electrified fencing touching palisade fencing resulting in an alarm  
                   violation condition 
 
The current needs to be drained through the mentioned earth links to ensure that the energiser 
will go into an alarm violation condition. 
 
When a person touches the fence and causes life drainage for two to five seconds, which will 
then restrict the electrical current to complete the fence wire circuit from the energiser and 
back to the energiser resulting in an alarm violation condition. 
 
The same theory applies when the live wires of the fence are touching the earth wire also for  
two to three seconds which will have the same effect as a human acting as an earth drainage.  
 
Motorised vehicle perimeter gates 
A motorised vehicle gate is a motor vehicle gate that has been automated. The device that 
automates the vehicle gate is called a vehicle gate motor. (See Picture 9) 
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Picture 9:  Example of a vehicle gate motor  
 
The vehicle gate motor can be either alternative current (AC) driven which means that it is 
only connected to a 220 volt power source (normal electricity power supply to a house) or it 
can also be direct current driven which means it is also connected to an uninterrupted power 
supply (hereafter referred to as UPS). 
  
This UPS will provide the vehicle gate motor with power to open and close in the absence of 
the alternative current power supply (i.e. when there is a electrical power failure). 
 
Electronic keypads 
An electronic keypad is a device with the ability to activate another electronic device. An 
example would be where the electronic keypad would either open or close the vehicle gate by 
activating the vehicle gate motor. Another example would be where the electronic keypad 
would arm or disarm the intruder alarm system or enable or disable the electrified fencing 
energiser. (See Picture 10 as an example of a typical electronic keypad used to activate a 
vehicle gate motor to open or close.)  
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Picture 10:  Example of an electronic keypad 
 
 
Electronic keypads are differentiated from each other through: 
· Compatibility with other devices; 
· User code capacity; and 
· Utilities. 
Compatibility with other devices 
The keypad might be compatible only with certain manufacturing brand names and devices or 
compatible with all manufacturing names but only certain devices. 
 
An example would be that an electronic keypad is compatible with all makes of vehicle gate 
motors, but not compatible with certain intruder alarm systems. 
User code capacity 
The electronic keypad will have the ability to store one, two, three or more user codes. These 
user codes would either have the ability to: 
· Enabling or switching a device on; 
· Disabling or switching a device off; or 
· Change the master settings. 
 
One of the user codes will be programmed as the “master code” and will have the ability to 
make hardware changes, changing other user codes etc. 
Utilities 
Electronic keypads have various utilities where they have: 
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· Inputs; 
· Outputs; and 
· Combination of the above-mentioned. 
 
A typical example of an input would be a tamper switch which will ensure that the keypad 
shuts down totally (and automatically) if an intruder tries to remove it from the wall in order to 
manipulate its functions to open the vehicle gate. 
 
An output would be where user code number one will only have the ability to close the vehicle 
gate and user code number two would be able to open and close the gate and user code number 
three would have the ability to change user codes one and two and their utilities. 
 
Pedestrian gates and locking mechanisms 
A pedestrian gate can be the entry point for persons on foot (usually a smaller gate than a gate 
for vehicle entry) on the outer perimeter of the property into the property of the homeowner. 
The pedestrian gate might be a stand alone (separate) gate or be integrated into the vehicular 
gate. (See pictures 11 and 12 to note the difference in a stand alone and an integrated gate.) 
Picture 11:  Example of stand alone pedestrian gate 
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Picture 12:  Example of an integrated pedestrian gate  
 
The locking mechanism on such a pedestrian gate can either be a combination of the following: 
· Manual lock; 
· Electronic magnetic lock; 
· Electrical striker lock; or 
· No lock. 
(Please see pictures 13 to 15 to view the differences these different locking mechanisms.)  
Picture 13:  Example of a manual lock  
 
Picture 14:  Example of an electronic magnetic lock 
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Picture 15:  Example of an electrical striker lock 
 
 
The pedestrian gate can also be equipped with a gate closer which will close the gate 
automatically after entry. 
(Please refer to picture 16 to view an example of a gate closer) 
Picture 16:  Example of a gate closer 
 
Power supply units (PSUs) 
Power supply units (hereafter referred to as PSUs) to devices in the domestic environment can 
either be powered only by alternative current (AC) or direct current (DC) or have a 
combination of the two sources. 
 
 If only AC is used will mean that the power supply unit will be non-functional since in the 
case of a general power failure the device it provides power to will be disabled unless the 
device has an alternative back-up power supply like a battery (DC power). 
 
The following drawing illustrates the integration of a PSU and an intruder alarm system with 
infrared beams.  
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Drawing 7:  Basic drawing illustrating PSU integration with an intruder alarm and infra- 
                     red beams system 
 
Infrared beams 
In this study infrared beams refer to passive or transmitted/received beams in the garden or on 
the external wall of the immediate house or external building.  
 
The mentioned beams can both transmit and receive a beam or an exterior infrared passive 
detector. 
 
The following drawing illustrates the differences between a transmit-receive infrared beam and 
an exterior passive infrared detector (hereafter referred to as exterior passives), and the 
integration with the intruder alarm system and PSUs.  
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Drawing 8:  Basic drawing illustrating the differences between a transmit-receive    
                     external beam and a passive infra-red detector 
 
 
 
 
 
The transmit and receive infrared beam structure would be activated if an object like a human 
being passes through both upper and lower beams.23 
 
Security floodlights 
Security floodlights in this research refer to external lights fixed to the immediate house area 
and providing light within the garden or inner perimeter areas. Security floodlights can also be 
fixed on the main vehicle gate area providing illumination to the immediate pavement or the 
insecure side of the outer perimeter. 
                                               
23 Transmit and receive beams can have more than just an upper an lower beam and can be sensitised more by the 
addition of more beams to ensure that only human beings are detected and animals like big birds or dogs are 
excluded, which are a problem and cause false alarms with older generation beams. 
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These floodlights can be activated by: 
· Manual switch; 
· Day/night photo sensor; 
· Relay switch supplied by another electronic device; or 
· Movement infra-red passive detectors. 
Manual switch 
The manual switch is the normal “light switch” in the house area that we are all familiar with. 
Day/night photo sensor 
This is a device which will automatically activate or switch the floodlights on or off depending 
on the light intensity. 
 
The floodlights will switch on when it is overcast weather or at sunset when it starts to get 
darker. This is also a useful mechanism which will indicate to the homeowner when the 
homeowner arrives home that there has been a power failure. This is when the homeowner 
should call their armed response company to escort them into the property in case the power 
has been tampered with by possible burglars.  
Relay switch supplied by another electronic device 
The floodlights can also be activated by the intruder alarm system. This can be done by 
connecting certain floodlights in the inner perimeter area to the intruder alarm and will switch 
on when the intruder alarm is either armed, disarmed or if there was an intruder alarm violation 
signal condition. 
Passive infrared motion detector 
Floodlights can also be connected to a passive infrared motion detector which will activate 
certain lights when movement is detected (see Picture 17). 
 
This is also regarded as an energy cost saving device, i.e. to only have floodlights on when 
they need to be. However, in security measure terms this is in fact the wrong approach since 
floodlights should be on at all times (when light is poor at night time) in order to ensure early 
detection and deterrence. 
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Picture 17: Example of a passive infrared motion detector integrated into a security  
                        flood light 
 
Door keys and locks 
Door keys and locks refer to doors leading to the external areas (garden, inner perimeter, outer 
perimeter or garage area). Door locks are differentiated from each other by how many levers 
there are inside the lock or the kind of key that opens it. 
 
The common locks used in the residential environment are the “CD – Series”, “Y – Series”, “D 
– Series”, “Flat stamped Yale lock type or cylinder locks” and “mortise locks”.24 
 
The management of the keys includes if the keys were left in the door locks, if there was a 
backup locking facility, kind of door lock and if locks were changed after the incident was 
areas of exploration in this research project. 
 
Windows 
When windows are referred to in this research the following security features within the 
immediate window area are being included, namely: 
· Burglar proofing; 
· Window latch lever; and 
· Type of glass. 
Burglar proofing 
Burglar proofing can be one of the following or different combinations:  
· Outside a window fixed to the wall; 
                                               
24 In this study the researcher focussed more on determining the lock “lever” status being either a normal two 
lever or four lever lock, whether there were any “night latch locks” - better known as the Yale or Union latch 
locks - and whether the key cylinder was a traditional “C, D, Y or CD – Series” or the more popular and new-age 
flat stamped keys or, as generally referred to, mortise locks.  
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· Integrated within a window frame; or 
· Fixed on the inside of the window frame or fixed to the inside of a wall and window sill 
area. 
Pictures 18 to 20 show different types burglar proofing. 
Picture 18:  Example of burglar proofing on the outside of the window 
 
Picture 19:  Example of burglar proofing integrated with the window frame 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  83 
 
Picture 20:  Example of burglar proofing on the secure (inside) side of the window frame 
 
Window latch lever 
The window latch lever refers to the device which will secure the window in the closing 
position. The latch lever, as its name indicates, secures the window from the outside area, but 
not from the inside since it can be opened from the inside or the secure side of the window 
without major difficulty. This will also be the case if the window is broken from the outside 
and the latch opened merely by putting a hand through the broken window and lifting the latch. 
 
Window latch levers can be made of bronze, cast iron or plastic (the latter common with the 
latest window frame designs). 
 
Type of glass 
The glass in a window can be fitted with protective film or be just plain glass. The latter is the 
more traditional and common form of glass used in windows. However, window safety film is 
becoming a popular item in new housing developments. 
 
Intruder alarm system and monitoring devices 
Intruder alarms have the ability to function on their own as a separate security system (stand 
alone). Monitoring devices are the link between the intruder alarm system, the homeowner and 
the armed reaction company. The latter relies on the intruder alarm to activate in order for the 
relay device to send a signal to the owner or the armed response company or both 
simultaneously. Each of the mentioned components will be discussed separately. 
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Intruder alarm systems  
Intruder alarm systems include a main panel component consisting of an electronic circuit 
board with the ability to report on hardware activities. An example of this is where a passive 
infra-red detector in the lounge will report back to the alarm panel that there was movement 
detected. The alarm panel will then go into an alarm violation condition, but only if the system 
has been armed and an unauthorised person enters the lounge area (see Picture 21).  
Picture 21:  Example of an interior passive infra-red detection device 
 
The alarm panel will then activate an electrical current pulse and send it to one of the 
monitoring hardware devices connected to it. 
Monitoring devices 
A radio frequency device is one of the most commonly used devices implemented by armed 
reaction companies to report on alarm activities. Such a device will react to the electrical pulse 
sent from the intruder alarm panel and will transmit a radio frequency signal to the armed 
reaction response control (radio) room. 
 
SMS units working on the cell phone network can also be used as a monitoring device and 
have the ability to send a signal directly to the homeowner’s cell phone when there is an alarm 
activation (see Picture 22).  
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Picture 22:  Example of monitoring devices 
 
A standard component of an intruder alarm system will be a siren which will sound when there 
is an alarm violation condition i.e. activation, and is therefore also regarded as a monitoring 
device. 
CONCLUSION 
Describing the various types of residential security hardware, their integration with other 
security hardware and how they operate can become technically quite complicated. However, 
this section dealt only with the most commonly used hardware and the way they operate was 
simplified to a very basic level. 
 
The integration of the different hardware can be effectively undertaken if one can 
conceptualise the main purpose of each, namely their ability to be compatible with other 
hardware and whether each is the correct choice of hardware for the given situation at a 
specific time. 
 
It is important that the various hardware is categorised as: 
· Physical; 
· Technological; and  
· Procedural. 
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The hardware should provide the homeowner with the following attributes: 
· Deterrent; 
· Detection; and  
· Delay. 
Provided that the hardware is correctly categorised and the various attributes25 are known and 
understood, one can manage it properly through the security risk management model. 
 
The next section will deal with the various types of residential security hardware and how the 
security risk management model has been adapted to the residential security environment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                               
25 The attributes are deterred, detect and delay. 
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Chapter 5 
TECHNOLOGICAL, PHYSICAL AND PROCEDURAL 
RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES AND THE 
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL 
INTRODUCTION 
Security concepts and differentiating between them can be challenging and at times cause 
problems when misinterpreted. The researcher these problems daily in providing project 
management for security system’s implementation between the front end user, being the client, 
the consulting engineer and the installer.  
 
Understanding the various residential security concepts, how these systems integrates with 
other systems and what attributes it can provides, will provide a better understanding towards 
how it can be properly managed through the use of the security risk management model. 
 
The following sections will provide information to guide the reader on and overview of the 
various residential security systems and the categorising of the measures. 
 
AN OVERVIEW OF RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES 
The researcher has been very closely involved and associated with project managing various 
security projects, usually at the early planning stage of such projects. Moreover, the researcher 
also has experience in giving advice on various security systems and their integration into an 
overall security measure. 
 
The following key concepts were used by the researcher as a guideline in the planning and 
recommending of residential security measures: 
· Technological security measures; 
· Physical security measures; and 
· Procedural security measures. 
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TECHNOLOGICAL SECURITY MEASURES 
One should be familiar with the product before making any recommendations on the 
implementation of the product. This was one of the key issues for the researcher underlying the 
motivation for undertaking this specific research project.  
 
The technology used in the security industry is very advanced, especially if we look at the 
various products integrated with our daily management tools like the SMS network.26 
 
Making use of technology in the residential security environment starts with the security 
initiative in the neighbourhood i.e. the bicycle patrol concept, which as an example can be 
managed by a patrol reporting system. In other words the use of technology can be 
incorporated into basic security measures thereby making simple, cost-effective measures like 
managing a bicycle patrol routine sheet and incident reporting system more efficient, effective, 
managed and centrally controlled by the integration of the latest technology. 
 
Such a patrol monitoring system is able to immediately report to the private security company, 
managing such a system, if the bicycle patrol failed to report in as scheduled, i.e. completed a 
patrol route within a certain time frame, completed the patrol route, but missed clocking in at 
certain check points etc. This in turn could result in the dispatch to the area where the bicycle 
patrol was last positioned of an armed response vehicle. However, it must be remembered that 
such a neighbourhood initiative ends at the perimeter or main gate of the property owner, this 
is where the homeowner/occupant’s own security system would take over. 
 
The average house can have the following security measures/equipment covering its perimeter 
(Please refer to Chapter four, which explains and describes these concepts):  
· Electrified fencing;  
· Motorised vehicle gate motor; 
· Electrical striker lock or magnetic lock; 
· Closed circuit television camera with normal iris or infrared capability; 
· Electronic gate opener keypad; 
                                               
26 Cellsecure is a company based in Pretoria and one of the first companies locally to integrate the remote intruder 
alarm with the SMS/GSM network. In 2001 the researcher completed the installers’ course in using the SMS 
communicators and integrates it with the various residential security measures other than also assisting the 
researcher in his own business of integrating SMS communication system into various other business critical units 
like the Uninterrupted Power Supply Units, Aircon Chiller Units etc. 
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· Infrared detection beams; 
· Magnetic under surface detection loops; 
· Security flood light connected to infrared sensitivity sensors; and  
· Remote panic buttons.  
 
Furthermore, these and additional measures/equipment can be extended into the property 
(inside of outer perimeter boundary). On average a residence might also have the following 
installed in the garden area: 
· Infrared motion detection beams; 
· Outdoor infrared passives; 
· CCTV; 
· Security flood light connected to infrared sensitivity sensors; and 
· Remote panic buttons. 
 
Moreover, an average house can also have the following security measures covering the 
immediate house area: 
· Door guards/contacts; 
· Curtain passives; 
· Glass break detectors; 
· Infrared motion detectors; 
· Remote panic buttons; 
· Fixed panic buttons; 
· Wired or wireless intruder alarm control panel; and 
· Electrical striker lock or magnetic lock on the security gates. 
 
The above-mentioned technological security measures will also further usually be connected to 
a 220 volt power source via a transformer stepping or converting the 220 volt to a required 12 
or 24 volt power supply to the main panel or controller. 
 
The main panel or controller needs then also to be connected to an additional battery backup 
power source which will ensure that the main panel or controller will have sufficient power 
supply for at least seven (7) hours during any power failure. 
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Finally, the controller or main panel needs to be monitored this can be done through a siren 
facility, RF radio signal to another destination like a security control room, a SMS network to a 
cell phone -  either the owner’s cell phone, neighbours, dedicated armed response vehicle etc. 
Below is a basic simplified diagrammatic representation of a typical intruder detection alarm 
system connected to the various detection and monitoring devices.  
Drawing 9:  Basic drawing of an average intruder detection alarm system linked to  
                     detection and monitoring devices  
 
Detection will occur either through a passive, sensitivity loop on an electrified fencing, infrared 
beam, glass break detector or door contact. 
 
The above-mentioned monitoring devices will then enable the alarm panel to send a common 
alarm violation condition via the siren and RF radio connection to the homeowner, guards and 
the armed response company control room. In such a system early detection right on the 
perimeter becomes doubly important. Therefore, an integrated system, for instance with 
electrified fencing combined with infra-red detection beams, will play a vital role in this 
regard.  
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However, overall technological security is still dependant on the physical and procedural 
security aspects of any security measure. Accordingly the deterrence factor (or component) is 
as important as that of detection. In addition, procedural measures/policies form the third 
component in any effective security measure since they will (or should) ensure that regular 
maintenance (upkeep) is instituted, and that enhancements (improvements and latest equipment 
and measures) are also implemented. This will help to combat the latest or new crime trends or 
changes to criminal modus operandi. As a rule of thumb then, security measures should 
constantly change in order to combat the latest crime modus operandi. 
 
The researcher had a discussion with a technical manager at a very prominent private security 
company. According to him in November 2005 the company had experienced a large number 
of residential burglaries where entry was gained through the roof area and the intruder alarm 
panels were completely removed.  
 
This modus operandi shows that the traditional approach of just looking at the immediate 
house interior, shifted to incorporate the ceiling/attic areas within a house as well. Infra-red 
beams do experience problems in functioning in these areas due to heat fluctuations, dust, 
insects etc. Dual technology27 has been successful in the researcher’s experience 
accommodating the mentioned variables28. 
 
PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES 
Physical security measures can be categorized as a typical delay measure, have a deterrent 
capability or a combination of both. 
 
When giving advise on technological, procedural or physical aspects of security to uncertain 
clients regarding the installation or implementation of new or additional security measures and 
equipment, a standard piece of advice has been devised by the researcher, namely along the 
following broad lines: 
 
                                               
27 Dual technology is where both microwave and infra-red technologies are combined in one detection device. 
28 The researcher has his own company called 18T  Risk Solutions and specializes in designing and project 
managing security systems for the corporate and security estate environments. 
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“You want to keep criminals out of your home and not invite them in. By the time a 
criminal breaks a window, the possibility is greater that it will be too late to detect, stop or 
apprehend him/her. The average response company will take between five and ten minutes 
to respond and hopefully will have access to your premises when they arrive.”  
 
Accordingly, an effective security system must look to delay an intruder (barriers), to detect 
them as early as possible, and to have a quick response, so that they can be apprehended if 
possible before they even get close to or inside a residence. With these basic security principles 
in mind an average house can have some, a combination of or even all of the following in 
terms of perimeter and neighbourhood security: 
· Palisade fencing; 
· Barbed wire or razor wire; 
· Wall spikes;  
· Manual vehicle gate lock; 
· Anti-lifting devices on a vehicle gate; 
· Physical barrel lock on pedestrian gate; 
· Dogs;  
· Patrol guards; 
· Armed response officer and vehicle;  
· Boomed-off area; 
· Thorn bushes; 
· Security floodlights; and 
· Security signage. 
 
The average house can have the following physical security measures in the inner perimeter or 
garden area: 
· Dogs;  
· Security floodlights; and 
· Beams. 
 
The average house can have the following physical security measures in the immediate house 
area: 
· Window burglar proofing; 
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· Barbed wire inside ceiling void; 
· Safety gates; 
· Door locks; 
· Solid doors; and 
· Dead bolts. 
 
Physical security is also dependant on technological and procedural security to ensure their 
effectiveness. Here an example on the technology side would be where a security gate needs to 
have a door monitor in order to report via the intruder alarm panel when it has been forced 
open.  
 
The procedural side of this example will be to have a maintenance plan in place where the 
intruder alarm will be serviced regularly to ensure that the door contact on the security gate 
will be functional at all times. 
PROCEDURAL SECURITY MEASURES 
Procedures guide us in terms of what to do when, where and how. In practical terms, when 
giving advice to clients the researcher based his procedures and policies largely on his own 
experience in responding to residential burglary scenes. 
 
Procedural Security can be implemented at any stage of a security project, whether it is at the 
planning phase, the implementation phase or the maintenance and management phase. It must, 
however, be remembered that without proper procedures, any security system will not be 
utilized in a cost effective manner to its fullest potential. 
 
Security is a cost centre to most companies. The outcome is not very visible in comparison, for 
instance, to sales for the month or clientele served during a week etc. 
 
Lack of maintenance of a security system is of concern to most security practitioners and 
consultants in the security field. Maintenance is in fact a very important procedural security 
measure and without this, security systems get neglected and in the majority of the cases and 
this are experienced by the researcher’s own experience in undertaking security audits and 
providing installation advice for security systems. It was often observed that security systems 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  94 
 
were either “switched off” because of “continuous false alarms” occurring and as a result 
viewed as an “unreliable system” by the home owner in the specific scenarios. 
 
Procedural security measures in general do not cost anything.  An example here would be the 
testing of one’s alarm at least once a week and having the armed response company report on 
whether their control room had received the RF radio signal.  
 
There are other security procedures for homeowners to implement that are also simple enough 
in themselves, and take minimal time and effort, such as closing see-through curtains during 
the day time in order to conceal any routine activities and movement from the view of possible 
burglars. 
 
Furthermore, regular security audits (i.e. check ups or a review of existing security measures 
and operations in a house) by a security professional should be part of procedural security, 
even if only to ensure an independent outside view of one’s security system. Homeowners have 
a tendency to overlook “unnecessary” aspects such as “we already have a keypad so why do 
we need another if we can arm and disarm the alarm through this keypad placed at the 
(conveniently) bottom of the sleeping room passage. However, in such a situation any good 
security professional should highlight the fact that the entry delay,29 with a keypad, for instance 
right next to the front door, will be much shorter in relation to the keypad at the main bedroom. 
The longer your entry/ exit delay, the more time the perpetrator can have in removing 
appliances and the homeowner’s personal belongings and thereafter still managing to flee the 
scene without being detected or apprehended. Therefore, a security professional needs to be 
flexible in what their approach might be and what type of advice will be given according to the 
individual system since each is adapted and integrated into the local residential security 
environment, i.e. each system is configured and set up to fit into specific needs and 
homeowner’s wishes, as well as operating procedure requirements.  
 
The security risk model30, as used by the Department for Security Risk Management at 
UNISA31 has reference to the residential security environment and like with the security 
                                               
29 ‘Entry Delay’ is the time it will take one to disarm the alarm when entering the house to avoid the alarm going 
into an alarm violation condition. 
30 Unless otherwise stated the information below in this section is based on an extensive interview with Mr. F.C. 
Rogers, (30/11/2006), currently the acting programme director for the Department Security Risk Management at 
UNISA, who developed a South African adapted Security risk Management Model, wherein the background to 
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industry in general. Each aspect of the model will be discussed in relation to the residential 
security environment and the practical application thereof. 
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT MODEL INTEGRATED INTO THE 
RESIDENTIAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Background to the security risk management model 
In the interview with Charles Rogers (2006, Nov 30) the background to the security risk 
management model was explained in detail. 
 
In the late 1980s, Stellenbosch University took it on themselves to present a course in Safety 
Risk Management. There was a good deal of feedback from security managers at the time, 
attending the course and also by security managers in their advisory capacities applying the 
safety risk management model in their various security environments.  
 
It was found that every security manager had their own management style due to their various 
backgrounds with either law enforcement agencies, intelligence services, the military and 
commercial private sector. A need for a generic risk management model for the security 
industry was then identified. This model had to adapt to all these various security management 
styles. 
 
In the new millennium, the following issues were raised within SAPS, which again highlighted 
the importance of a generic risk management model for the security industry: 
· What are the criteria to management and control crime; 
· Crime at the time was unacceptably high according to the annual SAPS statistics; and 
· SAPS do not utilize their resources to the maximum in order to combat crime. 
 
The problem of high levels of crime became a facet of everyday life in South Africa, 
influencing many people’s life decisions. At the former Technikon SA, where the Security 
Management Programme Group – established in 1996, developed a security risk management 
model. The model was primarily developed to ensure that all National Diploma and BTECH 
                                                                                                                                                    
the security risk management model was outlined and explained in detail. Additionally the description and outline 
of the model was supplemented by the researcher’s own experience as well as attending the UNISA annual 
BTECH Autumn School where the model is taught in detail.  
31 Formerly the Programme Group:  Security Management, at Technikon SA prior to the merger on 1 January 
2004 with UNISA. 
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degree candidates will be able to adapt the model in the various working environments, after 
completion of the autumn schools held at UNISA. 
 
The model is developed to assist the security manager in managing and controlling security 
crime risk with a cost beneficial approach. This needs to be compliant with good and healthy 
financial principles. It should also be complaint with good security practice providing the 
following security principles: 
· Deter; 
· Detection;  
· Delay; 
· Deflection; and 
· Detain. 
 
The risk management model is also based on the following formula: 
Risk=Probability x Impact 
 
Security risk is prioritized according to the probability that a specific security risk occur, and if 
it occurs, the impact of it measured in potential losses or damages. 
 
The model is currently viewed as a developing and changing work-in-progress being 
continually changed adapted due to the various approaches within the Security Risk 
Management Department at UNISA, on how it is applied, further applications and also further 
development and research to provide a model which is developed through scientific 
methodology. 
 
Application of the security risk management model in the residential security 
environment 
To make more meaningful analyses security professionals can refer to the following security 
risk management model in order to assist them in their work, particularly in the security risk 
management environment. This model typically is made up of a number of steps, namely: 
· A review of factors causing a crime; 
· The provision of a security policy; 
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· A preliminary review (security survey) of the existing situation at the site (in this study 
a residential burglary); 
· Application of analysis to the observed situation (risk analysis); 
· A full security survey (security audit); 
· Making recommendations for the implementation of security measures (security risk 
control); 
· Calculating costs and cost-effectiveness of recommended measures (in large projects 
this can include a return-on-investment exercise); 
· The writing of a security report, which all of the above are included) and presenting to 
client; 
· If these are accepted and implemented then the security service provider also needs to 
evaluate (at a later stage) the effectiveness (and impact – negative or positive) of the 
implemented measures; 
 
Below is a diagrammatic example of these steps in the security risk management model 
(developed by the Department of Security Risk Management at UNISA) and often followed by 
professional security practitioners in South Africa. 
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Diagram 1:  Security risk management model  
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CRIME  SECURITY POLICY
PRELIMINARY 
SECURITY SURVEY
RISK ANALYSIS
SECURITY SURVEY
SECURITY RISK 
CONTROL MEASURES
RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT
SECURITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
REPORT
IMPLEMENTATION 
AND EVALUATING OF 
SECURITY MEASURES
SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT 
MODEL
 
(Rogers, 2006:  2) 
 
Each of the units in this model will be explained separately in terms of the residential security 
environment and how each would be important to ensure that any security system will be 
designed and implemented in a cost effective manner using a holistic approach. 
 
Factors causing crime 
The model is premised on an understanding of crime, its causal factors and the consequences, 
i.e. what happens if it is left unattended. In the residential security environment there are 
specific factors that contribute to residential burglaries being successfully perpetrated. 
 
These factors can arise particularly when not adhering to generally accepted basic principles of 
security in that any one security measure, which has not got one of the following values or a 
combination thereof:  
· Serve as a deterrent; 
· Provides a delay mechanism; and 
· Provides a detection capability.  
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Furthermore, even if the security system contains (or demonstrates) either one or a 
combination of the above-mentioned principles it should still adhere to the following criteria 
(as far as possible): 
· Utilise a cost effective design;   
· Be implemented as accurately as possible (i.e. stick to the specifications as required by 
the designed system); 
· Have effective and correct use thereof; 
· There must be regular maintenance of the security system; and 
· Upgrades and enhancements of the security system must occur regularly. 
 
If any or all of the above are not adhered to their absence could well be a factor leading to a 
residential burglary occurring.  
 
Security policy 
A homeowner approaches a private security company to either provide him/her with a security 
solution and/or monitoring facility to protect a residential property as a whole or in the 
immediate house area. 
 
The contract between the homeowner and the private security company in essence represents a 
‘security policy’ which is regulated within the law, the guidelines and regulations of the Private 
Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA).  
 
This contract also provides the mandate to the private security provider to assist and/or provide 
the homeowner with one or other combination of the following: 
· Recommendation (advice); 
· Provision and implementation of the security measures; 
· Management (and possibly maintenance as well) of the security measures; and 
· Response to security threats. 
 
Risk analysis 
The residential burglary then gets analysed in terms of where it originated (the area of entry), 
the motivation (the reason why it was perpetrated), the consequences or impact (what was 
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removed from the premises), and the area of termination of the burglary (i.e. where the 
property was exited, what was used to get away from the property, e.g. mode of transportation 
or escape route. 
 
(By making use of the security risk management model steps, this specific project hopes to 
provide insight on such issues as how the crime was perpetrated, how the burglars gained entry 
and exited, what motivated this specific crime etc. This will be done by using not only a 
security audit at the site of the burglary but also analysing information gathered by means of 
the victim interviews and docket analysis on where the crime originated and the motivation. In 
addition, it is also hoped to provide the reader with information on how the crime was 
terminated through descriptive mapping.)  
 
Security survey 
The residential security audit (survey) at the homes of victims would be beneficial in providing 
a residential security audit format that can be used to guide the security professional in the 
following ways: 
· Providing cost effective advice on technological, physical and procedural security 
measures; 
· Providing advise which will adhere to the principles of deter, detect and delay; and 
· Provide advice which will assist with complying in terms of effective implementation, 
use and maintenance. 
 
Security risk control measures 
The security risk control measures (i.e. the systems and equipment actually installed and 
implemented) in the residential environment should be able to provide the homeowner with 
acceptable levels of deterrence, detection and delay. 
 
Residential security measures are a very expensive market and mostly focus on and cater for 
the upper income market.  
 
Return on investment 
The return on investment for the homeowner can be in the form of: 
· Having a higher valued property; 
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· Ensuring a safer environment for the family members and occupants and lesser 
probability of being exposed to intrusion of one’s person space (privacy invasion); and 
· Securing property of sentimental and irreplaceable qualities (photo albums, jewellery, 
family heirlooms etc.) 
 
All the above have merit in that they are probably of primary importance to a homeowner. 
 
Investing in residential security measures can contribute to the above but usually only if the 
security measures are implemented according to the principles and levels as outlined above.  
 
Security risk management report 
The homeowner seeking to install and implement new or additional security measures needs to 
be provided with a recommendation/s which will be user friendly and will prioritise residential 
security measures in terms of importance. 
 
The report should focus on providing cost effective recommendations in terms of the following 
layers of defence: 
· Immediate neighbourhood around the residential property; 
· Perimeter (outer boundary of property); 
· Inner perimeter (between outer boundary and actual residence, often the garden area); 
and 
· Immediate house area. 
 
The report should also cover the following aspects or dimensions of security measures within 
each of the layers of defence: 
· Technological; 
· Physical; and 
· Procedural. 
 
The report should be clearly and concisely written in order to provide the homeowner with an 
understanding of the importance of every security measure in terms of providing levels of 
deterrence, detection and delay and how each one is integrated with the other. 
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Implementation and evaluation of the security measures 
The evaluation of the implementation of residential security measures can be based on the 
following already mentioned criteria, namely:   
· A cost effective design; 
· Accurate (correct) implementation; 
· Effective and proper use (of all systems, procedures and components); 
· Regular maintenance of the security system; and 
· Regular upgrade and enhancements of the security system. 
 
The evaluation of a system implementation should not only confine itself to the planning, 
implementation and use of it, but also re-evaluate the systems in terms of its level of 
performance (impact) and effectiveness. 
 
The level of performance can be determined, for example, by activating the intruder alarm in 
all modes.32 
 
When an alarm is activated it should only indicate an alarm violation condition if human 
movement is detected and not for instance by any pet (or small animal like a mouse) 
movement. 
 
The effectiveness of an alarm can be determined by conducting an audit to establish whether 
all areas are still covered in terms of passive infra-red detectors and no areas left uncovered  
(i.e. ‘dead’ spots) due perhaps to recent renovations done or moving of furniture. 
 
Maintenance and upgrade 
In this research study the researcher added and additional step to the security risk management 
model, namely maintenance and upgrade. 
 
This section is vital to ensure that the audit report from the evaluation will be implemented in 
terms of recommendations, and that the system continues to perform at those optimal 
                                               
32 Modes in this context refers to either the ‘stay mode’ where there will be occupants at home and where all other 
areas except the sleeping areas will have immediate alarm detection capabilities and the other mode will refer to 
the ‘away mode’ where there are no occupants inside, i.e. the house will be empty and all areas within the house 
will be covered by immediate alarm detection capability. 
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performance levels as evaluated and specified, i.e. the system does not malfunction or levels 
fall off. 
 
Below is the adapted Security Risk Management Model – diagram, for the residential security 
environment, which shows the inclusion of the additional component (or step), namely 
maintenance and upgrade. 
Diagram 2:  Security risk management model adapted to the residential security  
                     environment  
FACTORS CAUSING A 
CRIME  SECURITY POLICY
PRELIMINARY 
SECURITY SURVEY
RISK ANALYSIS
SECURITY SURVEY
SECURITY RISK 
CONTROL MEASURES
RETURN ON 
INVESTMENT
SECURITY RISK 
MANAGEMENT 
REPORT
IMPLEMENTATION 
AND EVALUATING OF 
SECURITY MEASURES
SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT 
MODEL
MAINTENANCE AND 
UPGRADE
 
The maintenance of the security system is vital for increasing long-term operation capability 
and in fact can increase the life cycle considerably. The depreciation on value for the electronic 
equipment is about 25% per annum which therefore would result in a four-year life cycle 
prediction. The life cycle can also be increased according to the type of conditions in 
immediate environment of the system. For example, being sited in a closed dust free room with 
temperatures below 22 degrees Celsius; or alternately servicing mechanical parts regularly, for 
instance oiling the gate motor mechanics biannually to increase the life cycle of the vehicle 
gate motor. 
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The rate of upgrade (replacement of certain components) of the security system will either be 
based on the life cycle completed and/or environmental conditions/changes that might impact 
on the length of this life cycle.  For example, in practical terms, because of environmental 
impact and life cycle the cable infrastructure on an electrified fencing system should be 
rewired every four to five years to ensure that the resistance on the electrified fencing will be 
low. This will ensure that an acceptable electrical current will be transferred through the 
fencing. Low voltage will cause the electrical fencing to go into an alarm violation condition. 
 
In addition, the environment might change quite dramatically i.e. vegetation increase in size, 
and therefore might result in the security system not providing an effective range of cover as 
before.  
 
Another example of changes would be home improvements by for example adding additional 
buildings to the existing home infrastructure; the security system should then also be upgraded 
in order to cover the additional areas. In such a case the intruder alarm should also be changed 
to a bigger capacity to accommodate the extra infra-red detection passives that would be 
needed to be put in. 
CONCLUSION 
The research project was adapted in order to include a security risk management approach to 
the analysis of the collected information. The model used was the one outlined above and 
includes the adaptation by the addition of an extra component (step), namely the aspect of 
regular maintenance and upgrading of components.  This allowed for a more specific focus to 
the research problems and the results achieved. This research project is arguably the first of its 
kind in South Africa focusing, as it does, on the impact of residential security measures and not 
just on residential burglary as a crime problem. 
 
Furthermore, the research methodology is aimed at providing as much as possible information 
via the findings supported by the formulation of specific and practical recommendations, all of 
which can be integrated in to the adapted security risk management model thereby adding 
value to residential security risk audits. 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  105 
 
Chapter 6 
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AND RESIDENTIAL 
SECURITY MEASURES IN PARKHURST AND 
WESTCLIFF: CONTEXTUALISATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Crime has a tremendously negative impact on all aspects of life in South Africa, inter alia the 
economy, the country’s global position on the list of safe countries and more importantly, on 
the community who would like to create a country where our children can grow together in 
peace and prosperity. 
 
The extent of crime as revealed by statistics is one way of how one can either form a picture on 
generalising the situation in the country as a whole, or it can be used to focus on priority crimes 
and existing contingency plans to manage and counter it. 
 
The researcher has experience in crime statistics and also how they can be used to the benefit 
of the community. 
 
The approach the researcher uses is to focus on the priority crimes and then plan counter 
security measures accordingly. This approach has demonstrated that it can also deal indirectly 
with other less prioritised crimes and results in local crime levels. The Westcliff scenario is an 
example where the researcher in his daily work,33implemented bicycle guarding patrols, 
focussing on providing visible policing and also allowing home owners to have “eyes and  
ears“ in the immediate residential entry/exit points in the attempt to reduce hijackings and 
driveway robberies. 
 
The following sections will focus on the latest official crime statistics, the various residential 
security measures, which can be deployed in combating residential burglary and the two 
population areas in relation to residential burglary. 
 
                                               
33 The researcher had to focus on the residential environments of top executives, working for same company as the 
researcher. This would give researcher ability to have monitoring and contributing abilities within the residential 
area and not only the residential property itself. 
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THE POLICE AND CRIME DETECTION 
The South African Police Service (hereinafter referred to as the SAPS) annual crime report for 
2002/3 indicated that there was an increase and decrease of some crimes nationally in the 
detection and disposal of crimes respectively for the period of April 2002 to March 2003 
SAPS, 2002/3: 12). 
 
Generally it can be stated that any increase in the detection of crime is to a large extent 
dependant on the actions of the police, particularly with the use of crime intelligence combined 
with strategic crime awareness and detection operations (SAPS, 2003: 12) 
 
However, crimes such as residential burglaries are to a greater extent dependent on detection 
through residential security measures, the private and public partnership amongst private 
security companies, involvement of the Community Police Forums, (hereinafter referred to as 
CPFs) and, only as the last link in the detection chain, the actions of the South African Police 
Service, since they are largely reactive (i.e. responding to reported crime) and not 
proactive/preventative in any true sense of the word.  
 
The SAPS 2002/3 Annual Report clearly states that the police and government cannot on their 
own effectively deal with or completely reduce crime. For any meaningful reduction of crime 
to occur all levels of the government and civil society must work together, i.e. fully co-operate, 
in order to combat, reduce and ultimately prevent crime (SAPS Annual Report, 2002/3: 5). 
 
The descriptive mapping used in this study also aims in providing SAPS, private security 
companies and CPFs with vital information in strategising on crime prevention initiatives. 
 
However, what then is the current situation regarding the incidence of burglary in the policing 
precincts, in the area, in the province and nationally? 
BURGLARY AND CRIME STATISTICS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
According to Welman and Kruger (1999: 15), a research project should be based on a current 
and practical problem.  
 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  107 
 
Accordingly, the residential burglaries forming the focus of this report are the current and 
practical problem. Furthermore, the presence of residential security measures and the effective 
implementation thereof is the phenomena in this report.   
 
The following paragraphs will focus on residential burglary crime statistics within: 
· Johannesburg policing area with specific reference to the Parkview policing area; 
· Johannesburg policing area in total; 
· Gauteng provincial policing area in total; and 
· South Africa national totals. 
 
These crime statistics are for the review period from April 2001/March 2002 to April 
2006/March 2007 (the latest crime statistics available on the official South African Police 
Services web page http//www.saps.gov.za).  
 
PARKVIEW POLICING AREA CRIME STATISTICS 
Burglary at residential premises in the Parkview policing area34 remains the highest (608 cases) 
categorised crime for this Parkhurst Policing Area in the 2006/7 SAPS crime statistics year with theft of 
motor vehicles and motor cycles (414 cases) and theft out of or from motor vehicles (534 cases). (Refer 
to Table 3 in particular see yellow highlighted statistics for these specific frequencies and crime 
categories). “Theft not mentioned anywhere else” – category, hasn’t been included due to not 
specifically categorised as with the mentioned three highest category crimes mentioned. The crime 
category of ‘all theft not mentioned elsewhere’ remains the highest non-categorised crime (806 cases). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
34 Westcliff and Parkhurst are two residential areas within the Parkview policing area. 
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Table 3:  Crime statistics for the Parkview policing area: March 2001/April 2002 to  
                March 2006/April 2007 
Crime 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
Murder  8 2 1 3 2 5 
Rape 21 8 5 15 8 11 
Attempted murder  12 15 15 11 14 17 
Assault (GBH)  
(with intent to inflict 
grievous bodily 
harm) 69 55 57 49 47 41 
Common assault  108 119 108 101 113 112 
Robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances 310 296 283 273 281 411 
Common robbery  160 142 98 99 72 109 
Indecent assault  2 6 5 2 5 1 
Kidnapping  3 0 0 0 0 0 
Abduction  1 6 6 2 1 5 
Neglect and ill-
treatment of 
children  0 3 2 3 0 1 
Culpable homicide  7 9 7 7 4 7 
Public violence  0 0 1 0 0 1 
Carjacking (Sub 
Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 69 69 49 48 27 25 
Truck hijacking 
(Sub Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 7 1 0 0 0 0 
Bank robbery (Sub 
Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 2 1 1 0 2 1 
Robbery of cash in 
transit (Sub 
Category of 
Robbery 0 0 0 0 1 0 
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Aggravating) 
House robbery (Sub 
Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 0 50 51 62 54 110 
Business robbery 
(Sub Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating)  0 24 21 10 15 17 
Arson   4 5 1 5 4 3 
Malicious damage 
to property   334 274 188 150 200 240 
Crimen Injuria   27 15 15 19 23 15 
Burglary at 
residential premises   723 693 863 849 727 608 
Burglary at business 
premises  106 73 67 82 121 146 
Theft of motor 
vehicle and 
motorcycle  606 659 717 630 459 414 
Theft out of or from 
motor vehicle   959 1104 888 585 577 534 
Stock theft   0 0 0 0 0 0 
Illegal possession of 
firearms and 
ammunition 18 7 11 14 11 9 
Drug related crime   10 23 14 16 30 23 
Driving under the 
influence of alcohol 
or drugs  18 10 28 19 18 27 
All theft not 
mentioned 
elsewhere   934 1054 1040 864 903 806 
Commercial Crime   127 171 138 110 94 114 
Shoplifting   29 16 25 8 17 19 
Totals 4674 4910 4705 4036 3830 3832 
(SAPS:  Crime in the RSA. http//www.saps.gov.za. Accessed 28 October 2007) 
According to the table above residential burglary remain within the first three highest priority 
crimes.   
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According to Supt Nandi Moodley, the station commander at the Parkview police station, the 
SAPS in the area focus on the priority crimes (for Parkview) such as residential burglary in an 
attempt to reduce other associated crimes.  As a result the Parkview policing area has shown a 
steady reduction within in three months of 10 – 20% in residential burglary since his 
appointment in 2005 as the station commander at the Parkview police station (Moodley, 2005). 
 
The immediate question that arises here is whether the residential burglary statistics for the 
whole of the Johannesburg policing area, for the Gauteng Province and nationally (South 
Africa) reveal the same results of being in the top three (highest by frequency of incidence) 
crimes.35 
 
JOHANNESBURG POLICING AREA CRIME STATISTICS 
According to the SAPS crime statistics for 2006/7, burglary at residential premises for the 
whole of the Johannesburg policing area is the third highest (11 668 reported cases) in terms of 
reported crimes within categorised crimes. (Refer to the yellow highlighted areas in Table 4 in 
particular see yellow highlighted statistics for these specific frequencies and crime categories). 
Table 4:  Crime statistics for the Johannesburg Policing Area: April 2001/March 2002 to  
                April 2006/March 2007 
Crime 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
Murder  948 971 729 694 598 611 
Rape  1700 1612 1506 1542 1548 1393 
Attempted murder  1228 1619 1406 1135 1075 1097 
Assault (GBH) 
(with the intent to 
inflict 
grievous bodily harm  8042 8927 8929 9244 
 
 
 
9120 8595 
Common assault  9503 11089 12594 12659   
Robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances  15506 18530 18721 17310 
 
 
15505 16608 
Common robbery  7512 7896 7215 7289 6134 6369 
Indecent assault 238 316 405 384 344 356 
                                               
35 Parkview SAPS is part of the larger policing area: Johannesburg, which is one of seven policing areas for the 
whole of the Gauteng Province. 
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Kidnapping  291 162 196 178 152 199 
Abduction  129 274 275 271 267 208 
Neglect and ill-
treatment of children  87 205 347 321 
 
289 308 
Culpable homicide  424 412 384 372 436 439 
Public violence  13 35 46 41 46 52 
Carjacking (Sub 
Category of Robbery 
Aggravating)  2679 2990 2634 2233 
 
2112 
2332 
Truck hijacking (Sub 
Category of Robbery 
Aggravating)  348 51 52 43 
 
 
47 54 
Bank robbery (Sub 
Category of Robbery 
Aggravating)  56 8 8 13 
 
 
12 29 
Robbery of cash in 
transit (Sub Category 
of Robbery 
Aggravating)  16 42 18 19 
 
 
 
56 44 
House robbery (Sub 
Category of Robbery 
Aggravating)  0 1472 1450 1508 
 
 
1615 2211 
Business robbery 
(Sub Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating)  0 1258 1101 929 
 
 
 
1203 1634 
Arson  226 232 236 254 218 239 
Malicious damage to 
property  9570 9614 9870 9813 
 
9334 8937 
Crimen Injuria  1524 1729 1492 1467 1373 1151 
Burglary at 
residential premises  14908 15033 14970 14379 
 
13713 11668 
Burglary at business 
premises 5306 5064 4462 3534 
 
3618 3711 
Theft of motor 
vehicle and 
motorcycle 13690 12893 12200 12541 
 
 
12311 12178 
Theft out of or from 
motor vehicle  17449 16709 14556 12766 
 
12132 10170 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  112 
 
Stock theft 9 7 9 3 0 3 
Illegal possession of 
firearms and 
ammunition  826 908 985 691 
 
 
577 724 
Drug related crime  1968 1796 1512 1657 1853 1766 
Driving under the 
influence of alcohol 
or drugs  789 782 1007 1286 
 
 
1655 1751 
All theft not 
mentioned elsewhere 42324 44395 46285 43110 
 
35948 32050 
Commercial Crime  8669 8576 8982 8526 9624 10244 
Shoplifting  5504 5294 5256 4930 5155 4607 
Totals 171482 180901 179838 171142 148070 141738 
(SAPS:  Crime in the RSA. http//www.saps.gov.za. Accessed 28 October 2007) 
 
From the table above it is clear that for the Johannesburg policing area the highest categorised 
crime is robbery with aggravating circumstances (16 608 reported cases) and the highest and  
theft of motor vehicles and motor cycles (12 178 cases) second highest for the 2006/7 crime 
statistic year. From the table it is also clear then that residential burglary still remains within 
the first three highest reported crimes.  
 
“Theft not mentioned anywhere else” – category, hasn’t been included due to not specifically 
categorised as with the mentioned three highest category crimes mentioned. The crime 
category of ‘all theft not mentioned elsewhere’ remains the highest non-categorised crime 
(32 050 cases). 
 
GAUTENG PROVINCIAL CRIME STATISTICS 
The SAPS Gauteng provincial crime statistics for the 2006/7 year (refer to Table 5 in particular 
see yellow highlighted statistics for these specific frequencies and crime categories) indicate 
that burglary at residential premises is the highest (65 188 reported cases) categorised crime, 
followed by common assault with 56 971 reported cases and robbery with aggravating 
circumstances with 52n 924 cases reported. 
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Table 5:  Crime statistics for Gauteng: April 2001/March 2002 to April 2004/March 2005  
Crime 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
Murder 4779 4830 4216 3611 3434 3666 
Rape 12576 12091 11926 11923 11562 11114 
Attempted 
murder 7463 9058 7975 6237 
 
5370 5367 
Assault with the intent 
to inflict grievous 
bodily harm 54962 54872 52996 50563 
 
 
48205 47033 
Common 
assault 60468 70151 74322 69790 
 
60776 56971 
Robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances 54127 58167 60998 55139 
49784 
52924 
Common 
robbery 28553 31279 30876 29272 
 
24420 24356 
Indecent assault 1655 1833 1960 2007 2001 1970 
Kidnapping 1575 955 1015 841 784 884 
Abduction 902 1448 1445 1332 1134 1054 
Neglect and ill-
treatment of 
children 499 1033 1560 1325 
 
 
1171 1109 
Culpable 
homicide 2463 2454 2436 2568 
 
2758 2979 
Public violence 112 185 147 156 211 178 
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Carjacking 
(Sub Category 
of Robbery 
Aggravating) 9315 9371 8664 6902 
 
 
 
6890 6951 
Truck hijacking 
(Sub Category 
of Robbery 
Aggravating) 1794 447 466 454 
 
 
 
425 532 
Bank robbery 
(Sub Category 
of Robbery 
Aggravating) 142 41 17 38 
 
 
 
45 76 
Robbery of 
cash in transit 
(Sub Category 
of Robbery 
Aggravating) 94 141 71 82 
 
 
 
 
143 172 
House robbery 
(Sub Category 
of Robbery 
Aggravating) 0 4701 5154 5365 
 
 
 
5909 7461 
Business 
robbery (Sub 
Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 0 2625 2305 2073 
 
 
 
3068 
4322 
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Arson 1733 1867 1875 1868 1904 1997 
Malicious 
damage to 
property 39072 43194 45825 43728 
 
 
42696 42048 
Crimen Injuria 10011 10757 10244 9398 7831 6518 
Burglary at 
residential 
premises 82201 83226 81096 73941 
 
 
72146 65188 
Burglary at 
business 
premises 19272 16316 14463 12583 
 
 
12860 14085 
Theft of motor 
vehicle and 
motorcycle 47008 43424 41072 39251 
 
 
41170 41608 
Theft out of or 
from motor 
vehicle 59926 59077 52950 46842 
 
 
45436 39177 
Stock theft 855 769 771 581 497 519 
Illegal 
possession of 
firearms and 
ammunition 3674 4017 4621 3665 
 
 
 
3155 3652 
Drug related 
crime 8737 8874 8755 9756 
 
13268 11074 
Driving under 
the influence of 6168 5123 6112 6405 
 
 7336 
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alcohol or drugs 7090 
All theft not 
mentioned 
elsewhere 166073 179842 186820 165214 
 
 
132932 127400 
Commercial 
Crime 24074 23420 24424 23076 
 
24062 26515 
Shoplifting 16920 16770 17905 17298 17788 18039 
Totals 727203 762358 765482 703284 650925 634275 
(SAPS:  Crime in the RSA. http//www.saps.gov.za. Accessed 28 October 2007) 
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“Theft not mentioned anywhere else” – category, hasn’t been included due to not specifically 
categorised as with the mentioned three highest category crimes mentioned. The crime 
category of ‘all theft not mentioned elsewhere’ remains the highest non-categorised crime 
(172 400 cases). 
 
Again (as for the Parkview policing precinct and Johannesburg policing area) residential 
burglary is also within the three highest reported crimes on SAPS provincial level in the 
Gauteng province. 
 
SOUTH AFRICA NATIONAL CRIME STATISTICS 
According to the SAPS 2006/7 official crime statistics at national level, for the whole of South 
Africa burglary at residential premises is the highest (249 665 reported cases) categorised 
reported crime, followed by assault with grievous bodily harm (218 030 reported cases) and 
common assault at 210 057 reported cases for the same year at national level. (Refer to Table 6 
in particular see yellow highlighted statistics for these specific frequencies and crime 
categories). 
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Table 6:  Crime statistics for the RSA: April  2001/March 2002 to April 2006/March 2007 
Crime 2001/2 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
Murder  21405 21553 19824 18793 18545 19202 
Rape  54293 52425 52733 55114 54926 52617 
Attempted murder  31293 35861 30076 24516 
 
20553 20142 
Assault with the 
intent to inflict 
grievous bodily 
harm 264012 266321 260082 249369 
 
 
 
226942 218030 
Common assault 261886 282526 280942 267857 227553 210057 
Robbery with 
aggravating 
circumstances 116736 126905 133658 126789 
 
 
119726 126558 
Common robbery  90205 101537 95551 90825 74723 71156 
Indecent assault 7683 8815 9302 10123 9805 9367 
Kidnapping 4433 3071 3004 2618 2320 2345 
Abduction 3132 4210 4044 3880 3345 3217 
Neglect and ill-
treatment of 
children  2648 4798 6504 5568 
 
 
4828 4258 
Culpable 
homicide 10944 11202 11096 11995 
 
12415 12871 
Public violence  907 1049 979 974 1044 1023 
Carjacking (Sub 15846 14691 13793 12434 12825 13599 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  119 
 
Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 
Truck hijacking 
(Sub Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 3333 986 901 930 
 
 
 
829 892 
Bank robbery 
(Sub Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 356 127 54 58 
 
 
 
59 129 
Robbery of cash 
in transit (Sub 
Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 238 374 192 220 
 
 
 
 
385 467 
House robbery 
(Sub Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 0 9063 9351 9391 
 
 
 
10173 12761 
Business robbery 
(Sub Category of 
Robbery 
Aggravating) 0 5498 3677 3320 
 
 
 
4387 6689 
Arson 8739 9186 8806 8184 7622 7858 
Malicious damage 145451 157070 158247 150785 144265 143336 
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to property  
Crimen Injuria  60919 63717 59908 55929 44512 36747 
Burglary at 
residential 
premises  302657 319984 299290 276164 
 
 
262535 249665 
Burglary at 
business premises  87114 73975 64629 56048 
 
54367 58438 
Theft of motor 
vehicle and 
motorcycle  96859 93133 88144 83857 
 
 
85964 86298 
Theft out of or 
from motor 
vehicle  199282 195896 171982 148512 
 
 
139090 124029 
Stock theft  41635 46680 41273 32675 28742 28828 
Illegal possession 
of firearms and 
ammunition 15494 15839 16839 15497 
 
 
13453 14354 
Drug related 
crime  52900 53810 62689 84001 
 
95690 104689 
Driving under the 
influence of 
alcohol or drugs 24553 22144 24886 29927 
 
 
33116 38261 
All theft not 
mentioned 
elsewhere 576676 620240 606460 536281 
 
 
432629 415163 
Commercial 58462 56232 55869 53931 54214 61690 
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Crime  
Shoplifting  68404 69005 71888 66525 64491 65489 
Totals 2628495 2747923 2666673 2493090 2266073 2220225 
(SAPS:  Crime in the RSA. http//www.saps.gov.za. Accessed 28 October 2007) 
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Again note that although the listed crime of ‘All theft not mentioned elsewhere’ remains 
overall the highest (415 163 reported cases) reported crime in South Africa, this is a non-
categorised crime. Accordingly for the purposes of this study it is not taken into account for 
comparative purposes. Therefore residential burglary still remains within the three highest 
crimes reported at SAPS national level. 
 
Within this context of the comparison of crime statistics residential burglary should be a 
priority crime, but in many police stations across Gauteng other more violent crimes (e.g. 
murder, vehicle hijacking, cash-in-transit heists, etc.) are more often the listed priority crimes. 
In other words, these are crimes to which priority is given in investigating and allocating 
resources for solving and dealing with them immediately, even though in strict numerical terms 
(frequency of incidence) they do not statistically top the list of reported crimes. 
 
For this reason, with specific reference to the crime of burglary, residential security measures 
should and do form a crucial crime preventative and reduction role by assisting in minimising 
these incidents and reporting them to the SAPS. This is largely a so-called private security 
crime detection approach. 
EXPLORING RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES 
In the context of the wider research the following (in brief) were some of the aspects of 
domestic security measures that were explored by the researcher in the course of this study. 
 
Neighbourhood watch 
Gated communities or better known as ‘boomed-off areas’ locally, have been under scrutiny 
for at least the past three years where communities have attempted to get these measures 
legalized with local government. 
 
Within the context of this study the researcher was very interested to establish whether these 
kinds of security initiatives can contribute towards reducing the incidence of residential 
burglaries. 
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In fact in mid-2003 the researcher had started a patrol concept with the Westcliff Security 
Community Forum, which mainly focused on bicycle patrols. However, these patrols were not 
implemented in boomed or gated areas. 
 
This concept did lead to a reduction in violent crimes in the patrolled areas and had successes 
in detecting attempted trespassing and apprehended suspects in residential burglary cases. 
 
In the interview with Snr Supt Moodley from Parkview Police Station, he advised the 
researcher that for the years of 2004 and 2005, only four cases and one case violent crime 
incidents respectively were reported in his policing precinct and not one of them occurred in 
Westcliff (Moodley, 2005). 
 
Close circuit television systems 
In the residential environment, Closed Circuit Television (hereafter referred to as CCTV) is 
regarded as a system where the resident owner wants to know who stands at his/her main gate 
or pedestrian gate. (This assertion is based on the researcher’s own findings when conducting 
the residential security audits for this study). However, the researcher also found that this need 
(seeing who is at the gate) is not effective in the long-term since such a system is not crime 
prevention or crime reduction effective without any recording and storage of movements 
(persons) detected. 
 
Therefore, again in the context of this study, the researcher was interested in how CCTV would 
be more cost effective in the near future for the residential environment and not only effective 
in looking after the gate and perimeter (by recording movement) but also whether it would be 
cost sufficient for the corporate, retail and industrial environments. 
 
It must be stated here that there are systems available for the residential environment where the 
CCTV camera will be able to send the homeowner an e-mail to a computer (say in his/her 
office) or a SMS to a cellphone with a picture taken of the movement (person) detected. 
 
The use of CCTV and the link to private security companies can also be an interesting topic to 
ensure that armed response will minimise (reduce) the responding to false alarms and such 
companies would then only have to respond to definite alarm activations. 
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Closed circuit systems TV have not been implemented in general due to high maintenance and 
cost, but they are still a factor that the researcher would like to explore in terms of other case 
studies and in particular whether they can contribute substantially towards the reduction of 
residential burglaries. 
 
Perimeter types 
The use of palisade verses a solid brick wall as your main perimeter in the domestic security 
environment proved in this study to always be a topic for interesting discussion between the 
researcher and various other security specialists and residential homeowners. 
 
Issues such as the “acceptable” height of a perimeter boundary were also another interesting 
topic in these discussions. For instance the question “should one add electrified fencing to a 
four meter high wall?” was a question that the research sought to answer. 
 
Electrified fencing 
The use of electrified fencing is no longer only applicable for business premises and these days 
are also used in the residential environment. 
 
Generally the researcher found (from the researcher’s own experience in managing security 
projects within the residential environments and from the actual research – see research 
findings chapter for detail) that the implementation of electrified fencing somehow provides 
the homeowner with a sense of security. In many cases this is the first security measure that 
gets implemented. 
 
Another topic of research in this study regarding electrified fencing was to see whether a main 
vehicle gate is covered (protected) with electrified fencing (along the top) and if so, whether 
this section of electrified fencing is connected properly to the rest of the electrified fencing 
system in order to ensure continuity in the electrical current. 
 
From the residential security audits undertaken in his working environment the researcher 
found that in some instances the electrified fencing energizer is not connected to the armed 
response monitoring radio. The main reason found for this was largely due to the fact that 
armed response companies would not connect this without the electrified fencing initial 
installer being present (i.e. to validate the action). 
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Motorised vehicle gates 
The use of motorised vehicle gates is not uncommon and is used by many residential owners. 
In this study the securing of gate motors and the monitoring of them were a crucial security 
element to be researched.  
 
The researcher therefore aimed to establish whether these additional security measures on the 
gate automation system were present at the time of the residential burglary incident. 
 
Pedestrian gates 
Pedestrian gates and the level of robustness was a further research point in this study. The use 
of pedestrian gates by burglars to gain access to a house was also investigated in this research 
either through the victim interviews or the residential security audits. Here the researcher was 
interested in exploring whether this was a possibility as the modus operandi in the majority of 
the cases and especially in the Parkhurst area where wooden doors are still widely in use.36 
 
Infrared beams 
Infrared beams and the positioning thereof is a very important and integral part of the 
residential security system in terms of early detection particularly when the perimeter layer has 
been bridged by an intruder. In this study it was therefore a focus to establish whether this was 
present at the time of the residential burglary (selected case study) or if it was implemented 
afterwards (post-incident), In addition, whether this post-incident implementation had any 
impact on the reduction of burglaries. Moreover, if infrared breams are present as part of the 
overall security system at a house whether they detected suspects and also if this (detection) 
contributed towards any arrests. An ancillary issue for the research being the effectiveness of 
the infra-red beams and whether new technology will in future reduce false alarms.37 
 
Flood lights 
Floodlights and the positioning thereof formed another interesting area of exploration for the 
research. 
 
                                               
36 This particular piece of information is gleaned from the researcher’s own observations over the last three years 
where the researcher had personal experience in responding to burglary crime scenes and found that pedestrian 
gates were a common point of entry and a hard reality since entry through a pedestrian gate is done with minimal 
disruption to the locking mechanisms. 
37 From personal experience in managing residential security systems the researcher has found that false alarms 
are common especially in the rainy season and also ‘activated’ by big birds like the Hadeda bird specie. 
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Door keys and locks 
The management of door keys and locks is another area which the researcher explored in order 
to establish whether that aspect, for example, regarded as mismanagement38 of keys, might be 
present during the victim interviews and/or residential security audits. 
 
Windows 
Windows and more specifically reference to the types of glass, the location of burglar proofing 
and the kind of burglar proofing are issues that the researcher dealt with on a regular basis in 
an effort to convince homeowners on their location and the importance thereof. In terms of the 
research those aspects dealing with whether burglar proofing is on the secure side, insecure 
side or non-presence thereof, and whether it would have an impact on the reduction and 
detection of burglaries, and the successful apprehension of suspects were dealt with in the 
residential security audits and victim interviews. 
 
Intruder detection alarm systems 
Security systems form an integral part of today’s residential security market. In many 
households it is the insurance company that ensures (enforces) the installation and 
implementation of intruder alarms is the responsibility of the homeowner or responsible tenant. 
Furthermore, the changing technology and the ever-changing and evolving crime modus 
operandi ensure that this market (for the increased installation of ‘total’ security systems) is 
here to stay. 
 
Moreover, the ever changing technology and the integration and compatibility with existing 
residential security systems was also of interest to the researcher, particularly of how installers 
adapt and apply the concept of integrating new systems with older (not only time wise but also 
technologically dated) existing systems. An example here would be how armed response 
companies integrate an electrified fencing energiser with an intruder alarm RF radio 
monitoring device. 
 
In this context one of the researcher’s concerns was the level of “after service” that a resident 
gets when signing an agreement with the armed reaction company. The important question is 
this context was whether ‘armed response companies really provide a quick response? If they 
                                               
38 Leaving of keys in locks was very noticeable (and visible) with many of the residential burglary scenes visited 
by the researcher. 
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do respond within five to seven minutes, will they have access (be able to get in, i.e. have keys 
to open gates and doors) to the residential property in order to investigate any incidence? 
 
TARGET AREAS 
The researcher has a personal interest in the Parkview policing area due to his security 
responsibilities with the company for whom he is currently working. 
 
The company has many employees including expatriates (citizens of other countries) residing 
within the Parkview residential suburbs and research in this area will not only enhance the 
researcher’s current experience regarding residential security audits, but also assist with the 
descriptive mapping techniques used in this study, expanding his information network with 
local police and community members and enhancing residential security measures with 
reference to the planning and implementation of and the formulation of final recommendations. 
 
(Please refer to Annexure 2: Map 2: Parkview policing area and the Annexure 3: Parkhurst 
residential area in this regard.) 
 
Furthermore, the researcher has also been involved with the Westcliff Security Community 
Forum (please refer to Annexure 4: Map 4: Upper Westcliff security forum area) for the last 
three years.39 In addition, has advised the community on how to minimise their exposure to 
violent crimes. (Violent crimes in the area were down to zero for the last two years.40) 
 
The real test here would be if the security measures approach will still be that effective in the 
next two years and, further, would the impact be a real decrease in the Parkview area 
prioritised crime of residential burglary? 
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY AND SECURITY SYSTEMS 
From the researcher’s practical experience, burglaries have occurred even after 
recommendations for the installation of additional security have been made. The researcher has 
found that burglaries also occur after such residential security measures have been 
implemented and then not in the predicted manner.  
                                               
39 Since April 2003 the researcher has been involved on the operations side with the Westcliff Security 
Community Forum.  
40 Violent crimes down for the time frame 2004 and 2005 
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An example of this, from one case of repeated burglary that occurred at the same residence, 
just a few weeks apart where the victim did not install electrified fencing (as recommended) on 
the newly installed palisade fence (an identified vulnerability), but instead the burglars gained 
access by forcing the gate motor open and not climbing over the palisade (as predicted).  
 
In any one burglary there are a number of unforeseen circumstances and conditions that can 
and might be exploited by burglars. Accordingly, with all these unforeseen predictions research 
in this specialised private security field is therefore of vital and security importance to all 
homeowners. As a consequence of these concrete findings in the research, results need to be 
formulated to ensure more accurate recommendations for the securing of one's property. 
 
One of the questions raised in preventing burglaries is whether crime such as burglaries can be 
better controlled through environmental design?41  
 
Naudè & Stevens (1988: 187) state that it is accepted in both police and private security circles 
that an iron palisade fence encircling your property allows for better observation by those 
responding to a crime in process on the property or an alarm activation in comparison to 
having a high concrete wall around one’s property. Accordingly, for example, the research 
results emanating from this study would then focus on establishing what type of perimeter was 
in place at the time of the residential burglary incident and, depending on type of perimeter 
fencing, make the appropriate recommendation for that situation.  
 
According to Naudè & Stevens (1988: 188) it is also known that security and protection of 
equipment has specifically been developed to protect people and buildings. Therefore, such 
equipment is installed and deployed so as to obstruct and impede (deter) the intrusion of 
unauthorised people. These would then realistically form a physical and symbolic barrier, 
which can contribute in preventing crime being perpetrated on such a protected property/house.  
 
Again in this context one of the central research questions was whether security system 
installers implement such security barriers correctly and do security consultants and the 
homeowner understand the concepts of “physical” and “symbolic” barriers correctly within the 
                                               
41 Suburbs need to have one entry to the area, which will assist community security initiatives with planning and 
to man only one entry point. This can be an example of environmental design. 
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various environments where installed, and with the requirements of different routines and the 
effective implementation and use thereof? 
 
A further research question posed was whether the right strategies (as opposed to mere 
equipment and security measures) are in place in order to counter the incidents of burglary? 
Strategies relates to an important finding made by Naudè & Stevens (1988: 190), namely that 
in 98,7% of the households surveyed, household negligence was probably the single most 
important cause of theft-related crimes. 
 
In this research project the researcher specifically noted whether the non-use of intruder alarm 
systems and the reasons given for such non-use (non-activation) relate to negligence on the 
homeowner side or on the part of the armed reaction monitoring company. 
 
To this end use of a practical risk audit (residential security audit and interview with victims) 
of burgled dwellings and crime analysis/crime descriptive mapping assisted in the primary aim 
of assessing security measures at dwellings and residents burgled in the target areas.  
 
According to McGuine et al (2000: 5), tactical crime analyses involves the pattern of detection, 
linkage analysis for suspect crime correlation, target profiling and offender movement patterns. 
This was the researcher’s approach in terms of trying to prove by means of the descriptive 
mapping whether there are any relationships (linkages), for example, between the location of 
the victim’s property in relation to distance from main entry and exit routes.  
 
McGuine further states that the difference between tactical analyses and strategic analyses is 
the timeliness of the data (McGuine et al, 2000: 5). The data collected in this study can in fact 
be used for strategic crime analysis due to the data covering a time period of more than a year 
(2001 and 2002). Furthermore, according to McGuine, (2000: 5), strategic crime analyses 
involves data covering at least one year and more whereas tactical crime analyses uses data 
collected over several days or as in the researcher’s case, two years of data. As a result the 
SAPS can well make use of this study (and its findings, results and recommendations) as an 
example for crime prevention strategies within the two target areas42 and possibly the general 
principles can be applied elsewhere as well. 
                                               
42 Westcliff and Parkhurst residential areas 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion to this contextualisation of the research field the final research question that 
arose was: Do residential security measures have an impact on managing the incidence of 
residential burglaries? 
 
A specific desired outcome from the research (in reporting of the results obtained through the 
victim interviews, residential security audits, docket analysis and descriptive mapping) would 
then be the better and more effective managing of the incidence of residential burglary by 
adding value in preventing this crime and by contributing towards minimising the possibility of 
the homeowner being exposed to this crime.  
 
All of the above is further encapsulated within the primary premise of the researcher wanting 
to provide a basic understanding to all on residential security measures in order for the reader 
to be able to integrate the results and recommendations into practice with a good chance of 
success. 
 
Overall the challenge still remains to provide the homeowner with cost effective and practical 
residential security solutions without compromising the basic security measures which should 
be in place. 
 
The research findings will now be discussed in the next chapter which will attempt to provide 
the reader with information which will contribute to assist with describing residential security 
measures. 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  131 
 
Chapter 7 
A SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF RESIDENTIAL 
SECURITY PLANS USING CASE STUDIES OF 
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will focus on the following in terms of research results: 
· Descriptive mapping; 
· Docket analysis; 
· Victim interviews; and 
· Residential audit and victim interview additional notes. 
 
Each of these sections will aim to provide detailed information on the following categories, 
namely: 
· Residential security measures that were in place at the time of the incident;  
· Security measures which were implemented post incident; 
· Variables in the residential area which might have had a direct or indirect relationship 
with residential burglary;  and 
· Any other variables not noted through the docket analysis, descriptive mapping or 
victim interviews. 
DESCRIPTIVE MAPPING 
The descriptive mapping phase aimed to determine whether there were any other variables 
within the vicinity of the victim locations. 
 
The following focus areas for analysis and identification of possible variables were examined 
by means of the descriptive mapping process:  
· Quantifying the incidence of burglaries committed at residences of victims within a 
grid;  
· Total number of burglaries committed within a grid; 
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· Grid location in relation to community entertainment places, business property and 
open unoccupied property; 
· Quantifying victim location in relation to other victims within same grid reference; 
· Victim location in relation to main access roads; 
· Victim location in relation to dead-end roads; 
· Quantification of dead-end road descriptions in the same reference grid where victims 
were located;  and 
· Quantifying victim location in relation to street location within a grid. 
 
Quantifying the incidence of burglaries committed at the residences of victims within a 
grid  
 
The following graph quantifies the burglaries in the various categories of one, two and three 
burglaries committed at victims’ residences for both the Parkhurst and Westcliff residential 
areas: 
Pie Chart 5:  Burglary incidence categories for Parkhurst and Westcliff residential areas 
 
The majority (89%) of the victims in the research sample experienced at least one burglary 
within the time frame of two years (period covered by the research). Nine percent (9%) of the 
victims experienced two burglaries within the two-year time frame while 2% experienced three 
burglaries within the same time frame. 
 
Category Burglary Cases 
89% 
9% 2% 
One burglary 
Two burglaries 
Three burglaries 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  133 
 
The total number of burglaries committed within a grid reference 
The following graphs illustrate the following: 
· Total number of burglaries within each grid for Parkhurst  
· Total number of burglaries within each grid for Westcliff 
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Bar Graph 2:  Total number of burglaries within each grid: Parkhurst  
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Grid 10 and 11 has the most incidents within a grid reference. Grid 11 is situated within same 
grid where you will find a dead end road closed by an occupied property and also a dead end 
road closed with a palisade and controlled barrier. The grid is also within same grid reference 
to the river. Grid 10 is next to Grid 11 and next to river (Not within same grid reference from 
river, but next to it). 
 
The nature of goods taken is not clear and if it were small items such as jewellery and clothes, 
possibility that it was executed by foot and not vehicle is possible.  
 
Bar Graph 3:  Total number of burglaries within each grid: Westcliff 
 
The majority of the cases were within Grid W12. The grid is situated within one grid reference 
from one main road and the same grid reference from another main road. The grid also has a 
dead end area closed with a wall. Access could mainly be by vehicle due to the dead end road 
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closed with a wall unless the nature of goods removed were small such as jewellery and clothes 
and removed from the property by foot. 
 
The two areas cannot be compared in terms of total burglaries due to the difference in their 
respective population sizes.  
 
The grids in Parkhurst included on average two residential blocks which also differ in size 
compared to the grids used in Westcliff where a residual block is bigger in size than those in 
Parkhurst. 
 
The following graph illustrates the average number of burglaries committed within each grid 
for the Parkhurst and Westcliff residential areas respectively: 
 
Bar Graph 4:  Average number of burglaries committed within each grid for Parkhurst  
                         and Westcliff residential areas  
 
A further comparison can be drawn using the Mann-Whitney U test. This conclusion is based 
on the fact that the two samples, Parkhurst and Westcliff is not paired, and therefore we can 
make use of this method. 
 
The test to be done is to determine whether the pattern in burglaries within a grid is the same 
(H0) or the pattern of burglaries within a grid is not the same (H1). 
 
The results were as follow: 
Z = -2.17>±1.96 
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The null hypothesis had to be rejected because Z is greater the 95% confidence level. The 
changes that the pattern of burglaries within a grid is the same will be at a 70% confidence 
level as per the calculated Z – value. 
 
Comparing two populations (Westcliff and Parkhurst), the p-value is 0.009 and smaller than 
0.05. The H0 and again the patterns in burglaries within a grid is not the same. 
 
Grid location in relation to community entertainment places, business property and 
unoccupied and open properties 
 
The following chart illustrates victim location in relation to entertainment places, business 
property, unoccupied and open properties. 
 
Pie Chart 6: Victim location in relation to community entertainment places, business  
                        property, unoccupied and open properties 
 
 
The results of the above analysis indicate that the majority of the victim locations (50%) were 
within one grid away from entertainment places, business property, unoccupied and open 
properties while 35% were located within the same grid. 
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Quantifying victim location in relation to other victims within a grid 
The following chart quantifies victim location in relation to other victims within the same 
grid. 
Pie Chart 7: Quantification of victim locations in relation to other victims within the  
                same grid  
 
The majority of the victims (63%) were stand alone and not immediately neighbouring on 
either side or back or directly opposite the road or street area to other victims’ locations 
(residences). A total of 196 victims in [number of] grids were recorded with two of the grids 
having no victims recorded. 
 
Victim location in relation to main access roads or streets  
The pie chart below illustrates victim location in relation to main access roads or streets based 
on the grid reference system used in the descriptive mapping. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptive mapping:  Quantifying victim location in relation with 
other victims within same grid reference 
24% 
13% 63% 
Immediate neighbour on 
Either side 
Directly across the road 
Stand alone property 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  139 
 
Pie Chart 8: Victim location in relation to main access roads and streets  
The majority of the victims (40%) were located within the same grid vicinity as the main roads 
and streets. 
 
Victim location in relation to dead-end roads. 
The following chart quantifies the victim location in relation to dead-end roads by using the 
grid reference system. 
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Pie Chart 9: Victim location in relation to dead-end roads or streets 
 
The results indicate that the majority of the victims (41%) were within one reference grid from 
a dead-end road or street area and 33% were present within same grid reference. 
 
Quantification of dead-end road descriptions in the same grid reference where victims 
were located 
The following chart quantifies the various dead-end road/street descriptions found where 
victims were located within the same grid. 
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Pie Chart 10:  Dead-end road/street descriptions where victims were located within the  
                  same grid  
Wire diamond mesh fencing in majority of the areas is non existent in that they are in a poor 
condition although they do exist. Poor condition relates to poorly maintained and as a result 
there are holes in the fence, uprights are not fixed to a base such as concrete etc. In 14% of the 
cases there were wire diamond mesh fence, which contributes to the possibility of being used 
as entry and exit points by burglars. 
 
Quantifying victim location in relation to location on a street within a grid 
The following chart quantifies the location of a victim’s residence in relation to its actual 
location (where sited) on a street in order to indicate whether the victim was located: 
· On a street corner; 
· In the middle of a street; [this is two different locations – they should not be combined -
split into a third category and apply to analysis results as well] 
· Close to a street corner (2 – 3 house away from the corner) 
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Pie Chart 11:  Location of victim’s residence in relation to location on a street within a  
                grid  
 
The largest proportion (41%) of the victims was located close to a corner property while 37% 
of the victims were located in the middle of the street and 22% of the victims were sited on a 
corner. 
 
Corner properties were less exposed (twenty-two percent) 
 
DOCKET ANALYSIS 
The main research aim of the docket analysis was to gather contact information on the victims 
in order to schedule the victim interviews. 
 
The sample, as previously discussed, consisted of a total of 70 dockets. Each of these was 
individually analysed. 
 
The information from the seventh sampled docket was lost through a possible software 
problem and therefore the actual number of dockets analysed was 69.  
 
This section contains a discussion of all the secondary results obtained from the docket 
analysis. 
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Quantifying the day of the week of occurrence for burglary incidents 
The following chart will quantify on which day of the week the burglary occurred and whether 
there are any significant clustering, e.g. over a weekend.  
 
Pie Chart 12:  Day of week for burglary occurrences 
 
The majority of the burglaries (72%) in the docket sample occurred during the week while only 
28% occurred over a weekend (Saturday and Sunday).  
 
Quantifying the day of the week on which burglary occurred  
The following chart illustrates which days the burglaries in the docket sample occurred and on 
which days more burglaries occurred than on others.  
 
Bar Graph 5:  Day of week on which burglary occurred  
 
The majority of the burglary incidents (16 out of the 69 sample dockets) occurred on a Friday 
followed by 13 on a Monday while the weekend (Saturday and Sunday combined) was the 
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same number as Monday (13). This would indicate that burglaries were not necessarily 
perpetrated more frequently over weekends.  
 
Quantifying the method of access into the immediate house area 
The following chart will illustrate the most popular areas used to intrude the immediate house 
area. 
 
              Bar Graph 6: Intrusion methods used to gain access to the immediate house area 
Docket analysis - Quantifying method of access into immediate house area
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The most popular areas were the window areas and door areas. In 20% of the cases the doors 
were forced open and in 19% of the cases the windows were broken in an attempt to intrude 
the immediate house area. 
The researcher did not have a consistency in reporting on which particular door or window and 
could not report on results indicating specific areas due to dockets not mentioning the exact 
location of the specific door or window described. 
 
Intrusion through the roof area was not very popular at the time (one case). 
 
Quantifying the victims with intruder alarm systems 
The following chart will quantify victims with and without intruder detection alarm systems. 
 
Pie Chart 13:  Victims with and without intruder detection alarm systems 
 
 
The majority of the victims (56%) did not have an intruder detection alarm system. This 
explains the possibility of burglaries being detected within a reasonable time frame where it 
could have been detected. 
 
VICTIM INTERVIEWS 
The main aim of the victim interviews was to establish what security measures, if any, were in 
place, implemented and used, at the time of the residential burglary occurrence. 
 
There were a total of twenty victim interviews as discussed in Chapter 3: Research 
Methodology. 
Victims with intruder alarm systems 
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The results from the interviews are presented by means of bar charts and expressed in 
frequency. 
 
General information on the victims 
Types of dwelling 
The following bar chart quantifies the types of dwellings as identified during the interviews 
with victims.  
 
Bar Graph 7:  Types of dwelling 
 
The majority of the victims (17 out of the 20 interviews) resided in single standalone homes. 
Employment status 
The following bar chart quantifies interviewee (victim) employment status. 
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Bar Graph 8:  Interviewee (victim) employment status 
 
All the victims were employed at the time of the incident and the next two bar charts will 
describe whether the victims worked away from their homes. 
Employment status by type 
The following bar chart quantifies the different victim employment status types at the time the 
burglary occurred. 
 
Bar Graph 9:  Employment status by type 
 
The majority of the victims (15 out of the 20 interviews) were full time employees and all are 
assumed to have worked a normal eight hour day five days a week (with occasional nine-ten 
hour longer overtime days). 
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Victims working from home 
The following bar chart (refer to Bar graph 10: Victims working from home) quantifies victims 
who worked from and away from home. 
 
Bar Graph 10:  Victims working from and away from home 
 
The majority of the victims (13 out of the 20 interviews) worked away from home. The two 
respondents marked as “not applicable” explains one respondent had a domestic dispute and 
did not answer this question and the second respondent is a business owner and this question 
was not applicable to him. 
 
The following results may be of use in indicating whether the presence of persons authorised to 
be on the property (e.g. garden services or domestic help) have an impact on the incidence of 
residential burglary and what exact impact these activities might have. 
Persons other than owner or responsible tenant authorised to be at the burgled residence site 
The following bar chart quantifies, according to victims, whether there should have been 
anyone at the residence at the time the burglary incident occurred.  
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                  Bar Graph 11:  Persons other than owner or responsible tenant authorised to be at  
                        residence at time of burglary  
Victim interviews - Persons other than owner or responsible tennant authorised to be on the 
premises
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In the majority of the cases (nine out of the 20 interviews) there was nobody supposed to be at 
the residence or the premises at the time of the burglary incident. In only three cases were 
either a gardener or domestic help supposed to be present at the residence, while in two cases 
each it was only domestic help or another family member, and then one case each for gardener, 
business partner or domestic help, gardener and business partner. Accordingly for this 
particular study the above results could well point to the assumption that the presence of 
approved persons at the residence might well have acted as deterrence i.e. lead burglars to 
choose houses where no-one is present – authorised or otherwise – thereby contributing to 
homeowners/renters not becoming victims of a burglary.  
 
Neighbourhood 
Possible impact of the presence of neighbourhood watches 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who were subscribing to a 
neighbourhood watch initiative in their area. 
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                 Bar Graph 12:  Presence of a neighbourhood watch within the immediate vicinity of the  
                    victim’s property 
 
 
The majority of the victim’s (16 out of the 20 interviews) did not subscribe to a neighbourhood 
watch initiative at the time of the burglary incident.  
Contractor works in relation to victim location 
The following bar chart indicates the number of contractors working in the area and where they 
were working in relation to the victim’s property. 
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Bar Graph 13:  Contractor works in relation to victim location 
 
 
In the majority of the interviews (16 out of the 20 interviews) there were contractors working 
in the suburb. Furthermore, in thirteen out of the twenty interviews, there were contractors 
working within the immediate residential block where the victim resided. 
 
The following drawing will illustrate the immediate residential block where the victim location 
is indicated by a red square:  
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Drawing 10: Drawing illustrating an immediate residential block 
 
 
Perimeter and perimeter (barrier) types 
CCTV 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims with and without Closed Circuit 
Television (CCTV) systems at their residences or serving their residential block. 
 
Bar Graph 14: Victims with or without CCTV 
 
None of the victims had any CCTV systems installed at their residences or for their residential 
block. 
 
Accordingly no conclusion can be drawn in this study of whether the installation (presence) of 
CCTV either at their residences or serving the residential block might have increased the 
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probability of the victim not to be burgled. However, previous studies have indicated that the 
implementation of CCTV surveillance systems reduce the incidence of all crime in the area 
being surveyed, although whether this is merely a reduction due to displacement of crime to 
other areas still has to be established through more in-depth research.  
Perimeters enclosed 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who had their entire perimeter 
enclosed with some form of a physical barrier. 
 
               Bar Graph 15: Victims who had a perimeter barrier enclosing their entire  
                         property 
 
The above clearly indicate that every single one of the victims had a physical perimeter barrier 
enclosing their property. 
 
The following sections will focus on the different types of perimeter barriers used by victims to 
enclose their properties. 
 
The following bar indicates the number of different types of perimeter barriers enclosing the 
property of the victims at the time the burglary occurred. 
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                Bar Graph 16: Types of perimeter barriers present at the time of the burglary incident 
 
 
The majority (17 out of the 20 interviews) of the victims had a brick wall enclosing their entire 
perimeter or only sections of their perimeter. It is interesting to note that from the above results 
a minority of the victims (five out of the 20 interviews) had palisade fencing. It is not clear 
from these results whether the better visibility (can see into a property) provided by palisade 
fencing as opposed to solid brick walls might be a deterrent factor in burglaries (See 
Recommendation: Future research). 
 
Penetrable areas on the perimeter  
The following bar chart indicates the number of possible penetrable areas was non existent and 
all the victims stated that there were no penetrable areas according to the various possibilities 
pointed out to them, during the interviews. 
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                   Bar Graph 17:  Possible penetrable areas on the perimeter attended/not attended to  
                      prior to the incident 
 
Electrified fencing 
The following bar chart indicates the number of burglary victims (from the sample) in the 
Westcliff and Parkhurst areas who either had or did not have electrified fencing at the time of 
the incident. 
 
Bar Graph 18:  Victims with electrified fencing 
 
The majority of the victims (fifteen out of the 20 interviews) did not have electrified fencing 
installed on their perimeters. 
 
From the interviews and residential audits it was clear that those who did have electrified 
fencing showed or exhibited the following characteristics: 
· It was the neighbour’s fence and not entirely covering the victim’s perimeter; 
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· The electric fence energiser not connected to the armed response company monitoring 
unit; 
· The electrified fencing energiser not switched; and 
· The fence was pulled down and did not have loop detectors. 
 
Methods used to switch the electrified fencing energisers on and off 
Four of the twenty victims had electrified fencing and this is how they switched their fencing 
on and off: 
· Two of the victims used a physical key; 
· One of the victims used a keypad; and 
· One victim did not have control over the electrified fence since it was installed and 
operated by the neighbour.  
 
The use of physical keys poses a possible problem in that it gets left in the energiser and 
increases possibility of being switched off and then is neglected to being switched on again.  
 
The victim who did not have any control over the switching on and off of the electrified 
fencing was faced with the possible problem of the shared perimeter electrified fence not being 
switched on by the neighbour, the fence being faulty and the victim not being aware of the 
fence being off. Nor is it legally required of the neighbour to report any of this state of the 
electrified fence to the victim unless there was a formal or informal agreement to do this.  
Monitoring methods used with electrified fencing energisers 
Four of the twenty victims had electrified fencing and below are the reported methods of how 
their electrified fencing was monitored: 
· Two victims had a combination of a siren and link to the contracted armed response 
company;  
· One victim only had a remote keypad. A remote keypad is a keypad managing the 
electrified fencing energiser from another area within the residential property, i.e. 
energiser is in the garage and the remote keypad is in the main bedroom; and 
· One victim did not have full control over fence due to fence being controlled by 
neighbour. 
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Time frame before the incident when the electrified fencing was installed 
The following bar chart will illustrate the length of time the electrified fence was installed 
before the reported burglary occurred. 
 
                   Bar Graph 19:  Length of time the electrified fence installed before the reported    
                   burglary occurred  
 
 
While four out of the twenty victims had electrified fencing the bar chart is applicable only to 
three of them since the fourth victim did not have control over the fence and was under their 
neighbour’s control. 
 
Two of the victims had their electrified fencing systems installed within twelve months prior to 
the residential burglary incident and one victim had their system installed within two years 
prior to the residential burglary incident. 
 
The next question to the victims is no longer applicable (i.e. how long before the incident were 
the backup battery supplies changed?) since in all three of the cases the fencing was installed 
within two years prior to the incident and in practical terms such batteries only need to be 
replaced every two-three years. So in these specific cases above the batteries should still have 
been acceptable in terms of technical specifications on a battery changing schedule.   
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Calls received from armed reaction team/company monitoring alarm signals from the 
electrified fencing 
Two of the three victims who had electrified fencing and full control over their systems and 
connected to an armed response company, did not receive any calls or a response from any 
armed response or guarding company to any alarm violation conditions. 
Vehicle gate motors 
The following bar chart indicates the number of burglary victims (from the sample) in the 
Westcliff and Parkhurst areas who either had or did not have motorised vehicle gate(s) on 
victim properties at the time of the incident. 
 
                Bar Graph 20: Victims with motorised vehicle gates  
 
 
The majority of the victims (fourteen out of the twenty victims) had motorised vehicle gate/s 
on their properties (twelve having only a single motorised gate). 
 
In this study the researcher was interested in establishing whether the automation system on 
such motorised gates was safeguarded from possible tampering and intrusion. An example of 
vehicle gate automation safeguarding would be to lock down the gate motor enclosure with a 
steel bracket to minimise the electronics being exposed to tampering. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of burglary victims (from the sample) in the 
Westcliff and Parkhurst areas who either had or did not have their vehicle gate(s) connected to 
an intruder alarm system at the time of the incident. 
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                Bar Graph 21: Victims with motorised vehicle gates connected to an intruder alarm  
                     system 
 
The majority of the victims (seventeen out of the twenty interviews) did not have their vehicle 
gates connected to an intruder alarm system at the time of the incident.  
 
Connecting the vehicle gate to the intruder alarm system can be done with a heavy duty gate 
monitor, infra red beam etc. Early detection could have been established with the gate 
connected to the intruder alarm system and only applicable if the intruder alarm was armed at 
the time of the incident and the perpetrator(s) used the vehicle gate to gain entry into the 
victim’s property 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of burglary victims (from the sample) in the 
Westcliff and Parkhurst areas who either had or did not have their vehicle gate 
motor(s)/automation connected to an electronic keypad at the time of the incident. 
 
Vehicle gate motors and automation system do refer to the same device in that provides the 
gate with a mechanism to open and close automatically and not just manually. 
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               Bar Graph 22: Victims with vehicle gate automation systems connected to an electronic 
                   keypad   
 
None of the victims had electronic keypads connected to their vehicle gate automation systems. 
 
Electronic keypads can provide armed response companies with access into properties and so 
do keys to pedestrian gate locks and remotes for gate automation. This can provide armed 
response companies with the ability to investigate alarm violation conditions more in depth by 
conducting a physical patrol on the home owner’s property and not just from the side walk 
through the vehicle gate or pedestrian gate. 
 
The following bar chart (refer to Bar graph 23: Persons other than owner or responsible tenant 
who had access to activating the vehicle gate automation system) indicates persons other than 
the homeowner or the responsible tenant who had access to opening and closing the vehicle 
gate on the burgled property at the time of the incident.  
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               Bar Graph 23: Persons other than owner (and family members) or responsible tenant  
                   who had access in activating the vehicle gate automation system 
 
 
The majority of the victims (nine out of the twenty interviews) said that nobody was supposed 
to have access to either keypad access codes, remotes or gate keys for opening and closing the 
vehicle gate or releasing its manual device (the vehicle gate release lever). 
Manual locking devices on vehicle gates 
The following bar chart indicates the number of burglary victims (from the sample) in the 
Westcliff and Parkhurst areas who either had or did not have their automated vehicle gates 
fitted with manual locking devices at the time of the incident.  
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               Bar Graph 24: Victims’ motorised vehicle gates fitted with or without manual locking  
                   devices 
 
There is no substantial difference between victims who had a manual locking device fitted to 
their automated vehicle gate and those victims without it. (In this instance a lock and chain can 
also be considered to be a manual locking device). This has been explored in terms of 
automation failures where the victim locked the gate manually whilst the automation system 
was faulty. 
 
The possibility of automation systems in failures state would raise the issue of how was the 
vehicle gates were locked down.  
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of persons other than the owner, family members 
or responsible tenant who had access to locking and unlocking the manual locking device on 
the vehicle gate  
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              Bar Graph 25: Persons other than owner, family members or responsible tenant who had  
                 access to locking and unlocking manual locking device on the vehicle gate 
 
The above results indicate that the majority of the victims who had a manual locking device 
fitted to their vehicle gates, had someone else other than the owner, family members or 
responsible tenant having access to locking and unlocking the manual locking device on the 
vehicle gate. 
 
The following bar chart establishes (identifies) who the persons, other than owner, family 
members or responsible tenant, were who had access to locking and unlocking the manual 
locking device on the vehicle gate  
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               Bar Graph 26: Persons other than owner, family members or responsible tenant who had  
                 access to the locking and unlocking of the manual locking device on the  
                 vehicle gate 
 
The above chart does not provide any conclusive statistics indicating that either children or 
personnel of the owner or responsible tenant were in any way responsible for a possible breach 
(access through vehicle gate by the burglars) in the security system. In other words whether the 
breach can be ascribed to their possibly neglecting to responsibly control the use of the lock 
keys to the vehicle gate.   
Backup battery supply units 
The following bar chart indicates the number of burglary victims (from the sample) in the 
Westcliff and Parkhurst areas who either had or did not have backup battery supplies 
connected to the vehicle gate automation systems at the time of the burglary incident. (Such 
batteries could possibly have an impact on private security companies being able to access or 
not access a victim’s property via vehicle gates if there is a general power failure at the time of 
the occurrence of the burglary incident.  
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Bar Graph 27: Automated vehicle gates with backup battery supply units 
 
The majority of those victims (ten of the twelve victims) who had an automated system 
connected to their vehicle gates did not have a backup battery supply. 
 
A backup battery supply is crucial if there is an electronic keypad connected to the automation 
system. Such a backup battery allows the armed response team to gain access to the property 
even if there is a power failure. 
 
In this study there were no victims with electronic keypads linked to the automated vehicle 
gate and therefore one cannot conclude that the absence of a backup battery could possibly 
have contributed to armed response companies not being able to gain access to the victim’s 
properties if there is a power failure at the time of the incident. 
 
It is not common for armed response companies, within the two residential areas (where the 
research took place), to have access to the remotes activating the vehicle gate automation 
system and so the above situation would also be applicable to them gaining access to properties 
at times of incidents occurring.  
Additional security features fitted to vehicle gate automation systems 
The following bar chart indicates the number of burglary victims (from the sample) in the 
Westcliff and Parkhurst areas who either had or did not have additional security features fitted 
to safeguard their vehicle gate automation systems against possible tampering at the time of the 
burglary incident. 
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                Bar Graph 28: Victims who had additional security features fitted to their vehicle gate  
                    automation systems 
 
There is no significant difference between victims who had additional security features (five 
out of the twelve victims who had a vehicle gate automation system) and victims who did not 
have any additional security features (seven out of the twelve victims). 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number and specific kind of additional security features 
fitted to the vehicle gate automation systems at the time of the burglary incident 
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               Bar Graph 29:  Specific additional security features fitted to the vehicle gate automation  
                   systems 
 
Three of the five victims who had additional security features fitted to their vehicle gate 
automation systems had anti-theft brackets one had a manual lock securing the manual lever  
and one had a remote receiver activating the intruder alarm to disarm if an remote transmitter 
was used to open the vehicle gate motor43.  
 
There is not much difference in the number of victims (seven out of the twelve) without any 
additional security features fitted to their vehicle automation system versus those with (five out 
of the twelve) and therefore it cannot be concluded in this study that the absence or presence of 
additional security features to vehicle gate automation systems had any impact on the 
occurrence or not of a residential burglary  
 
 
 
                                               
43 The remote receiver switches the intruder alarm off when the remote is pressed to activate the gate 
motor/automation. This ensures that the intruder alarm at the vehicle gate will remain an instant zone when 
someone tries to force the gate open and will activate the intruder alarm immediately. 
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Perimeter pedestrian gates 
The following bar chart indicates the number of the victims that had perimeter pedestrian gates 
at the time of the burglary incident.  
Bar Graph 30:  Number of victim’s with perimeter pedestrian gates 
 
The majority of the victims (sixteen out of twenty victims) had perimeter pedestrian gates  
This can only be conclusive to have an impact on the incidence of residential burglary if it can 
be proven that the perpetrator(s) used the pedestrian gate as entry and exit points. 
Number of perimeter pedestrian gates 
The following bar chart indicates the number of pedestrian gates on the perimeter of the 
victim’s property at the time of the burglary incident.   
 
               Bar Graph 30:  Number of perimeter pedestrian gates at victim’s properties 
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The majority of the victims (fifteen out of the twenty victims) had one perimeter pedestrian 
gate on their property and one victim had two pedestrian gates. 
Perimeter pedestrian gate locking mechanisms 
The following bar chart indicates the number of specific locking mechanisms used on the 
perimeter pedestrian gates of the victim’s property at the time of the burglary incident.  
 
               Bar Graph 31:  Specific perimeter pedestrian gate locking mechanisms 
 
There is no substantial difference in the various specific locking mechanisms used on the 
perimeter pedestrian gates and therefore it cannot be concluded in this study that the presence 
of a specific perimeter pedestrian lock possibly increased possibility of a perimeter pedestrian 
gate used to intrude into the victim’s property. 
 
As stated previously, if there were proof of pedestrian gates used as entry and exit points, one 
could then extend the research to types of locks and determine if the type of lock and incidence 
of burglary had a relationship. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of specific persons other than the owner or the 
responsible tenant who had access to the locking and unlocking of the perimeter pedestrian 
gates of the victim’s property at the time of the burglary incident.  
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Bar Graph 32: Specific persons other than owner or responsible tenant who had access to  
                           the locking and unlocking of the perimeter pedestrian gates 
 
The majority of the victims (seven out of fifteen victims) had allowed their domestic workers 
to lock and unlock their perimeter pedestrian gates. Furthermore, five out of fifteen and three 
out of fifteen victims also allowed their gardeners and tenants and children respectively to lock 
and unlock perimeter pedestrian gates.  
Electrical striker locks  
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who had electrical striker locks fitted 
to their perimeter pedestrian gates at the time of the burglary incident. 
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               Bar Graph 33: Number of electrical striker locks fitted to perimeter pedestrian gates  
 
Three out of the twenty victims had electrical striker locks fitted to their perimeter pedestrian 
gate(s). However, none of these, three victims had backup battery supply units connected to 
their electrical striker locks. This shortcoming had the same potential regarding power supply 
failures and preventing an armed response gaining access through such pedestrian gates as with 
vehicle gates if such power failures were to occur at the same time as the burglary incident. 
 
In the case of power failures and where the pedestrian gate is also connected to an electronic 
keypad to be the entry point for the armed response company, it would then again be 
impossible for the armed response company to gain access to the property to investigate alarm 
activation. 
 
However, such a situation was not applicable in this study since none of the twenty victims had 
an electronic keypad connected to any electronic or electrical locks on the perimeter pedestrian 
gates. 
Automatic gate closure devices 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who had automatic gate closers fitted 
to their perimeter pedestrian gates at the time of the burglary incident.  
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               Bar Graph 34:  Number of pedestrian gates with automatic gate closure devices 
 
The majority of the victims (thirteen out of nineteen victims) did not have automatic gate 
closers on their perimeter pedestrian gates. Such automatic gate closers would have an impact 
on whether such gates close (lock) properly particularly if the gates were fitted with a slam 
lock, magnetic lock or electrical striker lock. 
 
Inner perimeter and garden areas 
Infra-red detection beams 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who had infra-red detection beams 
within their inner perimeter or garden areas at the time of the burglary incident.  
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               Bar Graph 35: Number of victims with infra-red detection beams within their inner  
                    perimeter and garden areas 
 
Based on the above-mentioned bar chart the majority of the victims (seventeen out of the 
twenty interviews) did not have infra-red detection beams within their inner perimeter or 
garden areas. As a consequence it can be postulated that there was no possibility of early 
detection (by infra-red detection beams) in the incidents of burglary on those victim properties 
not having any infra-red detection beams installed. Therefore detection would only have 
occurred where the intruders gained access to the immediate house area. Furthermore, this 
detection would only have been applicable in those cases where victims had armed (activated) 
their house intruder alarm systems. 
 
The two victims who had infra-red detection beams within their inner perimeter and garden 
area had these areas covered as follow: 
· One victim had all areas covered; and 
· One victim had only one side of the garden or inner perimeter covered by beams. 
 
Only one of the two victims, who had infra-red detection beams, had removed shrubs and other 
vegetation from the paths of their beams. Such removal is generally undertaken so as to ensure 
that false alarms will be minimal (i.e. wind moving branches or leaves can set of an infra-red 
beam). 
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Both the victims who had infra-red detection beams within their inner perimeter or garden 
areas did not bypass their infra-red detection beams. Bypassing beams would be done if as an 
example the beam is faulty, routine changes with new occupants on the property and beams are 
not accommodating their routine, etc. 
 
However, one of the victims with installed infra-red beams in the inner perimeter/garden area 
on occasion would bypass one of their beams due to their children moving in and out of the 
premises at irregular times which caused false alarms.  As a result this one beam was regularly 
bypassed as a matter of course in an attempt to minimise on false alarms.  
 
The other victim only had one beam installed in the inner perimeter/garden area. Therefore one 
can make the assumption that the entry point of the perpetrator(s) might well have been 
planned so as to avoid the beam area. 
Security floodlights  
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who had security lights/floodlights 
within their garden or inner perimeter areas at the time of the burglary incident. 
 
               Bar Graph 36: Victims with floodlights in their garden or inner perimeter areas 
 
The majority of the victims (sixteen out of the twenty interviews) had floodlights/security 
lights within their inner perimeter and garden areas. The question here would be how these 
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lights were managed in terms of switching them on and off. Such management (or 
mismanagement) can contribute to the variable of either increasing (creating opportunity) or 
decreasing (deterrence) the possibility of victims being burgled. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who had security lights/floodlights 
within their garden or inner perimeter areas floodlights that were operational at the time of the 
burglary incident. 
 
               Bar Graph 37: The number of operational floodlights within the garden or inner  
                      perimeter areas 
 
The majority of the victims (fourteen out of the sixteen interviews) had floodlights that were 
operational at the time of the incident. This could have an impact where the burglaries occurred 
during night time (only two incidents occurred during day time and this would not have an 
impact) and where the security lights can be a deterrent and detection mechanism with regards 
to residential burglary. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the various methods used to switch the security floodlights 
within the garden and inner perimeter areas on and off at the time of the burglary incident. 
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               Bar Graph 38: Methods of activation of the security floodlights within the garden or  
                    inner perimeter areas 
Only fourteen out of the twenty interviews have reference in this section. Another two victims 
are classified as not applicable to the security floodlights section due to the fact that the 
residual burglary incident occurred during the day time. The majority of the victims (eight out 
of the fourteen interviews) activated their security floodlights with a manual switch.  
 
A manual switch enables the victims to activate their security flood lights when they want to 
and also to switch it off at anytime. The day night sensor with a manual facility ensures that the 
security lights are activated when it is dark and switched off when the light lux level has 
increased to a value regarded as daytime. 
 
The researcher concludes in this particular research section that there would exist the 
possibility of human neglect where the security floodlights might not have been switched on 
(i.e. on a regular basis or consistently all the time). 
 
Immediate house area 
Doors 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who had locked all their external 
door/s (of the house) leading to the inner perimeter or garden areas at the time of the burglary 
incident. 
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               Bar Graph 39: The number of victims who had locked all the external doors leading to  
                   the inner perimeter or garden areas 
 
The majority of the victims (seventeen out of the twenty interviews) had all their doors leading 
to the inner perimeter or garden areas locked at the time of the burglary incident. 
 
The variable of leaving doors unlocked and thereby contributing to residential burglary cannot 
be concluded here for this research project since other variables such as the managing of the 
keys for the locking of these doors leading to external areas might well have an impact in terms 
of either increasing/decreasing the possibility of a person being burgled. Below an attempt is 
made to examine this variable in order to ascertain whether it might have had an impact 
(providing an opportunity for burglar entrance directly through an external door) on the 
occurrence of the actual burglary. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who left keys in door locks leading to 
the inner perimeter or garden areas at the time of the burglary incident. 
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              Bar Graph 40: The number of victims who left keys in doors leading to the inner   
                    perimeter and garden areas 
 
The majority of the victims (fourteen out of the twenty interviews) did not leave their keys in 
doors leading to the inner perimeter or garden areas. It can therefore not be concluded in this 
research that leaving keys in doors contributed to the possibility of being burgled. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of persons other than owner or responsible tenant 
who had access to the keys locking and unlocking the external door/s leading to the inner 
perimeter or garden areas at the time of the burglary incident. 
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               Bar Graph 41: The number of persons other than owner or responsible tenant who had   
                  access to external door keys 
 
In the majority of the responses, eleven of the victims gave their domestic workers access to 
(use of) external door keys, while in three cases each use of external door keys was extended to 
children and gardeners and in one case family. Additionally in only four cases were no-one 
else but the owner or responsible tenant having use of these keys (i.e. having control of the 
keys at any one time). 
 
The researcher concludes that in majority of the cases (16 out of possible 19 cases) there was 
more than the owner or responsible tenant who had access to the keys locking external doors. 
Safety/security gates 
The following bar chart indicates all the areas in the residence where safety/security gates were 
installed at the time of the burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 42:  Areas in residence of safety/security gate locations 
 
In the majority of the cases (nine of the twenty victims) safety/security doors had been installed 
to cover patio doors, followed by eight of the twenty victims who had their front doors and 
seven of the twenty victims who had their kitchen doors covered with safety/security doors at 
the time of the burglary incident. It can therefore be concluded that the majority of the victims 
(sixteen out of the twenty interviews) had some or the majority of their external doors secured 
by a safety/security gate. Three of the victims had none and one had no applicability to this 
question. 
Windows and burglar proofing 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims with burglar proofing on some or all of 
their windows at the time of the burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 43: The number of victims with burglar proofing on all or some of their  
                            external windows 
 
 
The majority of the victims (sixteen out of the twenty interviews) had burglar proofing 
securing all or some of their external windows. 
 
The question would be if all the windows were secured with burglar proofing and the outcome 
would be concluding if this result contributed to the victims being burgled. The following bar 
chart indicates which of the victims had all their windows covered with burglar proofing, some 
covered with burglar proofing and none covered with burglar proofing 
 
The following bar chart distinguishes between victims having all or only some windows 
covered with burglar proofing window guards. 
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               Bar Graph 44: The number of victims with all or some of windows covered with burglar  
                 proofing/window guards 
 
Majority of the victims (thirteen out of the sixteen victims) who had burglar proofing, had all 
their windows secured in this regard. 
 
In comparison with regard to the docket analysis where the following results were reflected: 
· 19% of the cases windows were broken;  
· 11% of the cases burglar proofing were forced open;  
· 11% of the cases the windows were forced open; and 
· and 20% of the cases where the doors were forced open, one could possibly state that 
just over 50 percent of those who experienced intrusion through windows, had burglar 
proofing (11% of the 19% of cases). In the majority of the interviews, 16 out of the 20 
victims had burglar proofing and 13 of the 16 victims had all areas covered with burglar 
proofing.  
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who closed their windows prior to the 
burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 45:  The number of victims who closed their windows prior to the  
                                 incident 
 
In this study it was found that the majority of the victims (twelve out of the twenty interviews) 
did not close their windows prior to the burglary incident. Therefore, within the context of 
possible factors (security shortcomings or security practices (routines) in existing security 
systems measures) in this study that could have contributed to the burglary incident, it can be 
concluded that open windows contribute to the possibility of being burgled. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of different reasons for windows being left open 
by victims prior to the burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 46:  Reasons for leaving windows open 
 
The majority of the victims (seven out of the twelve victims) left their windows open for fresh 
air ventilation. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of window areas that were secured by closed 
curtains during day time thereby concealing movement within from any possible intruders.  
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Bar Graph 47:  The number of window areas closed with curtains during day time 
 
The majority of the victims (eleven out of the twenty interviews) did not have any of their 
windows covered with curtains during day time and in three of the cases only some windows 
closed by curtains. Accordingly, it can be concluded in this study that windows without 
curtains closed during daytime contributed to the possibility of being burgled since (as a 
security measure), any internal movement was not concealed from possible intruders (i.e. 
serves as a deterrent factor). In other words an intruder possibly observing no movement might 
well conclude that this factor provides an opportunity and a motivation to burgle the house. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of window areas that were secured by closed 
curtains during night time thereby concealing movement within from any possible intruders.  
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Bar Graph 48:   Number of window areas closed with curtains during night time 
 
There is no distinct difference between victims who closed all of the windows with curtains 
during night time (nine of the twenty victims) and those who only closed some of the windows 
with curtains (seven out of the twenty victims). It cannot therefore be conclusively concluded 
that windows without curtains contributed to a person being burgled at night time. 
 
If burglaries are committed mostly during night time then one can conclude in this study that 
the covering of windows with curtains during day time might increase the possibility of not 
being burgled during the day and vice versa for night. 
Intruder alarm systems 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who had intruder alarms at the time of 
the burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 49: Number of victims with intruder alarm systems 
 
The majority of the victims (thirteen out of the twenty interviews) had intruder alarms. 
However, one cannot conclude from this result that the presence of intruder alarms increases 
the possibility of being burgled due to the possibility of other variables such as arming 
(activation) status of the intruder alarms. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who armed their intruder alarm 
systems prior to the burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 50: The number of victims who armed their intruder alarm systems 
 
There is almost no distinct difference between victims who armed their intruder alarm systems 
(seven out of the thirteen victims who had intruder alarms) and victims who did not arm their 
intruder alarm systems (six out of the thirteen victims who had intruder alarms). It cannot be 
concluded that the arming status of the intruder alarm can contribute to the possibility of being 
burgled or not being burgled due to other variables such as whether the intruder alarm was 
properly setup to cover all possible areas. 
 
The following were reasons for not arming the intruder alarm systems were provided by the 
respondents: 
· Faulty beam; 
· Irregular routine of other occupants causing false alarms; 
· Just moved into the premises and not familiar with the use of the alarm; 
· Not familiar in using the alarm; 
· Was at home; 
· Faulty alarm and not functional; and 
· Only use it when not at home and prefer use of dogs instead. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims with intruder alarms linked to an 
armed response monitoring facility prior to the burglary incident.  
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Bar Graph 51:  Number of victims with intruder alarms linked to an armed response  
                           monitoring facility 
 
The majority of the victims (eleven out of the thirteen victims who had intruder alarm systems) 
had intruder alarms linked to an armed response monitoring facility. However, it can not 
necessarily be concluded that having intruder alarms linked to an armed response facility 
would increase the likelihood of not being burgled. Again in these circumstances there are such 
variables as whether the alarm was armed at the time of the burglary incident, or for the armed 
response officer having access to the property – both of which can have an impact on whether 
an intruder alarm linked to a response monitoring facility is effective. 
 
Only two reasons for the intruder alarm systems not being linked to an armed response 
monitoring facility were given, namely: 
· Just moved into the house; and 
· Alarm was not functional. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victim’s intruder alarms that were tested prior 
to the burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 52:  The number of victims’ intruder alarms tested prior to the incident 
 
From the above chart there appears to be no significant difference in terms of becoming a 
victim of a burglary between those victims who tested their alarms prior to the incident (seven 
out of the thirteen victims who had intruder alarms) and those victims who did not test their 
intruder alarm systems (six out of the thirteen victims who had intruder alarm systems) before 
the burglary incident. Therefore it cannot be concluded that the testing of alarms prior to the 
burglary incident would minimise the possibility of a person being burgled or being exposed to 
a greater extent to a residential burglar. This assumption is based on variables such as the 
length of time i.e. how long before the incident the alarm was tested and the placement of 
hardware (infra-red beams (eyes) inside the house and finally to what extent these cover all 
possible areas of access. 
 
The time frames (how long) before the residential burglary incident that the intruder alarms 
were tested by victims ranged from days, weeks, months, annually and never. It can therefore 
not be concluded what the optimal time frame (i.e. how regularly) should be for testing an 
alarm system in order to minimise the likelihood of being exposed to a residential burglary 
incident. Within this context other possible variables such as whether the armed response 
monitoring device was properly linked to the intruder alarm, did the armed response give 
accurate feedback to the owner in terms of what alarm signals were received etc. must also be 
taken into account. 
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The following bar chart indicates the number of persons other than the owner or responsible 
tenant who had access to arming (activating) and disarming (putting off) the intruder alarm 
system. 
 
Bar Graph 53: The number of persons other than the owner or responsible tenant who  
                           had access to arming and disarming the intruder alarm system 
 
The majority of the alarm systems (eight of the thirteen victims who had intruder alarm 
systems) had persons other than the owner or responsible tenant who could arm and disarm it. 
One possible inference here is that there is possibly less control over an alarm system and it’s 
effectiveness the more users there are that have control over its activation and de-activation.  
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of specific persons other than the owner or 
responsible tenant who had access to the arming or disarming of the intruder alarm system. 
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Bar Graph 54: The number of specific persons other than the owner or responsible  
                             tenant who had access to the arming and disarming of the intruder  
                             alarm system 
 
The children of victims in five of the possible eight cases had access to the arming and 
disarming of the intruder alarm system. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of intruder alarm zones bypassed/isolated prior to 
the burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 54: The number of intruder alarm system zone bypassed/isolated prior to the  
                           incident 
 
None of the victims (possible seven out of the seven interviews who armed their intruder alarm 
systems) bypassed any zones on their intruder alarm systems. 
Panic buttons 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims with fixed panic buttons connected to 
their intruder alarm systems prior to the burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 55:  The number of victims with fixed panic buttons connected to their  
                                intruder alarm systems 
Victim interviews:  Quantifying victims with fixed panic 
buttons
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The majority of the victims (nine out of the thirteen victims who had intruder alarm systems) 
had fixed panic buttons connected to their intruder alarm systems. 
 
Fixed panic buttons as an additional deterrent factor in security systems are again dependent 
upon a number of variables inter alia detection of perpetrator movement by any of the 
occupants and quickly pushing of panic button; panic buttons not immediately reachable; 
location of the panic button not known or possibly not connected to a dedicated panic zone on 
the intruder alarm and armed response monitoring device. (Radio frequency device 
transmitting a panic signal back to the armed response control room) 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who had remote panic buttons. 
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Bar Graph 56:  Indicates number of victims with remote panic buttons 
 
There is no distinct difference between those victims who had remote panic buttons (six of the 
thirteen victims who had intruder alarm systems connected to an armed response monitoring 
facility) and those victims who did not have remote panic buttons (seven of the thirteen victims 
who had intruder alarms linked to an armed response monitoring facility). No real conclusion 
can therefore be drawn whether the presence of remote panic buttons will minimise the risk of 
a victim being burgled on the basis of activating the panic on early detection before the 
perpetrator is able to take anything from the premises over and above the presence of fixed 
panic buttons. 
 
The presence of fixed of remote panic buttons linked to an armed response company can 
facilitate quicker reaction for example the domestic help on the property can activate an alarm 
signal with the armed response company when irregularities are suspected. 
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of specific persons having access to the remote 
panic buttons. 
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Bar Graph 57:  The number of specific persons who had access to remote panic buttons 
 
From the above chart there is no distinct evidence that a specific person having access to the 
remote panic button might have contributed to non response of armed response.  
 
However, the above statement could well not be accurate if, for example, only the responsible 
owner had access (i.e. on his/her person) to the remote panic buttons and therefore the gardener 
or domestic worker could not activate the armed response monitoring.   
 
The following bar chart indicates the number of victims who tested their remote panic buttons 
prior to the burglary incident. 
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Bar Graph 58:  The number of remote panic buttons tested prior to the incident 
 
The majority of the victims who had remote panic buttons (four out of the six interviews) did 
not test their remote panic buttons prior to the incident compared to the two victims who tested 
their remote panic buttons.44 
 
The two victims who tested their remote panic buttons had respectively tested their buttons 
months and annually prior to the burglary incident. The testing of the remote panic months or 
annually (or even more regularly) might well increase the possibility of detecting a variable 
such as faulty batteries, faulty armed response monitoring devices or faulty panic receivers.   
 
POST-INCIDENT SECURITY ENHANCEMENTS AT RESIDENCES OF VICTIMS 
The neighbourhood area 
The following bar chart indicates what type of security enhancements were in place or were 
implemented after the incident in the neighbourhood areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
44 As an aside, in reality the researcher has experienced that the majority of his clients only start complaining 
about their remotes when they do not work properly to open their vehicle gates and never bother to test the 
working of such remotes. 
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Bar graph 59: The type of post-incident security enhancements implemented in the  
                            neighbourhood area 
 
The majority of the responses (nine out of a possible twenty interviews) reported on separate 
new neighbourhood watch initiatives that were established post-incident, while two reported 
that a combination of implementing bicycle patrols, foot patrols and dedicated armed response 
vehicles had occurred (i.e. not separate enhancements on their own).45 In comparison eight out 
of twenty interviews reported that no such enhancements had occurred in their neighbourhood 
area. The majority, therefore, reported either establishment of a security forum or a security 
enhancement in their neighbourhood area post-incident.  
 
The above has been implemented over and above what the victims already had in terms of 
neighbourhood security measures. 
                                               
45 It must be noted here that some of the nine first mentioned responses also reported that a combination of 
implementing bicycle patrols, foot patrols and dedicated armed response vehicles had occurred in their 
neighbourhood areas as well. 
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The following bar chart indicates the post security enhancements implemented by the victim in 
the perimeter area. 
 
Bar Graph 60:  Post-incident security enhancements implemented in the victim’s  
                                 perimeter area 
 
The majority of the victims post incident implemented either of the following security 
enhancements in their perimeter areas: 
· Diamond mesh fence (5);  
· Electrified fencing (4); 
· Brick walls (4); and 
· Razor wire (3). 
 
The above has been implemented over and above what the victims already had in terms of 
perimeter security. 
 
In only four of the cases were there no enhancements implemented in the perimeter area of a 
victim’s residence.  
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The minority either implemented the following: 
· Palisade (1); 
· New pedestrian gate (1); and 
· Wall spikes (1). 
 
Based on the above, the majority focused on creating an additional deterrent (by 
hardening/improving an existing barrier) by utilising electrical fencing, razor wire or spikes, or 
a delay barrier in terms of a brick wall or diamond mesh fencing. 
 
The vehicle gate 
The following bar indicates post-incident security enhancements implemented at/on the vehicle 
gate. 
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Bar Graph 61:  Post-incident security enhancements at the vehicle gate 
Victim interviews - Quantifying post incident security 
enhancements done with the vehicle gate
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The majority (fifteen out of a possible twenty responses) did not implement any changes in the 
vehicle gate area. 
 
The above has been implemented over and above what the victims already had in terms of their 
vehicle gate security measures. 
 
The balance either implemented one or a combination of the following security enhancements 
in the vehicle gate area: 
· Installed (1) a lock on the gate motor release lever; 
· Installed (1) automation on the garage door ; 
· One victim changed the gate remote frequency46 ; 
· One victim added additional height to the vehicle gate; and 
· One victim implemented wall spikes on top of the vehicle gate. 
 
The perimeter pedestrian gate 
The following bar chart indicates the post-incident security enhancements implemented by 
victims on/to the pedestrian gate. 
 
 
                                               
46 The receiver frequency should be changed after a burglary when there was no forced entry or when the remote 
transmitter went missing and in both instances get used by the perpetrators to gain unauthorized access. 
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Bar Graph 62:  Post-incident security enhancements to the perimeter pedestrian gate 
Victim interviews - Quantifying post incident security 
enhancements to the perimeter pedestrian gate
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The above has been implemented over and above what the victims already had in terms of their 
pedestrian gate(s) security measures. 
 
The majority of the responses (eleven out of a possible twenty responses) implemented no 
enhancements to their perimeter pedestrian gates.  The remainder of the responses either 
implemented one or a combination of the following to their perimeter pedestrian gates: 
· Implemented an intercom (two of the responses); 
· Implemented an additional safety/security gate47; 
                                               
47 Where the pedestrian gate was a door and an additional security gate was installed to reinforce the existing 
pedestrian door. 
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· Changed the lock (three of the responses); and 
· Reinforced the gate hinges. 
 
The inner perimeter or garden areas 
The following bar chart indicates the post -incident security enhancements implemented in the 
inner perimeter or garden area.  
 
Bar Graph 63:  Post-incident security enhancements in the inner perimeter or garden  
                             areas 
Victim interviews - Quantifying post incident security enhancements within the 
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The above has been implemented over and above what the victims already had in terms of their 
inner perimeter/garden areas security measures. 
 
The majority of the responses (fourteen out of a possible twenty responses) implemented no 
security enhancements in the inner perimeter or garden areas. The remainder of the responses 
indicated implementing either one or a combination of the following security enhancements in 
the inner perimeter or garden areas: 
· Installed security floodlights (four of the responses); 
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· Purchased a new dog/s (two of the responses); 
· Installed intruder detection beams; and 
· Connected the security floodlights to the intruder alarm system. 
 
The immediate house area 
The following bar chart indicates post-incident security enhancements within the immediate 
house area.  
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Bar Graph 64:  Post-incident security enhancements within the immediate house area 
Victim interviews - Quantifying post incident security 
enhancements in the immediate house area
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The above has been implemented over and above what the victims already had in terms of their 
immediate house area security measures. 
 
The majority of the responses (eight out of possible twenty responses) changed door locks 
followed by the second most responses (seven out of possible twenty responses) who 
implemented burglar proofing/window guards. Four responses also started to close windows. 
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Four respondents indicated that no enhancements post-incident were implemented at all. One 
and/or a combination of the following security enhancements were implemented by victims 
within the immediate house area:  
· Installed (2) a safety gate between the living and sleeping areas. Three victims already 
had this done prior to the incident which amounts to 25% having this measure post 
incident; 
· Installed (2) an intruder alarm. 13 of the victims already had this prior to the incident, 
which now amounts to 75% of the victims having intruder alarms post incident; 
· Linked (2) the existing intruder alarm to an armed response monitoring facility. 11 of 
the victims already had there alarms linked to an armed response facility, which now 
amounts to 65% of the victims having their intruder alarms linked to an armed response 
company post incident; 
· Linked (1) a remote panic receiver to a dedicated panic zone on the armed response 
monitoring facility. Six of the victims already had their remote panics linked to the 
armed response company;  
· Implemented (1) separate codes for different users of the intruder alarm system. 61% of 
the victims had other users also having access to their intruder alarm systems with same 
user code prior to the incident and post incident having only 53% of the victims still 
having more than one user on the same user code to arm and disarm the alarm system; 
· Installed (2) additional door locks; 
· Changed (1) alarm codes; 
· Closed curtains (1) to conceal movement (inside living area) and belongings. This isn’t 
clear in terms of day and night time and according to the interviews 8 already covered 
some or all of their windows with curtains during daytime and 16 of the victims already 
covered some or all of their windows during night time; and 
· Upgraded intruder alarm (1). Only one out of the 13 victims, who already had an 
intruder alarm, upgraded their alarm. 
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ADDITIONAL NOTES ON RESIDENTIAL SECURITY AUDITS AND VICTIM 
INTERVIEWS  
The following is a summary in the various categories of additional notes taken at the time of 
undertaking the residential security audits and victim interviews.  The notes are a summary and 
not grouped according to separate interviews, but per category: 
 
Table 7:  Additional notes on residential security audits and victim interviews  
Series 
number Variable Details 
1 
Reason for 
relocation 
The victim relocated due to the improved investment 
return obtained by selling house and purchasing a bigger 
property (with more space) at a better price. 
2 Crime recording  
Victim caught perpetrators on site and should be a 
robbery. 
 
Crime 
recording 
Was actually an armed robbery. The residents were inside 
the house and the perpetrators were armed. 
 
Crime 
recording 
Victim was surprised that his own guard actually reported 
the incident.  
 
Crime 
recording 
The victim was at home at the time of the incident and this 
incident must therefore be regarded as a robbery.  
 
Crime 
recording 
This was and is a business premise and therefore a 
business burglary.   
 
Crime 
recording 
This case was in fact a residential dispute and civil issue in 
a divorce where one party removed furniture from 
property and other party reported this to police and 
incident then recorded as a residential burglary. 
3 Entry point 
The perimeter boundary was about five feet high and the 
perpetrators gained access by merely climbing over this 
wall into the enclosed court yard. 
 Entry point 
The kitchen window left open was the entry point into the 
house. 
 Entry point Burglar proofing and window frame ripped out of wall.  
 Entry point Climbed over electrified fencing by pulling it down. 
 Entry point Attackers came through many windows. 
 Entry point Suspect gained access over wall.  
 Entry point 
Entry through door on the western side which was out of 
sight.  
 Entry point Pick was used to force sliding door open.  
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 Entry point 
Access was gained via neighbour's property over the 
boundary wall.  
 Entry point Entry was through diamond mesh fence adjacent to river. 
 Entry point 
Gained access through corner of northern sliding door 
glass which was behind a bench and passive did not detect 
entry.  
 Entry point 
Entered property through diamond mesh fence. The 
method of entry not known if it was cut or crossed. 
 Entry point 
Entry and exit was through perimeter fence (barrier was 
not electrified) by scaling the fence. 
 Entry point Entry was through northern patio door. 
 Entry point 
The neighbour's property was used to enter the premises 
by scaling the boundary wall. 
 Entry point 
The perpetrators gained access over the shared boundary 
wall from the neighbour’s side.    
 Entry point 
Entry was gained over front wall by pulling nylon 
electrical fence back and creating a space for climbing 
over wall.  
 Entry point 
Kicked in burglar proofing and wooden window frame to 
gain access into house. 
 Entry point 
Both incidents occurred through back window in court 
yard.  
 Entry point 
Access gained through diamond mesh fence via the 
neighbour’s property. The method of entry not known. 
 Entry point Entry was through the TV room window. 
 Entry point 
Entry was through the bath room window on the second 
floor with the second burglary. 
4 Goods taken Clothes, jewellery and small appliances were removed 
 Goods taken Perpetrators took jewellery, cell phones and cash. 
 Goods taken Took tools in garage. 
 Goods taken TV was removed. 
 Goods taken Clothing, tools, golf clubs and bicycles were removed. 
 Goods taken Computer and sound system removed. 
 Goods taken Furniture was stolen.  
 Goods taken 
PC equipment close to window was removed. The passive 
infrared detector did not reach this point and therefore the 
system was not implemented properly. 
5 
Reason for 
non effective 
Pushed fixed panic button, but armed response only 
arrived later when perpetrators had already left. 
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security 
system 
6 Escape route Escaped through river area. 
 Escape route Wooden balustrades at back of property were used to exit.  
 Escape route 
Garage door was used to exit where the emergency release 
was disabled and door was then opened manually. 
 Escape route 
Gate motor release lever was not locked and vehicle gate 
was then opened to exit. 
7 Suspects Builders up the road suspected of being involved. 
 Suspects Armed response company suspected of being involved. 
 Suspects Victim's son is suspected by victim.  
 Suspects 
A previous incident also committed by same person – 
victim and wife were able to positively identified 
perpetrator and link to both incidents.  
 Suspects 
The domestic worker is suspected of being involved since 
the dogs were locked inside the house and the domestic 
worker has failed to return to work after incident.  
 Suspects 
The previous tenant is also suspected since she was 
conveniently next door using neighbour's phone at the 
time of the incident, whilst there was a phone in the 
suspect’s house. 
 Suspects 
Victim suspect a person sitting across the road of copying 
victim’s remote control code. Entry was gained through 
the diamond mesh fence 
 Suspects Victim’s gardener is suspected of being involved.  
 Suspects 
Victim suspects the building contractors since victim had 
never had any problems for a period of six years until they 
got the building contractor onto site. Clothes, tools, golf 
clubs and bicycles were taken 
 Suspects 
Two white males were on the premises when victim 
arrived. The reason for the victim returning home isn’t 
known. 
 Suspects House was a building site at the time of the incident.  
 Suspects 
Domestic help and gardener had access to key to the 
kitchen door and the pedestrian gate on the main street.  
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 Suspects Contractors next door are suspected. 
8 
Reason for 
non effective 
security 
system Landlord was not helpful in getting security enhanced. 
 
Reason for 
non effective 
security 
system 
Pushed fixed panic button, but armed response only 
arrived later when perpetrators had already left. 
 
Reason for 
non effective 
security 
system 
Alarm not activated at night because it was old fashioned 
and hard to use and basically only armed when nobody 
was inside the house. 
 
Reason for 
non effective 
security 
system External lights were not on at the time of the incident.  
 
Reason for 
non effective 
security 
system 
There was no security i.e. electrified fencing, in the corner 
of the property. 
 
Reason for 
non-effective 
security 
system 
Gate motor release lever was not locked and vehicle gate 
was then opened to exit. 
 
Reason for 
non-effective 
security 
system 
Electrical striker lock was not working on the wooden 
pedestrian door. 
 
Reason for 
non-effective 
security 
system 
The electrical fencing was not activated at the time 
because the fence was faulty and it was the older version 
fence with semiconductor covering the strands of the 
fence.   
 
Reason for 
non-effective 
security 
system 
Did not clear bushes from path of detector beams although 
victim had already been staying at residence for four 
months.  
 
Reason for 
non-effective 
Bypassed front detector beam due to irregular routine of 
domestic worker staying on the property.  
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security 
system 
 
Reason for 
non effective 
security 
system Victim tended to leave doors open.  
 
Reason for 
non-effective 
security 
system 
Got robbed of cell phone and wallet year prior to incident 
and still not locking doors 
 
Reason for 
non-effective 
security 
system 
Got robbed of cell phone and wallet a year prior to 
incident and still not locking doors. 
 
Reason for 
non effective 
security 
system 
Victim was more interested in determining how one can 
implement security in the street and suburb rather than 
implementing any on the victim's own property. 
 
Reason for 
non effective 
security 
system 
Only the areas where the intruder came in were enhanced 
in terms of security measures. The areas referred to has not 
been mentioned specifically. 
 
Reason for 
non-effective 
security 
system 
Both management and two employees had access to the 
alarm code and no separate codes. No audit trail in terms 
of who actually armed and disarmed the alarm can be 
determined. 
 
Reason for 
non effective 
security 
system 
The window was also far away from passive and the doors 
had door contacts and possibility that it is inside job 
because doors were not used as an entry exit point during 
intrusion. This can also be regarded as an inside job, 
because who would know that the door had a door monitor 
and the passive would not reach the specific window. 
 
Reason for 
non-effective 
security 
system 
Client not sure if he armed the alarm but used the remote 
panic button when noises were heard. Did not activate 
armed response company. 
9 Incident time Incident occurred 22:00.  
 Incident time Happened during daytime 
 Incident time 
All incidents occurred between 09:00 and 13:00 whilst 
victim was working. 
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 Incident time Incident occurred during daytime.  
 Incident time The incident occurred at midday. 
10 Renovations 
Victim was busy with renovations and there were builders 
on the property. 
11 
Motive for 
burglary Burgled victim to fund his drug abuse problem. 
12 
Number of 
incidents 
One of the victims had 22 incidents ranging from 
robberies to residential burglary from 2002 till end of 2004 
in the Westcliff area. 
 
Number of 
incidents Was burgled twice (three months apart).  
 
Number of 
incidents Was burgled twice in one year.    
13 
Modus 
operandi Graffiti was left on washing machine.  
14 
Reason for 
effective 
security 
Panic button was activated in both instances. The client 
was not sure if the intruder alarm was armed. The armed 
response company responded, but only after 20 minutes.  
 
Reason for 
effective 
security 
Had razor wire on front wall and due to this wall without 
any security measures were used to gain access into the 
property. 
 
There were some variables which did not fall within the research focus framework, i.e. the 
incident turned out to in fact be a house robbery. In this the victim had to activate his fixed 
panic button, whereas in an ordinary residential burglary the intruder alarm should have, as a 
matter of course, been automatically activated.  
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Variable Details 
Crime recording Was actually an armed robbery.  
Incident time Incident occurred 22:00.  
Entry point 
Attackers came through various windows. The 
cause of entry through windows not known 
i.e. windows left open. 
Renovations 
Victim was busy with renovations on their 
property. 
Suspects 
The armed response company suspected of 
being involved. 
Goods taken 
Perpetrators took jewellery, cell phones and 
cash 
Reason for non-effective 
security system 
Pushed fixed panic button, but armed response 
only arrived later when perpetrators had 
already left. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The research results were gathered through four different types of measuring instruments, each 
providing vital information on residential burglary and security measures and other external 
variables which did or did not have an impact on the incidence of residential burglary.  
 
The four measuring instruments used were: 
· Descriptive mapping; 
· Docket analysis; 
· Victim interviews; and 
· Residential security audits. 
 
Descriptive mapping 
The descriptive mapping provided information which will be useful to the South African Police 
Services. 
 
The research findings have been provided to the Parkview Police Station so that they can be 
used in their crime reduction and detection strategies.48  
                                               
48 The information was shared with the Parkview Police early December 2005. 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  214 
 
The descriptive mapping exercise aimed to contextualise and place the victim location in 
perspective with various variables such as the following: 
· Burglaries experienced – 89% experienced only one burglary in the time frame of two 
years; 
· Average burglaries in each grid reference for both the residential areas were about three 
burglaries; 
· Distance from shops, parks, business premises and open or unoccupied properties was 
about one grid reference away as experienced by 50% of the victims; 
· Victim location in relation with other victims were mainly standalone and not 
immediate neighbours as experienced by 63% of the grid references; 
· Victim location in relation to main roads were mainly in the same grid reference as 
experienced by 40% of the victims; 
· Victim location in relation to dead-end roads were about one grid reference away in the 
majority of the grids as experienced in 41% of the cases; 
· Dead-end road barriers were mainly diamond wire mesh or chain link fences 
experienced by 14% of the possible 31% of the victims; and 
· Victim location to corner properties was mainly two to four houses away from corner 
properties and not necessarily corner properties themselves. 
 
In summary the following needs to be considered when planning for neighbourhood watch 
strategies: 
· Proactive measures on possible future incidents needs to be extended beyond the 
immediate residential block or victim’s property; 
· Proactive measures should also include areas where there is shops and public areas; 
· Proactive measures in and around main roads need to be increased due to possibility of 
this being used as escape routes; 
· Access points to the river ends and dead-end road areas are less vulnerable in terms of 
burglary, but should be considered with more violent crimes such as robberies where it 
can be executed by foot and the dead end areas on the river side used as possible escape 
routes. Barriers need to be planned in terms of deterrent, detection and delay values 
replacing areas where there are poorly maintained or non existent barriers; and 
· Proactive measures in and around residential blocks need to be planned in accordance 
to areas more vulnerable such as two to four properties from corner properties etc. 
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Docket analysis 
The primary objective of the docket analysis was to provide the researcher with contact 
information on the victims.  
 
The researcher made use of the opportunity to gather secondary information such as modus 
operandi in order to provide the South African Police Service with information which can 
again be used with their crime prevention and detection strategies. 
 
The following is a summary of information gathered from the dockets: 
· In 54% of the cases, burglaries were committed on the same day as when the crime was 
detected by the complainant or a delegate of the complainant; 
· In 72% of the cases the burglary was committed on a weekday; 
· Mondays (13), Thursdays (11) and Fridays (16) were the days with the three highest 
days recorded with residential burglary incidents; 
· Entry points reported were mainly with the immediate house area and not sequential 
from the perimeter, inner perimeter and then the immediate house area. Majority of the 
entry points were either through windows or doors (19% and 20% respectively), but no 
definite modus operandi of how access was gained through these points was provided 
in the dockets. The modus operandi of entry through roof areas was only mentioned in 
one case; and 
· 56% of the victims did not have intruder alarms. The question would be whether the 
44% who the intruder alarms had used it, was connected to an armed response company 
and if the armed response company had access to the property to investigate the alarm 
violation signal. 
 
The following should be considered with regard to proactive security measures within the 
neighbourhood and immediate residential environment: 
· Proactive measures should focus more resources around specific days such as 
Mondays, Thursdays and Fridays where residential burglaries are more frequent. 
· Security measures around the window and door areas should be increased due to these 
areas are more prone to be attacked. 
· Detection of crime should be increased through monitoring devices. The monitoring of 
signals could also incorporate SAPS integration. 
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Victim interviews 
Not all the victims gave the researcher the opportunity to conduct residential audits due to 
interviews being conducted at the victim’s workplace or the victim had relocated by the time 
the interviews were undertaken. 
 
The following areas where residential security can exist were evaluated: 
· Community; 
· Perimeter; 
· Inner perimeter; and 
· Immediate house area. 
 
The following residential security measures were evaluated for their existence and application: 
· Community security initiatives; 
· CCTV; 
· Perimeter types; 
· Electrified fencing; 
· Vehicle gates; 
· Pedestrian gates; 
· Infra red beams; 
· Security flood lights; 
· Doors locks and keys; 
· Safety/security gates; 
· Windows and burglar proofing; 
· Intruder alarm systems; and 
· Fixed and remote panic buttons. 
Community 
Community security initiatives 
13 of the victims worked away from home and not always at home. Community security 
initiatives can be an early detection and deterrent to burglars and in 16 of the 20 cases, there 
were not any community security initiatives present. 
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In 16 of the 20 cases building activities were also to be found within the victim’s immediate 
residential block area and this is where community security forums can play a major roll in 
managing builder movement through the residential area. 
Perimeter 
CCTV 
None of the victims had CCTV. CCTV can be a deterrent in that burglars identify can be 
positively identified and CCTV can also be a detection mechanism where CCTV can alert the 
owner of movement in a specific area and the footage can be immediate provided off site i.e. 
through e-mail function. 
 
Perimeter types 
17 of the 20 cases had solid brick walls, which conceals visibility from the street area. This 
could be a problem concealing burglar’s movements when they gained access into the 
property.  
 
Electrified fencing 
16 of the 20 victims did not have electrified fencing. 
Electrified fencing provides a deterrent, detection and delay mechanisms to the owner. 
 
The four victims who had electrified fencing, only two were linked to an armed response 
company. Only one of the two had their fence switched on, but no signals were received by the 
armed response company, which can constitute that the fence were not setup properly. The 
fence was virtually pulled down without activating the alarm. 
 
The two other fences were not fully covering the entire perimeter and the last fence was under 
the neighbour’s control. 
 
In summary fences did not exhibit all the characteristics of covering the entire property, not 
switched on/activated, setup properly or linked to an armed response company and under the 
victim’s full control. 
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Vehicle gates 
17 of the 20 cases did not have their vehicle gates monitored. Monitoring the vehicle gates 
through the intruder alarm systems can provide detection already at perimeter level. 
 
Manual locks only existed in 10 of the 20 cases and this should not only be restricted to manual 
gates, but also to automated gates. Manual lock provides extra security in that when the 
automation is bridged, the manual lock provides additional security. 
 
12 of the 20 victims had automated vehicle gates.  Not one of the victims had an electronic 
keypad facility connected to their vehicle gates. This feature can  be used to let the armed 
response company have access to their properties to investigate alarms, or restrict keys and 
remotes to employees and rather allocate a user number which can provide an audit trail to the 
owner on who had access when. Only nine of the victims said that nobody except themselves 
had access to remotes and keys opening and closing the vehicle gate and gate automation. 
 
Two of the possible 12 victims had back-up batteries on their vehicle gate automation. This is 
problematic if there were electronic keypads connected to the vehicle gate automation and the 
armed response company had to gain access to investigate alarm activities and as a result of the 
bad battery, could not gain access. 
 
Only three of the possible 12 victims had anti-theft brackets on their gate automation, which 
should be secured to avoid being tampered with. Only one victim had a manual lock on the 
gate automation release mechanism and again this should be locked to avoid it being accessed 
and opened by the perpetrators. 
 
Pedestrian gates 
Three of the possible 16 cases had electrical striker locks on their pedestrian gates. 
 
None of the three were connected to an electronic keypad, which as previously explained with 
automated vehicle gates, could be utilised by employees or the armed response company to 
minimise keys and remotes being used and as a result being lost, stolen or duplicated. In the 
majority of the cases other persons other than the owner or responsible tenant had access to the 
keys for opening of pedestrian gates. 
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The three victims, who had electrical striker locks on their pedestrian gates, did not have back-
up battery supply to the striker locks. As explained previously with vehicle gate automation, 
the a back-up battery would ensure that the striker lock will still be functional during power 
failures and where it was connected to an electronic keypad, the armed response officer would 
have had access in any case to investigate alarm violation signals received. 
 
Six of the possible 16 cases who had pedestrian gates, had gate closers, which close the gate 
automatically. The gate closer will ensure that locks like the night latch locks and striker locks 
latch properly. It is possible that gates with these locks did not latch properly due to possible 
human errors and accordingly the pedestrian gate was used to enter the property. 
Inner perimeter 
Infrared beams 
Two out of the possible 19 cases had infra-red beams in their garden areas. Infra-red beams do 
act as an early detection mechanism. One had the beam covering all sides of the garden and 
one only had one section of the garden covered. Early detection in the other 17 cases would not 
be possible due to the absence of infra-red beams.  
 
Security flood lights 
16 of the 20 cases had security flood lights. Only 14 stated that their flood lights were 
operational at the time. A cause of concern being that was found that eight of the possible 16 
had their lights activated (turned on and off) by means of a manual switch. This again would 
raise the issue of human error when burglaries that might have occurred during night time and 
the lights were not activated by the manual switch. Lights provide visibility to the owner and 
occupants and can be a deterrent and detection mechanism if it is setup to minimise view for 
the perpetrator by facing from the house towards the perimeter and an infra red sensor to 
activate the lights on movement. Four of the cases had motion detection, one had a timer 
switch and one had a day/night sensor. 
Immediate house 
Door locks and keys 
Of the possible 20 cases, 17 had their doors leading to the garden and external areas locked. 14 
of the possible 20 cases said that they did not leave any keys in door locks and four of the 
possible 20 cases had only the owner or responsible tenant having access to keys unlocking and 
locking doors leading to external areas. 
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There is cause of concern with keys left in door locks due to fact that it can be duplicated, 
accidentally being unlocked or even used by the perpetrator of the door for instance is a glass 
door and the keys are visible from outside. 
 
Security/safety gates 
Three of the victims did not have safety/security gates on any of their external doors or 
between the living and sleeping areas. 
 
It was not clear if all the doors were covered with safety gates or only some, due to victims 
focussed on reporting on specific doors having safety gates. 
 
Safety/security gate can be a delay mechanism to increase the possibility for the armed 
response to apprehend the perpetrators on the scene. This will only be possible if there were 
detection mechanisms, i.e. infra-red beams in place, before the perpetrators reached the 
safety/security gates. 
 
Windows and burglar proofing 
Of the possible 20 cases, only 16 had some or all windows covered with burglar proofing. 
Three of the possible 16 cases had all windows covered with burglar proofing. 
 
In the docket analysis it was found that in 19% of the cases windows were broken and in 11% 
of the cases, the burglar proofing was forced open. It was not clear in all cases what specific 
area were used to intrude the immediate house, but with only three victims having all their 
windows covered with burglar proofing, one could possibly state that intrusion could have 
been through those windows without burglar proofing. Out of the possible 20 cases, 12 said 
that they did not close their windows and seven stated that they did this kept open for fresh air 
required. 
 
Burglar proofing can provide a delay mechanism and the same principle applies as discussed 
with safety/security gates if there were detection mechanisms, i.e. infra-red beams in place 
before the perpetrators reached the burglar proofing. 
 
In terms of concealing movement and routine in the house, 11 of the possible 20 cases had all 
their windows covered with curtains during daytime and three only some of the windows. This 
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constitutes nine having only some or none of the windows covered with curtains during day 
time. Nine of the possible 20 cases covered their windows with curtains during night time and 
seven had some windows covered at night time. This constitutes to 11 victims having only 
some or none of their windows covered with curtains during night time. A concealing routine 
could be beneficial to avoid perpetrators from determining whether the victim is at home or 
not.  
 
Intruder alarm systems 
Intruder alarm is there to centralise detection devices such as infra-red passive motion 
detectors, door monitors and infra-red beams and panics and provide a medium where 
monitoring devices such as radio frequency (RF radios) can be linked in order to send signals 
on various alarm activities to an armed response company. 
 
Only 13 of the possible 20 victims had intruder alarms, but only seven armed their alarms and 
11 of the possible 13 had their alarms monitored by an armed response company. This 
constitute to possibly only five of the seven who had their alarms armed, had it monitored by 
an armed response company. Arming and disarming the system can be done by an electronic 
keypad. Each user should have its own user code to provide an effective audit trail of who 
armed and disarmed the alarm. Eight of the possible 13 victims who had alarms, stated that 
more than one person had access to their alarm system. This constitute that possibly the seven 
who had alarms, did have someone else who disarmed it knowingly, unknowingly or forgot to 
really arm the system. 
 
Testing the alarm system is a very important aspect of maintenance. Only seven of the possible 
13 done this prior to the incident, which explains that of the possible 13 victims armed their 
alarm systems. 
 
Fixed and remote panic buttons 
Nine of the 13 victims, who had intruder alarm systems, had fixed panic buttons connected to 
their alarm systems. Six of the nine members who had panic facilities connected to their 
intruder alarm systems, had remove panic buttons. A panic button can be used by occupants on 
the property to alert the armed response company of a possible threat or an immediate threat. In 
the cases where the victims were at home, the panics could have been used to alert the armed 
response companies and possibly had the armed response companies arriving in time to 
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apprehend the perpetrators. According to the interviews it was found that there was one armed 
robbery and six house robberies. 
 
The descriptive mapping can be useful as a tool to South African Police Service and also 
Community Police Forums in their effort to combat crime. The maps indicated to provide 
useful information in terms of victim location in relation to environmental variables such as 
open properties, main roads etc. 
 
The docket analysis did not only provide victim contact details, but also provided information 
assisting the Police in recording vital crime information i.e. area of intrusion, day of week, time 
of day etc. The docket analysis is also a useful tool if one needs to establish variables and how 
they relate to the crime residential burglary. The police can also provide victims with useful 
tips on securing their properties when arriving at scenes based on the modus operandi and 
possible security measures49 to counter there modus operandi. 
 
In the victim interviews it was noted that majority of the victims did not have much in terms of 
residential security in place and those who had did either not use or maintained their systems 
well and the systems they had wasn’t setup strategically to provide maximum ability 
conforming to the attributes of: 
· Deterrent; 
· Detection; and 
· Delay. 
 
The following chapter aims in providing the reader with possible recommendations on how to 
achieve the maximum capabilities of a residential security system. 
 
 
 
                                               
49 Recommendations will be discussed in Chapter 8 of this research report. 
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Chapter 8 
A SECURITY RISK ANALYSIS MANAGEMENT 
APPROACH TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF RESIDENTIAL 
SECURITY PLANS USING CASE STUDIES OF 
RESIDENTIAL BURGLARIES:  RECOMMENDATIONS 
AND CONTEXTUALISATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
INTRODUCTION 
The research project does not end when the results are reported and therefore the results need 
to be put into a meaningful context to report on patterns observed and also to promote 
conclusions which result in further research to add scientific merit to the project (Rossouw, 
2003: 168) 
 
The purpose of these recommendations is to ensure that the research motivation and purpose 
will be completed and that this will contribute towards existing procedures within the security 
industry, law enforcement and more importantly, guiding the private homeowner with 
reference to the improvement of residential security measures. 
 
In implementing any of the security measure recommendations the focus should be to apply the 
following when implementing them: 
· Cost-effective planning; 
· Cost-effective implementation; 
· Effective use; 
· Regular maintenance; and 
· Regular upgrading. 
 
Furthermore, any security system should provide the following characteristics: 
· Deterrent; 
· Detection; and 
· Delay. 
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Moreover, and additional focus should be to implement technological security measures, 
physical security measures and procedural security measures in the above-mentioned manner 
in order to provide an holistic, integrated cost-effective system. 
 
Finally, a security system should be planned for each of the following areas: 
· Neighbourhood; 
· Perimeter; 
· Vehicle gates; 
· Perimeter pedestrian gates; 
· Inner perimeter or garden area; and 
· Immediate house area. 
 
The majority of the victims in the study had physical security measures in place such as walls, 
door locks, burglar proofing and safety gates. All of these security measures provided a form of 
delay, but did not provide full detection or deterrent value. 
 
JUSTIFYING RESULTS AND CONTEXTUALISING THE RESULTS IN PRACTICAL 
TERMS  
Justifying the results into meaningful recommendations is the core approach of this study. 
The recommendations will be discussed in terms of results collected through: 
· Docket analysis; 
· Victim interviews; 
· Victim residential security audits; 
· Descriptive mapping; and 
· Practical experience of the researcher. 
 
The recommendations should be regarded as a guideline and not accepted as the norm based on 
the fact that criminal modus operandi is over time getting more sophisticated and so should the 
security measures. 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  225 
 
SUBURB INITIATIVES 
Active security patrols are a big deterrent as observed by the researcher through his 
involvement with this in the upper Westcliff area. 
 
The initiative’s success in the opinion of the researcher is primarily successful due to: 
· The involvement of law enforcement to guide with initiate these projects to be ; 
· The close involvement of the community to contribute to this initiative; 
· Focus on violent crimes contributes to the reduction in less violent crimes; 
· Accept the opinion of security specialists; 
· Managing security companies by independent individuals outside these companies; 
· Motivating guard through initiatives; 
· Implementation of tamper proof monitoring devices; 
· Crime information to community on a regular basis; and 
· Implementation of a practical network and communication system. 
 
Involvement of local law enforcement 
The research results gathered from the docket analysis and descriptive mapping were 
introduced to the Parkview police, which might be used in their crime prevention strategies. 
 
Furthermore private security companies should make use of the opportunity to provide their 
crime statistics to local law enforcement agencies such as the South African police services to 
identify crime hotspots and also to compare the accuracy of private security crime statistics 
with those of the South African Police Service. 
 
Involvement of the community 
The opinion and acceptance of the community is a very important milestone in establishing a 
community security initiative. 
 
The initiative’s successes will depend on the acceptance of the community and local law 
enforcement agencies. 
 
The initiative in the upper Westcliff area is operation over three years now and the crime has 
been reduced drastically from serious and violent crimes to less serious and less incidents. 
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The survival of this initiative is ensured by the prompt and regular monetary contribution of 
community members to the initiative and the keep implemented the minimal security 
requirements50. 
 
Focus on violent crimes reducing other crimes 
The upper Westcliff initiative was initiated by community members concerned about the 
violent crimes present at the time.51 
 
The researcher focussed on hijackings and driveway robberies by implementing a practical, 
cost effective communications network which can be utilised by both the security provider and 
the community contributor in using the cell phone52 
 
This communication enables the homeowner has the ability to call a guard on patrol to ensure 
that the street has been surveyed for possible security risks before the residential property is 
entered or exit. 
 
The application of initiatives with this approach in other provinces or cities will be a interesting 
research project to determine the effectiveness of neighbourhood security initiatives. 
 
Accept the advice of security industry qualified professionals 
The security initiative in the upper Westcliff had a challenge in that another security opinion 
was to be heard by community members. 
 
The researcher had to use an approach to get the community to accept this concept of reducing 
violent crimes and ultimately reduce the other crimes. 
 
The challenges were great in that the researcher had to focus in getting the  community to 
accept the proposal from a professional point of view after the community already had 
numerous other proposals and initiatives the last couple of years. 
                                               
50 Minimal security requirements is to have electrified fencing, infra-red beams in the garden, safety gates, burglar 
proofing, an intruder alarm, linked to an armed response company and ensuring all will be managed effectively 
without giving out alarm codes or leaving keys and remotes unattended. 
51 Violent crimes which were raised at the time in 2003 ranged from rape, driveway robberies, armed robberies 
and hijackings 
52 This system was implemented by the researcher in 2003 for it’s practical application where the two way radios 
had restrictions in that only the security company could access this. 
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In dealing with the community during this initiative it became apparent that members of the 
public have little knowledge of or are not even aware of the existence of such organisations as 
the Private Security Industry Regulating Authority (PSIRA), the Security Association of South 
Africa (SASA), the South African Institute of Security (SAIS) and various other similar 
professional bodies within the Security Industry and all it’s various disciplines, should the 
public be made more aware of their existence and how these organisations promote 
professionalism in the security sector and promoting equally important role the private security 
sector plays in the residential security environment. 
 
The researcher is of opinion that the community security initiative’s survival is mainly based 
on contributor participation. 
 
Implementing the same initiative in a low income residential area with all of the challenges 
involved will be another interesting research topic. Furthermore government involvement 
getting private security companies to contribute to lower income communities through similar 
security initiatives could be beneficial towards lowering crime risk South Africa. 
 
Independent management of private security companies 
The upper Westcliff security initiative operations are monitored by the independent view of the 
researcher. The researcher is independent from the private security company, who provides the 
patrols and armed response. 
 
This enables the researcher to report to the security forum53 from an independent view, 
providing an independent (external, unbiased and objective) view. 
 
This approach benefited both the security provider and the security forum by: 
· Providing both with an independent view; and 
· Advising both on potential problem areas form an independent perspective. 
 
Motivating guards by means of incentives 
The researcher experienced successes with his guards by motivating them. 
 
                                               
53 The forum refers to the Westcliff Community Security forum where the researcher is involved managing the 
operational reporting to the community forum 
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Motivating the guards can be done by: 
· Giving guards the space to grow and equip them to grow; 
· Allowing guards to improvise and to utilise their initiative. They are on average twelve 
hours a day on duty and observe and experience more than their management; 
· Get the community to involve guards in their activities, knowing the guards and to 
praise the guards where possible. Complaints should be directed to management and 
not the guards; 
· Giving the guards achievable aims to work towards. Number of patrols should be 
achievable and should allow space for motivating the guard to do a little bit more and 
not getting guards to observe properly due to demand in patrols which needs to be 
completed within a certain time frame; and 
· Monetary bonuses should be part of the security budget to allow guards to receive more 
than their normal, low salaries and to be regarded as a site specific bonus – empowering 
guards only with knowledge will have little effect on a starving unmotivated guard. 
 
Implementing tamper proof monitoring devices 
The management of the community security initiative depends a great deal on the monitoring 
of guards and their safety during their patrols. Technology has now advanced beyond only 
tracking vehicles to tracking guards. These devices enable the security management to do life 
monitoring on guards to ensure: 
· The guards are safe; 
· Guards are providing patrols; and 
· Guards have the ability to communicate any potential security risks immediately and 
will have quick and effective backup. 
 
All the above will provide both management and the contributor with: 
· An audit trail on events for investigative purposes and accurate reporting to the 
contributor (a security forum); and 
· Quick backup response if situations where both the guards and the contributor lives can 
be saved. 
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Providing regular and accurate crime prevention information 
Networking with both private security companies and local law enforcement has its benefits in 
that security crime risks in areas can be reported to other communities and ensure: 
· No repeat of the risk; and 
· Promote crime detection and arrest. 
 
While the SAPS to provide annual crime statistics, private security companies should also be 
involved with this project to contribute to the police crime prevention strategies. (A study 
comparing private security company crime statistics with the annual police crime statistics will 
be another interesting research project topic.) 
 
Implementing an effective communications network 
The cell phone network has been very efficient in providing crime reporting mediums. 
 
The medium is available to many and affordable cell phone use packages ensure that a simple 
security alert can reach an entire community within a very short space of time. 
 
The community forum needs to utilise this communication medium in order to provide vital 
information the community and to gather information for effective planning. 
 
PERIMETER SECURITY 
The security circle starts with crime information gathering and implementing strategies to 
manage the crime information. 
 
The perimeter should provide a medium of being both a deterrent and detector. 
 
The average perimeter’s deterrent value can be increased by a combination of: 
· Height; 
· Razor wire or wall spikes; 
· Electrified fencing; 
· Double layer perimeter system; 
· CCTV; 
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· Security signage; 
· Security lights; 
· Automated gates; and 
· Type of perimeter. 
 
The average perimeter detection ability can be enhanced through a combination of: 
· Electrified fencing; 
· Infra-red beams; 
· CCTV; and 
· Vehicle gate and pedestrian gate monitors. 
 
Perimeter height 
The majority of the victims had perimeter ranging between 1,8 meters and two meters in 
height. However most of the properties were intruded by scaling the perimeter walls. 
Accordingly, in the researcher’s opinion, height of the perimeter in the researcher’s opinion 
should be able to conceal movement observation to a person. Therefore, based on the research 
findings in this study, a standard height of two metres and more would be advisable. 
 
Razor wire and wall spikes 
The presence of razor wire and wall spikes can be both deterrent and delay to criminals. The 
accurate implementation thereof would be crucial to ensure that that the purpose will be 
constant throughout (along) the entire perimeter and not just applicable to certain section such 
as some of the victims who focussed on having this only the front wall and where criminals 
then came though the neighbour side of the perimeter where there was not razor wire or wall 
spikes. 
 
Electrified fencing 
Electrified fencing was absent with the majority of the interviews (with victims). There was 
one specific case where there was electrified fencing in place, but forced downwards and the 
perimeter wall was scaled. In this regard no residential audit was done, but the researcher 
would recommend the following: 
· Proper earthing techniques; 
· Effective monitoring techniques; and 
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· Regular maintenance. 
Proper earthing 
This means that the fence needs to be earthed throughout. (The electrified fencing operation 
has been discussed already in chapter 2 where a normal operation and an alarm condition was 
illustrated.) 
 
Such an electrified fence will require to be earthed properly to provide an alarm violation 
condition with any attempt of intrusion. Sensitising the fence with earth loops can be a way of 
sensitising the fence to possible intrusion. The drawing below explains sensitising the 
electrified fencing. 
Drawing 11:  Electrical fencing sensitising example to illustrate how to increase the fence  
                        detection ability 
 
 
The drawing above illustrates how the fence can both the fence wires, indicated by A and C, 
can activate the alarm when wire B touches any of the sides of the earth loop (indicated with 
red circle and connected to wires A and C. 
Effective monitoring techniques 
In one interview it was recorded that the electrified fencing energiser alarm was disconnected 
according to one of the interview notes. The reason for this was that the neighbour was 
complaining about the noise factor associated with the electrical fencing alarm violation. 
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The siren alone does act as a monitoring device to the occupants of the house, visitors, 
neighbours and the armed response company or security guard. 
 
It is therefore crucial to ensure the electrical fencing energiser is connected to a device which 
will report to the occupants of the house, the armed response company, security guards or 
secondary key holder54 
 
The device referred to in the previous paragraph can be: 
· Cell phone (GSM unit); 
· Radio frequency unit (RF Unit); and 
· Remote key pad. 
 
The first two devices are units reporting to either to the primary key holders or to a security 
control room who will advise the primary and secondary key holders on an alarm violation. 
 
The remote keypad is a device installed in the primary key holders house and will report to 
him/her on an alarm violation. 
 
It is therefore important that these devices will be connected correctly to report on: 
· Electrified fencing armed or disarmed; 
· Electrified fencing violation alarm; 
· Power failure; and 
· Electrified fencing energiser tamper signal (applicable if someone attempts to intrude 
the electrified fencing energiser to tamper with it). 
Regular maintenance 
Any electronic security device is effective as: 
· The accurate planning of the system; 
· The effective installation of the system; 
· The effective and regular use of the system;  
· The regular maintenance of the system; and 
· The regular upgrading and enhancements of the system. 
                                               
54 Secondary key holder is a person or organisation which might be included on a call list with the chosen armed 
response company to be called when the homeowner of primary key holders are not available. 
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All the abovementioned all rely on each other (linked totally) in order to ensure a reliable 
security system. 
 
The electrified fencing in particular requires an annual service where the following needs to be 
done: 
· Change damaged bobbins in the fence uprights (This is cause by branches falling on the 
fence, sun and weather changes); 
· Tension the fence wires (Sagging wires are caused by continuous tension on the 
tensioners, vegetation pulling fences down etc.); 
· Change wiring due to corrosion (only applicable if corrosion appears which causes the 
fence resistance to increase and the current supply to decrease in volts); and 
· Backup battery to be changed (The industry requirement is two years, but with our 
regular power failures we need to this at least annually). 
 
If all the above contributes to false alarms and possibly result into the electrical fence to be 
switched off. 
 
Double layer perimeter fence system 
The double layer perimeter fence was present with one of the victim interviews in the Westcliff 
areas. 
 
This is practical with large properties where in some cases piratical and feasibility of the fence 
will be much more effective to look after the immediate house and garden area with electrified 
fencing. 
 
Extending electrified fencing along the entire outer perimeter might have the following 
implications: 
· High cost on maintaining the garden vegetation from  not interfering with the proposed 
electrified fencing; 
· High cost in maintaining of an extended (length) electrified fencing; and 
· High cost in implementing a proper perimeter i.e. a brick wall, to host the electrified 
fencing. 
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The following drawing illustrates the concept of implement a perimeter which will both act as 
a deterrent and detection and the outer perimeter as a deterrent: 
Drawing 12:  Double layer perimeter illustration providing a cost effective approach 
 
 
Closed circuit television system 
Closed circuit television systems can be both a deterrent and detection security method. 
 
Not one of the victims had CCTV systems according to the victim interviews. 
 
The following is common problems experienced with CCTV: 
· Poor lighting; 
· Poor picture quality; 
· Non functional with power failures; and 
· No recording of footage. 
 
CCTV for the domestic application has emerged from very expensive and commercial to more 
affordable and user friendly. 
 
The following is guidelines in minimising the above-mentioned problems: 
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Poor lighting 
The homeowner should first request for the potential security installer to measure the light 
density where the cameras are required. This normally gets measured in LUX and referred to 
as the LUX level of the lighting. The LUX level determines whether one wants to spend more 
on a more sophisticated camera and lens or do one want to spend more upgrading and 
enhancing the existing lighting levels. 
Poor picture quality 
Poor picture quality can be due to the LUX level of the lighting in the camera vicinity. The 
poor picture quality can also be due to the type of camera lens used. One should decide on 
what is required from the camera within a certain area. 
 
For example, is a well defined picture of the visitor or does one want to establish whether or 
not a person is in a particular area. 
 
The placement angle of the lens will determine the following:  small angle with more definition 
on distance or a wide angle with reduced picture definition, but enables the viewer of more 
activities over a wider area. For the domestic environment a wide angle would be beneficial on 
the perimeter to cover as much as possible of the pavement and main gate area and areas across 
the road from the main vehicle entrance. 
 
A camera inside the intercom would be beneficial if one wants to have a positive identification 
(good picture definition – close-up) of an expected visitor. 
Non functional systems resulting from power failures 
Power failures contribute to may security systems not functional and/or getting damaged. A 
system is non-functional if the systems are not connected to a backup uninterrupted power 
supply (UPS). The systems also get damaged if the system was not connected to an UPS and 
the sudden recommissioning of power causes a surge and damage the delicate electronic 
hardware. 
 
UPS was not affordable a few years ago, but became more affordable for the residential 
application. 
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The CCTV cameras and the recording system should be on a UPS to ensure that the 
homeowner will have continuous (constant) use of the system. 
No CCTV footage 
The application of CCTV footage is a popular security measure (commodity) in the domestic 
environment where the homeowner wants to have remote control over activities at home. 
These days the cell phone (GSM) and internet networks give the homeowner the ability to have 
application in hand and a phone call away. 
 
Security signage 
Security signage is required to be displayed by homeowners who makes use of a private 
security company and required by the private security service provider. The effectiveness of 
the signage can not be determined as contributing towards minimising residential burglaries if 
the victim’s alarm, panic or electrical fence was connected to an armed response company. In 
other words these other responses may have more impact on the reduction than the mere fact of 
a sign (of an armed response company) outside on an exterior wall. It is not known (and is not 
within the scope of this study) whether the presence of a sign acts as a deterrent (or influences 
the decision – target selection – of whether to burgle that house or not). 
 
(Another interesting research topic would be to determine the effectiveness of security signage 
in minimising crime would be another interesting research topic.) 
 
Security lights 
The majority of the victims had security lights and some found the questions on security lights 
irrelevant where the burglary had occurred during the day.  
 
(Security lights and the effectiveness of being a deterrent would also be another interesting 
research topic interviewing incarcerated criminals.) 
 
The application of the security lights can either be detection method through: 
· Warning the homeowner of an alarm violation by connecting some of the security lights 
to the alarm system; and 
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· Warning the homeowner of power failure if the lights are not activated. Therefore the 
lights should be connected to a day/night photo sensor, which arm automatically at 
night time. 
 
Security lights can be a deterrent by lighting the perimeter area to expose any possible 
intrusion or activate when movement detected on the perimeter through motion sensors. 
 
Gate automation 
Vehicle gate automation can be a security and convenience application. 
 
The use of vehicle gate motors has its advantages and disadvantages and due to the type of 
motor and the implementation method. 
 
Any security device should provide the owner with a security application either through 
detection or being a deterrent. Any security application should also be guarded by another 
device to ensure backup with system failure or minimising the exposure to possible failure. An 
example of a vehicle gate motor is to provide the owner with the ability to open and close the 
gate without getting out of his/her vehicle and exposed to possible hijacking. 
 
In return should be guarded by a backup battery supply to provide the owner of gate 
automation during a power failure. 
 
The following is important for the gate motor in terms of reliability: 
· Backup battery supply during power failures; 
· Gate keypad to activate gate motor in case of a remote button failure, for armed 
response access or can be used by gardener and domestic help without providing access 
to physical keys which can be misplaced; 
· Manual override facility to manually open the gate in a total failure (lightning strike as 
an example or a major power surge damage); and 
· Anti theft bracket to minimise being tampered with or stolen. 
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Perimeter types 
The following is recommended as guiding principles in evaluating a security perimeter: 
· Delay ability; 
· Deterrent ability; and 
· Detection ability. 
 
An existing perimeter might require more of the one principal and less of another. 
 
In the following example the existing perimeter is palisade fencing. Note how the existing 
palisade fence can be enhanced to comply with the three principles of a security device:   
Table 8:  An illustration of how a current perimeter type can be enhanced to comply with  
                the three principles of a security system 
Current 
situation    
Perimeter 
type Deterrent Delay Detection 
Palisade Barbwire 
Steel uprights 
30mm x 30 mm Blind and deaf dog 
Proposed 
situation    
Perimeter 
type Deterrent Delay Detection 
Palisade Barbwire  
Steel uprights 
30mm x 30 mm Blind and deaf dog 
  
Add 
electrified 
fencing 
Electrify from 
top to bottom 
adding game 
fencing attached 
to existing 
palisade 
infrastructure 
Add electrified fencing 
connected to an armed 
response RF device 
 
Infra-red beams 
Infra-red beams are a detection device and provide an additional backup to the other devices on 
a secured perimeter in failure. They also provide an additional confirmation to the homeowner 
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that there is a definite intrusion or bridging of the security perimeter if for example the 
electrified fencing violation signal was received prior to the infrared beam zone violation. 
 
Below infra-red beams will now be discussed with the inner perimeter security. 
INNER PERIMETER SECURITY 
Security lights 
This was discussed in the perimeter section. The activation of the lights remains a problem area 
in that majority of the victims activated them with a manual switch. This would raise the 
question of human error which is highly probable with lights not being switched on. 
 
Infra-red beams 
Infra-red beams are more effective during night time when there is no direct sunlight or daily 
routines such as gardening services or children running around to set them off. 
 
The effective setup of the infra-red beams is important to ensure: 
· Minimal false alarms; 
· User friendly; and 
· Reporting as a dedicated zone.  
Minimal false alarms 
In the researcher’s experience it was found that beams are placed in garden areas that it will 
have minimal false alarms if: 
· There is not shrubs or vegetation close as two meters from these beams; and 
· Minimal movement in terms of children, gardening services, big bird types or dogs. 
 
The best approach is to setup the beams to accommodate routine. For example not to bypass 
the front beam due to irregular teenager behaviour patterns etc. and also the setup the beams 
close to the immediate hose to avoid beams being triggered by big birds or dogs. 
User friendly 
One needs to separate the beams from the house hardware, but still have them on the same 
intruder alarm control panel. This allows an owner to arm beams separately from the internal 
house and still have a detection capability when using the house apart from the external area. 
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Reporting as a dedicated partition  
Having the beams reporting separately (dedicated zone) from the immediate house alarm and 
to indicate a chronological sequence of events where there was an example of a beam violation 
and immediately after it a house violation. This would allow for the armed response can make 
a more accurate decision in responding to a definite as supposed to and false alarm activation. 
IMMEDIATE HOUSE SECURITY 
The immediate house security includes the following: 
· Doors; 
· Safety gates; 
· Windows; 
· Intruder alarms; and 
· Panics. 
 
Doors 
The following recommendations in terms of doors will be discussed: 
· Key control and management; and 
· Lock types. 
Key control and management 
The management of keys and controlling them are essential to ensure that the keys will not be 
used by unauthorised persons and will locks will be changed immediately after there is 
suspicion that the keys were used unlawfully or went missing. 
Lock types 
Locks need to have a backup in case of failure. The night latch lock is commonly used by 
homeowners and provides the ability to lock immediately (slam lock) if the owner needs to 
escape from an intruder. The type of lock will also provide a certain level of delay when it is 
tampered with. The ‘Y”, “CD” etc ranges are commonly used by building developers in 
developments where the homeowner do not have the opportunity to choose the required locks. 
 
A dead bolt on both sides of the door fame (opening and closing side) can also provide a delay 
to the homeowner from an intruder. 
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A more expensive and effective approach is a magnetic lock. This would be beneficial where 
the door would only be opened with an electronic keypad or the latest on finger print 
recognition. The latter would be more expensive than other traditional physical locks. 
 
Safety gates 
The following recommendations in terms of safety gates will be discussed: 
· Vital areas; and 
· Lock types. 
Vital areas 
Less the half of the respondents in the victim interviews had safety gates either in the patio 
doors, kitchen doors or front door areas. 
 
Safety gates are the barrier before the immediate house is entered. A safety gate (second 
barrier) should provide the homeowner with a delay barrier in case the door is opened and 
there is a perpetrator. It should also be a barrier which will enable the owner to open doors 
during day time (when it is hot) so that a cool breeze can floe into the house. 
Lock types 
The same statements would apply as with doors discussed in the door section.  
 
The lock used should provide a reasonable delay and should not have keys which can be 
bought over the counter without providing the master key. 
 
Windows 
The following recommendations will be discussed in terms of windows: 
· Burglar proofing; 
· Concealment of movement; and 
· Closing window latches 
Burglar proofing 
The majority of the victims had burglar proofing integrated into their window frames. 
 
Burglar proofing on the secure side of the window would be more beneficial if there the 
window is closed and the window needs to be broken before an attempt is made on the burglar 
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proofing. With breaking of the window the victim would be able to hear this unless safety film 
has the ability to reduce breaking glass – this has the ability to reduce breaking glass sound. In 
such cases it is recommended that the intruder alarm glass break detectors be installed. 
 
The type of steel used will depend on the aesthetic value the homeowner/resident prefers. If it 
is more about aesthetics, one can assume that the steel will be very thin in diameter or non-
existent. The approach should be to provide advise in using thicker steel and apply this in the 
design. 
 
Correctly placed burglar proofing provides a delay mechanism which can ensure that the infra-
red beam outside the window can ensure detection and the glass break detector inside the house 
detecting the breaking glass. This all can contribute to early detection and quicker armed 
response. 
Concealment of movement 
Less than fifty percent of the victims covered their windows with curtains during day or night 
time. Covering windows with curtains can: 
· Conceal movement inside the house; and 
· Conceal valuable and small appliances from observation. 
 
(The impact of closed curtains on the incidence of burglary will be another interesting research 
project.) 
Closing window latches 
The majority of the victims did not close their windows which can not have the effect as 
explained in the above-mentioned section on burglar proofing. 
 
The majority of the victims had the traditional lever latch system on their windows which at 
times do not latch properly due to mechanism not locking properly. The window designs have 
now changed to more effective lever latches with less possibility of mechanisms coming loose 
or not latching properly. The latter is more expensive if window frames need to be changed and 
should be a procedure checking the tightness of the lever latches regularly. 
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Intruder alarms 
The following recommendations will be discussed in terms of intruder alarms: 
· Need for user friendliness; 
· Monitoring; and 
· Zone description and identification. 
Need for friendliness 
Half of the victims who had intruder alarms did not use their alarms and the reasons varied 
from either they were at home at the time and felt not using it; did not know how to use it; the 
system was not functional or was not sure if they armed their alarms (i.e. may forgotten to arm 
the alarm system). 
 
The researcher found that intruder alarms in general are not used due to clients not sure how to 
trouble shoot the system when indicating a fault, open zone or not sure how to bypass/isolate 
zones when other areas are occupied by visitors, domestics, garden workers, children or pets. 
 
Fundamentally installers or sellers of intruder alarm systems should provide clear guidelines to 
the user for the following user actions: 
· Arming and disarming it in the following conditions: 
o Stay arming; 
o Away arming; 
o Arming partitions separately; 
o Isolating/bypassing zones; 
o Trouble shooting alarm; and 
o Testing sequence or procedures. 
 
The system should also be able to provide the user with alarm violation signals. 
Monitoring 
An alarm system also provides output devices on the system to report via an armed response 
monitoring device such as a RF radio and SMS communicator. An alarm system can also be 
connected to the telephone line and internal alarm communicator to report on specific zone 
conditions such as zone violations and faulty zones or on the alarm system status quo such as 
alarm armed or disarmed by a certain user. 
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The siren inside the house will alert the user or neighbours of alarm violation and also a strobe 
light close to the main perimeter entrance on approach the house (i.e. can see there has been a 
violation if been away). 
 
The keypad next to the user’s bed or the keypad as the user enter the house area will alert the 
user of any alarm violation conditions power failures or panics. 
 
The following is important to ensure that both the monitoring system and the intruder alarm 
system will provide each other with accurate information: 
· Required alarm signals need to be planned (i.e. clear indication of what each is for e.g. 
such as mains failure, keypad panic activation, remote panic button activation, infra-red 
beam violation, electrified fencing violation, intruder alarm house alarm violation); 
· The signals need to be provided through the output devices on the alarm system and 
these output devices need to be programmed to provide the required signals; and 
· The monitoring device need to be provided with enough inputs to accommodate all the 
required signals received from the intruder alarm system. 
 
The end result should provide both the armed response monitoring control room operator and 
the homeowner with accurate information on the alarm status. 
Zone description and identification 
Zone description is important for both the user and the armed response monitoring control 
room operator to ensure that the user will know where the alarm violation occurred and the 
movement of the perpetrator and the response officer to know where to expect to find the 
perpetrator and makes an accurate appreciation how to approach the house area. 
 
The identification of zones can be via the alarm keypad providing zone description with LED’s 
(lights with zone descriptions hard tagged, or LCD display where the zone descriptions appears 
on a LCD display. 
 
Both will vary according to the user’s preference and the one s not regarded to be more popular 
than the other. 
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The LED display has a disadvantage in that it cannot display more than 16 zones without 
looking to “busy” and then becoming “confusing”. 
 
Panic buttons 
Effective monitoring 
The majority of the victims had fixed panic button, but only six out of the potential thirteen 
interviews indicated that they also had remote panic buttons. 
 
Panic buttons are applicable to this research in that some of the cases reported were robberies, 
i.e. occurred when the occupants were inside or on the property at the time of the burglary and 
needed to activate a panic alarm at the time of the intruder detection. 
 
The following can be used to activate a panic condition on the intruder alarm system: 
· Remote panic button and receiver; 
· Fixed panic button; 
· Keypad panic button facility; and 
· Duress user code. 
Remote panic button and receiver 
Only two of the potential victims who had remote panics, had tested it prior to the incident. 
The disadvantage of the remote panic buttons is within their batteries not changed regularly or 
where remotes were changed and only reprogrammed to open the garage and gate motor and 
not to activate the panic receiver. 
Fixed panic button 
Fixed panic buttons should be placed strategically throughout the house to provide at least one 
button for each room. 
 
The researcher experienced in general that intrude alarm systems are not programmed properly 
to ensure that the alarm system will provide a panic signal output to the armed response 
monitoring device, SMS communicator or intruder alarm communicator. 
 
An intruder alarm should be programmed to provide an output connected to these fixed panics 
and provide the output required. 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  246 
 
Keypad panic facility 
The intruder alarm keypad can provide a panic facility. This is normally the best place to have 
a panic facility in that this is the first point which the victim will approach to arming, 
disarming or viewing alarm activities. The intruder alarm system should be programmed to 
provide an output and reporting on a panic signal. 
Duress user code 
The keypad should have a user code which will send a signal via the monitoring device(s) on a 
panic or duress situation. This code will be used when the perpetrator forced the homeowner to 
deactivate the alarm from an alarm violation condition (i.e. the homeowner can put in a 
specific code which will deactivate the intruder alarm system, but will still send a silent signal 
to an armed response company that an emergency is occurring).  The majority of the intruder 
alarm do have this facility and the researcher experienced that the average alarm is not 
programmed with this feature especially where there is small companies involved and not 
monitored by regulating authorities and not have proper quality control in place. 
Location 
The location of panic buttons should be known to all occupants in the house. Remote panics 
should be either on a person or close to a person. Each room should either have a fixed panic or 
a remote panic button and all should be aware of the duress code. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The above recommendations for the homeowner use of an array of security measures were 
based on the findings from the study and also drawn from the personal work experience the 
researcher gained over the last seven years being involved with residential security projects, 
residential security audits and electronic courses in intruder alarm systems and assisting with 
installations. In addition, involvement with the community security forums in the research area 
also added to these recommendations. 
 
The research findings indicated poorly implemented, used and maintained outer perimeter 
security, inner perimeter security and also immediate house area security. The security 
measures did, in the majority of cases, not comply with the principles/attributes of: 
· Deterrent; 
· Detection; and 
· Delay. 
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The outcomes (research findings) focussed in providing security solutions in order to manage 
security crime risks such as residential burglary and adhere to the principles of: 
· Determining the best and most cost-effective way of implementing and choosing a 
security system; 
· Enhancing the security system’s deterrence value; 
· Improving the security system’s detection capabilities; 
· Enhancing the ability of the security system to delay a threat; and  
· Developing efficiency by regular use, continual upgrading, providing effective training 
and having a constant maintenance plan in place. 
 
Overall these security solutions need to incorporate some of the following basic principles (of 
security): 
· The most effective way of implementing a security system is for it to be properly 
designed by a security professional, integrating a cost effective system in relation with 
the latest crime trends and modus operandi, but all to the needs and requirements of the 
client and front end user; 
· The system should have deterrent value to minimise the risk of being exposed to 
possible unauthorised intrusion of one’s property; and 
· The system needs to have a detection value warning the homeowner in advance 
(reducing the probability of the risk being exposed) and the perpetrator being detected 
and apprehended in time. The latter can also be achieved by increasing physical barriers 
so as to delay perpetrators (in the commissioning of their crime). 
 
During the victim interviews it was clear that there was a need for communities to get together 
and establish Community Police Forums. These forums will enable communities, in 
partnership with the South African Police Service and private security companies, to have 
proactive measures in place (identifying variables such as builders in areas) and implement 
them in order to reduce and to detect crime before claiming another victim. 
 
CCTV can also be a deterrent. The challenge would be to get metro councils to speed up 
regulations regarding implementation of CCTV surveillance systems in public space areas. In 
the experience of the researcher it is currently problematic where a metro council do not want 
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to approve power to the CCTV, although the positioning of CCTV has already being approved. 
The lack of a directive on CCTV implementation leaves no hope for decisions to be made by 
any metro council member. Crime continues due to lack of cooperation by metro council. 
 
A need sophisticated perimeter and security measures becomes more crucial. If the community 
initiative failed in detecting, deterring or delaying a crime, the perimeter is the next barrier, 
which needs to provide values/attributes of deterrent, detection and delay.  
 
Infra-red beams and will be next barrier of detection if the property perimeter was breached by 
the intruder. Implementing beams and upgrading it to the latest and newer technologies, will 
not only minimise false alarms, but bring more faith and trust in the effectiveness of beams by 
the home owner and as a result will be more used to a greater extend than merely either 
switching them off or bypassing them. 
 
The immediate house area security measures need to be managed more effectively. The control 
of keys, gate remotes and alarm codes should be allowed to be fragmented control (i.e. diverse 
users allowed to use the various security measures).  
 
Alarm monitoring needs to be more objective providing as much as possible information to the 
homeowner and the armed response company on sequence of events in order to draw more 
accurate conclusions and more accurate decisions on how to react. 
 
The descriptive mapping can be useful as a tool to the South African Police Service and also 
the Community Police Forums in their effort to combat crime. The maps indicated can provide 
useful information in terms of victim location in relation to environmental variables such as 
open properties, main roads etc. Police and community forums should keep these maps up to 
date to plan in advance for any possibilities in terms of crime risks. Insurance companies 
should also be more active in communities sharing statistics and resources in managing this 
tool. 
 
Dockets should have a pre-designed form to assist the police officers recording as much as 
possible information of the crime. This will ensure that statistical data can be available for 
analysis and this again, will provide a tool for proactive policing. 
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Focussing only on one’s immediate house has changed dramatically in terms of the latest crime 
trends and modus operandi. Focussing at macro level should be the focus, starting in your 
surrounding communities and working towards the immediate house area. 
 
An effort of instituting partnering programmes through public-private partnership is important 
to engage synergies amongst all stakeholders ranging from private homeowner, insurer, 
potential property developer and buyer, foreign investor, government and private companies. 
Without these synergies, the chain of cooperation can not be completed and as a result leaving 
crime to be the problem of only some of the stakeholders. 
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Interview 
number Date 
Reference 
number Area 
1 06 April 2005 W1 Westcliff 
2 
07 April 
2005 W2 Westcliff 
3 
12 April 
2005 W3 Westcliff 
4 
14 April 
2005 W4 Westcliff 
5 
18 April 
2005 P1 Parkhurst 
6 
19 April 
2005 W5 Westcliff 
7 
21 April 
2005 W6 Westcliff 
8 
26 April 
2005 W7 Westcliff 
9 
27 April 
2005 P2 Parkhurst 
10 
28 April 
2005 P3 Parkhurst 
11 
04 May 
2005 P4 Parkhurst 
12 
04 May 
2005 P5 Parkhurst 
13 
07 May 
2005 P6 Parkhurst 
14 
07 June 
2005 P7 Parkhurst 
15 11 July 2005 P8 Parkhurst 
16 14 July 2005 P9 Parkhurst 
17 19 July 2005 P10 Parkhurst 
18 21 July 2005 W8 Westcliff 
19 26 July 2005 P11 Parkhurst 
20 28 July 2005 P12 Parkhurst 
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ANNEXURES 
ANNEXURE 1 
Map 1: Westcliff Area 
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ANNEXURE 2 
Map 2: Parkview Policing Area 
 
(Adopted from the Parkview Police official web site) 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  257 
 
ANNEXURE 3 
Map 3: Parkhurst Area 
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ANNEXURE 4 
Map 4: Upper Westcliff Security Forum area 
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ANNEXURE 5 
Docket Digital Survey Form 
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Docket Digital Survey Form - Hardcopy 
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ANNEXURE 6 
 
VICTIM INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
VICTIM INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FORM: 
 
NEW UNISA 
INTERVIEW WITH VICTIMS OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY RESIDING WITHIN ONE OF 
THE TWO NORTHERN SUBURBS OF JOHANNESBURG TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT 
OF RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES ON THE INCIDENCE OF BURGLARY 
 
Dear Respondent, 
 
This research project is undertaken by the researcher as part of an M Tech Degree in Security Risk 
Management at New Unisa. 
 
(Notes:  Bridging dialogue is in italics, but questions are in normal text. Additional questions to 
clarify answers will be used where applicable. In general, answers will be recorded verbatim as 
much as far as possible. With the permission of the respondents, all interviews will be recorded 
either by means of writing and dicta phone recordings done by the researcher.) 
 
SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT 
The interview schedule forms part of an attempted research project to determine the impact of 
residential security measures on residential burglary. In these interviews, only persons who were 
victims of burglary, in one of two Northern suburbs, Westcliff or Parkhurst as target areas, between 
1 January 2001 and 31 December 2002 will be interviewed 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The identities of all the persons interviewed will be kept strictly confidential. Only the research 
results will be made available to interest groups. Your identity will be in no way being detectable 
from the research results. The location of your house will only be used by the researcher analysing 
variables on timing, locality, geographical analysis, escape routes etc. and will not be indicated in 
the descriptive mapping. 
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The researcher is bound to his assurances and guarantees by the Ethics Code for Research of the 
New University of South Africa (UNISA). 
 
The information you provide will be used in the research project for a MTECH Degree registered 
with the Department Security Risk Management, School of Criminal Justice and the College of 
Law all at the New University of South Africa (UNISA). 
 
DEFINITION 
Residential burglary 
In this study residential burglary is defined as taking possession of any household appliances, 
furniture and any other property of the lawful owner (the respondent), in an unlawful manner 
and/or without the lawful owner’s (the respondent’s) permission. 
 
Incident 
In this study the incident refers to the latest burglary or burglary attempt committed at the residents 
of the respondent. 
 
The Respondent 
In this study the respondent refers to the homeowner or homeowners or both or the responsible 
tenant at the time of the latest burglary incident and still residing in the same home being burgled 
and at the time of this interview. 
 
GENERAL 
The South African Police gave permission for the researcher to conduct a docket analysis. 
 
The Parkview Police approved the researcher application to do the docket analysis at their Crime 
Intelligence Centre and to use the information gained from the docket analysis, to get in contact 
with the respondents in an attempt to arrange interviews and audits. 
 
Your responses will be noted by the interviewer on paper, dicta phone or both. Should any question 
or statement be unclear to you, please ask the researcher present, to clarify the issue. 
 
The interview schedule has 95 questions that might be all or partially applicable to the each 
interview. 
 
The interview is scheduled to take approximately 45 minutes. 
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Only one answer per question is required. 
 
When answering the questions it is very important to give your opinion. 
 
Please feel free to interrupt the researcher to ask for clarification. 
 
The last thing I like to say before we get started is to remind you that you have the right to refuse 
any answer any particular question, although I would appreciate you telling me why if there is 
anything you do not want to answer. Do you any questions now? 
 
SECTION A 
Let me start with some general information. I would like to know something about your 
background in general  
 
1. Type of dwelling: 
 
Duet 
Single house 
Flat 
Duplex Town House 
Simplex Town House 
Cottage 
Security Village 
Gated Neighbourhood 
 
2. Were you employed at the time of the incident? 
Yes No 
 
3. Employment status at the time of the incident? 
Full time  Part time  Student 
Self 
Employed Unemployed 
          
 
4. At the time of the incident, were you working from home? 
Yes No 
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5. If employed, have any of the following personnel employed or family members  
or lodgers supposed to be on site at the time of the incident? 
Domestic 
Help 
Child minder Lodger Retired 
Partner 
Other 
Family 
Gardener Building 
Contractor 
              
 
Now that you have told me about yourself, let’s move on to the actual burglary incident, the crime 
category you are a victim of. 
 
I would like to ask you questions regarding the incident.  
 
Please remember that what you will say will be treated as confidential. Please remember that the 
Incident refers to the latest burglary or attempted burglary you were a victim of according to the 
local police records at the time of this interview. 
 
Premises refer to the place burgled according to the local police records. 
 
SECTION B 
All the following questions relate to at the time of the actual burglary. 
Suburb 
 
6. Was there a patrolling neighbourhood watch? 
Yes No 
 
7. Were there any contractors55  works in the following areas: 
In your street 
At your house 
At your immediate56 neighbours 
In your suburb 
In you immediate residential block3 
 
 
 
                                               
55 Contractors: Refers to any activities related to installing, erecting or maintaining public services like electricity, 
plumbing, road works, civil engineering works etc. 
56 Immediate neighbour refers to your neighbours on either side of you, diagonally on the left and right to the back 
of your property and neighbour immediately behind the back of your property. 
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Perimeter 
CCTV 
8. Did you have CCTV installed? 
Yes No 
 
9. If yes, was it recording any footage? 
Yes No 
 
Perimeter Fence 
10. Have you had a perimeter fence in place which encircled your property? 
Yes No 
 
11. If yes, what kind of a fence? 
Steel palisade 
Wooden balustrades 
Precast slab walling 
Wired diamond mesh 
Brick wall 
Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
12. Did you attend to the following possible penetrable areas: 
Cracked pre-cast slabs 
Overhanging tree branches 
Missing or loose palisade 
Missing wooden balustrades 
Other (Please specify) 
 
 
Electrified fencing 
13. Did you have electrified fencing? 
Yes No 
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14. How was your fence energiser switched on/off? 
Key Remote Keypad 
 
15. How was your fence energiser monitored? 
Siren 
Armed response (RF) radio link 
Remote Keypad 
SMS 
Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
16. How long before (In months) the incident did you install your electrified fencing? 
1-12 13-24 25-36 37 + 
 
17. Did you have a back up battery facility to the fence energiser replaced prior to the  
  incident? 
Yes No 
 
18. If yes, within how many months before the incidents did you had the back up battery  
replaced? 
1-12 13-24 25-36 37 + 
 
19. Did you receive any calls regarding alarm violation signals, from the armed response 
control room prior to the incident? 
 
Yes No 
 
20. If yes, which of the following signals were they reporting on? 
Common alarm violation 
Electrified fencing alarm violation 
Mains failure signal 
Other (Please specify) 
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Motorised Vehicle Perimeter Gates 
21. How many motorised vehicle perimeter gate areas did you have on the property? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
22. Were your vehicle gate(s) linked with your intruder alarm system? 
 
 
23. Did you have an electronic key pad connected to the vehicle gate motor? 
 
 
24. If yes, what is the reason and purpose for this? 
Access for the armed response company 
Access for the domestic help 
Access for the gardener 
Access for your children 
Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
25. Have you ever had the main access code changed at the mentioned keypad? 
Yes No 
 
26. If yes, how many months prior to the incident? 
1-12 13-24 25-36 37 + OTHER (Please 
specify) 
 
 
 
 
27. Did you have the other user codes changed on the vehicle gate motor electronic keypad? 
Yes No 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes No 
Yes No 
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  28. If yes, how many months? 
1-12 13-24 25-36 37 + OTHER (Please 
specify) 
 
 
 
 
29. Was there anyone else other than yourself, your children and you partner, who else had 
access to the vehicular perimeter gate? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………… 
30. Did you have a manual lock fitted to your vehicular gate? 
Yes No 
 
31. Did anyone else other than yourself had access to the keys locking and unlocking this manual 
lock. 
Yes No 
 
32. If yes who had access to these keys? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
33. Did you have a back up battery supply to the vehicle gate motor? 
Yes No 
 
34. If yes, within how many months before the incidents did you had the back up battery  
replaced? 
1-12 13-24 25-36 37 + 
 
35. Have you had any other additional security feature(s) fitted to your gate motor that 
secured your gate motor? 
Yes No 
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36. Please describe the feature(s). 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
Pedestrian Gates 
37. Did you have any pedestrian gates on your property? 
Yes No 
 
38. If yes, how many pedestrian gates? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
39. How do you lock or secure these pedestrian gates? 
Gate 1  
Gate 2  
Gate 3  
Gate 4  
Gate 5  
 
40. Which of the following people had access to these locking systems and in what manner? 
Children  
Child minder  
Gardener  
Domestic help  
Others: (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41. Did you have a manual locking facility fitted to the pedestrian gate(s) 
Yes No 
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42. If yes, how persons had access to the keys other than yourself and your partner to  this manual 
locking facility? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………… 
 
43. Did you have an electrical striker/magnetic locking facility to the pedestrian gate(s)? 
Yes No 
 
44. If yes, did you have a back up battery supply to pedestrian gate striker/magnetic lock? 
Yes No 
 
45. Did you replace the back up battery replaced to these electrical/magnetic locks? 
Yes No 
 
 46. If yes, how many months ago prior to the incident? 
 1-12 13-24 25-36 37 + 
 
47. Did you have a gate closer fitted to the pedestrian gate at the time? 
Yes No 
 
48. Did you have a digital keypad connected the pedestrian gate striker/magnetic lock? 
 Yes No 
 
49. If yes, what is the reason and purpose for this? 
Access for the armed response company 
Access for the domestic help 
Access for the gardener 
Access for your children 
Other (Please specify) 
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50. Did you change the main access code at any stage? 
Yes No 
 
51. If yes, how many months prior to the incident? 
1-12 13-24 25-36 37 + OTHER (Please 
specify) 
 
 
 
 
52. Did you have any other user codes changed? 
Yes No 
 
 53. If yes, how many months prior to the incident? 
1-12 13-24 25-36 37 + OTHER (Please 
specify) 
 
 
 
 
Inner Perimeter (Garden Area) 
Infrared Beams 
54. Did you have any infrared beams installed in the garden area? 
Yes No 
 
55. If yes, please indicate where. 
All around the house 
Only the front garden area 
Only in the back garden area 
Other (Please specify) 
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56. Have you removed any bushes, shrubs or other vegetation encroaching on the infra-red beam 
system, before the incident? 
Yes No 
 
57. If yes within how many days have you done this? 
Full time 1-2 3-4 5-6 7+ 
 
58. Did you bypass your beams before the incident? 
Yes No 
 
59. If yes, why were the beams bypassed at the time of the incident? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Floodlights 
60. Did you have security floodlights in the garden area? 
Yes No 
 
61. If yes, were these lights operational at the time of the incident. 
Yes No 
 
62. In what way are the floodlights activated?: 
Day/night photo sensor 
Timer 
Manual 
Other (Please specify) 
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Immediate House Area 
Door Keys and Locks 
63. Were all the external doors locked at the time of the incident? 
Yes No 
 
64. Were any keys left inside (secure side of the doors at the time of the incident of the external 
doors)? 
Yes No 
 
65. Did any of the following, if any, have access to the keys of any or all external door locks? 
Children 
Domestic help 
Gardener 
Other family members other than immediate family 
Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
66. Did you have any safety gates in the following areas: 
Kitchen Door 
Front Door 
Patio door(s) 
Door that leads from garage directly into house 
Door between living and sleeping areas 
Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
Windows 
67. Were there burglar proofing in front of external windows? 
Yes No 
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68. Was the burglar proofing covering all the windows in the following areas or only some 
windows or none? :    
Living area windows  
Sleeping area windows  
Both areas  
 
69. Were all the external windows closed? 
Yes No 
 
 70. If not, which windows were not closed and why? 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
71. Did you have all, some or any or none of the external windows covered with closed curtains 
during the day? 
All of the external windows  
Some of the external windows  
None of the external windows  
 
72. Did you have all, some or any or none of the external windows covered with closed 
curtains during the night? 
All of the external windows  
Some of the external windows  
None of the external windows  
 
Intruder Alarm 
73. Did you have any intruder alarm? 
Yes No 
 
74. If yes, did you arm it before the incident? 
Yes No 
 
75. If no, state your reason for not arming the alarm? 
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
76. Were the intruder alarm system connected to an armed response (RF) radio link? 
Yes No 
 
77. If not, please state your reason for this? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
78. Did you have your intruder alarm tested prior to the incident? 
Yes No 
 
79. If yes, how long before the incident did you test your alarm? 
Days Weeks Months Years Never Other (Please specify) 
            
 
80. Were there any fixed panic buttons inside the residence? 
Yes No 
 
81. Were there any remote panic buttons inside the residence? 
Yes No 
 
82. If yes, please indicate which member(s) was/were in possession of a remote panic 
button(s)? 
Children 
Domestic Help 
Child Minder 
Homeowner/Responsible tenant’s partner 
Homeowner/Responsible tenant  
Other (Please specify) 
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83. Did you have your remote panic buttons tested prior to the incident? 
Yes No 
 
84. If yes, how long before the incident did you have the remote panic buttons tested? 
Days Weeks Months Years Never Other (Please specify) 
            
 
85. Other than yourself and your partner, did anyone else have access to the code which was used 
to arm and disarm the intruder alarm system? 
Yes No 
 
86. If yes, please specify who else had access to the code which was used to arm and disarm 
the system? 
Children  
Domestic Help  
Child Minder  
Homeowner/Responsible tenant’s partner  
Homeowner/Responsible tenant   
Other (Please specify) 
 
 
 
 
 
87. Was there any zones bypassed? 
Yes No 
 
 88. If yes, please explain why these/this zone(s) were/was bypassed? 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Post Incident 
Security Enhancements 
Neighbourhood 
89. Since the incident, what in your neighbourhood has been enhanced in terms of security? 
  N/A New Increased Decreased 
Bicycles 
patrols 
        
Walking 
patrols 
        
Dedicated 
armed 
response car 
        
Boomed off 
area 
        
Visible 
surveillance 
cameras 
        
Establishment 
of 
neighbourhood 
watch  
        
Other (Please 
specify) 
        
 
Additional  Notes 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
 
Perimeter 
90. Since the incident, what has been enhanced with your perimeter in terms of security at the 
perimeter area? 
  N/A New Increased Decreased 
Erecting 
electrified 
fencing 
        
Erecting wall 
spikes 
        
Erecting 
barbwire 
        
Erecting 
palisade 
        
Building brick 
walls 
        
Other (Please 
specify) 
        
 
 
Additional Notes 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
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Vehicle Gate 
91. Since the incident, what has been enhanced at your vehicle gate in terms of security at the 
vehicle gate area? 
  N/A New Increased Decreased 
Gate release 
clutch lock 
        
Digital keypad 
for the armed 
response 
        
Other (Please 
specify) 
        
 
Additional Notes 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
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Pedestrian Gate 
92. Since the incident, what has been what has been enhanced at the pedestrian gate(s) in terms of 
security measures at the pedestrian gate(s) area(s)? 
  N/A New Increased Decreased 
Backup battery 
to the 
electrical 
striker 
lock/magnetic 
lock 
        
Gate Closer         
Other (Please 
specify) 
        
 
 
Additional Notes 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………… 
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Inner perimeter 
93. Since the incident, what has been in enhanced in the garden area in terms of security measures 
within the inner perimeter area? 
  N/A New Increased Decreased 
Floodlights         
Infrared beams         
Dogs         
Other (Please 
specify) 
        
 
 
Additional Notes 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
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Immediate home security 
94. Since the incident, what has been enhanced within the immediate house area in terms of  
security measures at the immediate house area? 
  N/A New Increased Decreased 
Closed windows         
Changed door locks         
Burglar proofing inside 
windows of sleeping 
areas 
        
Safety gate between the 
living and sleeping 
areas 
        
Intruder alarm installed         
Intruder alarm 
connected to RF radio 
link to armed response 
company 
        
Link Intruder alarm 
with SMS unit 
monitored by a 
centralised armed 
response company 
        
Remote panic buttons 
implemented connected 
to RF radio dedicated 
panic zone 
        
Separate user codes 
and owner/responsible 
tenant the master code 
        
Other (Please specify)         
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Additional Notes 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
INTERVIEWER COMMENTS 
 
Interview Number………………………Identification Code………………………………….. 
 
Description of circumstances under which the interview has taken place 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
General Impressions (Co-operation, body language and communication) 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
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Summary of the interview with important aspects 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
Adoption of the question and theory 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………… 
 
Proposition: (Conformation, modification, rejection, new understanding, new areas to be 
researched and explored) 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………… 
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ANNEXURE 7 
VICTIM RESIDENTIAL SECURITY AUDIT SCHEDULE 
 
RESIDENTIAL AUDIT AT VICTIM OF RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY - FORM : 
 
NEW UNISA 
 
RESIDENTIAL SECURITY AUDITS AT THE HOMES OF VICTIMS OF RESIDENTIASL 
BURGLARY RESIDING WITHIN ONE OF THE TWO NORTHERN SUBURBS OF 
JOHANNESBURG, WESTCLIFF AND PARKHURST, TO DETERMINE THE IMPACT OF 
RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES ON THE INCIDENCE OF BURGLARY COMMITTED 
BETWEEN 1 JANUARY 2001 AND 31 DECEMBER 2002  
 
This research project is undertaken by the researcher as part of an M Tech Degree in Security Risk 
Management at New Unisa. 
 
(Notes:  Bridging dialogue is in italics, but questions are in normal text. Additional questions to clarify 
answers will be used where applicable. In general, answers will be recorded verbatim as much as 
possible. The interviews will be recorded in writing, digital pictures and dicta phone recordings by the 
researcher.) 
 
SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT 
 
The Residential Security Audit forms part of a research project to determine the impact of 
residential security measures on the incidence of burglary committed between 1 January 2001 
and 31 December 2002 in two Northern suburbs, Westcliff and Parkhurst, in Johannesburg. In 
these audits, only persons who were victims of burglary, in one of the two Northern suburbs, 
premises will be audited. 
 
The Residential Security Audit Form can be applied: 
 
· As a proactive security measure; 
· For the compilation of a future residential security audit template; and 
· For the compilation of descriptive mapping to determine crime trends and domestic 
security measures; 
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CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
You are not required to give your name in this audit. Your name will also not appear in any other report 
and the researcher guarantees your anonymity. In addition all other personal information will be kept 
confidential. 
 
The identities of all the persons properties audited will be kept strictly confidential. Only the research 
results will be made available to interest groups. Your identity will be in no way being detectable from 
the research results. The location of your house will only be used by the researcher analysing variables 
on timing, locality, geographical analysis, escape routes etc. and will not be indicated in the descriptive 
mapping. 
 
The researcher is bound to his assurances and guarantees by the ethics code for research at the New 
University of South Africa. 
 
The information you provide will be used in the research project for a Master of Technology Degree 
registered with the Programme Group Security Risk Management at Technikon SA. The analysed and 
processed data (statistics and powerful statements will be published in the research project). 
 
DEFINITION 
In this study burglary is defined as theft of any household appliances, furniture and any other 
property of the victim. 
 
In this study the incident refers to the latest burglary committed at the home of the victim between 1 
January 2001 and 31 December 2002 according to the Parkview Police records. 
 
In this study the victim refers to the homeowner or homeowners or both or the responsible tenant at the 
time of the latest burglary incident and still residing in the same home being burgled and at the time of 
this interview. 
 
In this study residential security measures refers to the physical, procedural and technological security 
measures implemented before the incident and after the incident. 
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GENERAL 
Residential Security Measures and your answers will be noted by the interviewer on paper, dicta phone, 
laptop PC and digital camera. Should any question or statement be unclear to you, please ask the 
researcher present, to clarify the issue. 
 
Written permissions have been obtained from the South African Police Service in advance for the 
interviews and audits to be conducted. This also sole depends on the participation and final approval of 
the homeowner/responsible tenant. 
 
Given what I’m interested in, you should be able to see why I’m asking most of the questions that 
follow. If not, you can ask for an explanation, and I will try to explain, although it may be until we have 
finished the interview because it is very important that we finish in time we have available. Also, if you 
have other information that you think is important that I do not ask about, please tell me. 
 
The last thing I like to say before we get started is to remind you that you have the right to refuse the 
researcher access to any area, although I would appreciate you telling me why if there is anything you 
do not want to answer or deny me access to. Do you any questions now? 
 
SECTION A 
Now that we have agreed to the survey process I would like to start with the following in sequence: 
· Perimeter 
· Inner perimeter (garden area) 
· Immediate House 
 
I will then continue with the neighbourhood on my exit and will not need you to accompany me on that 
part of the survey. 
 
Thank you again for the time. 
 
This section will go in accordance with the Residential Security Audit as agreed prior to this. 
 
PERIMETER 
Walls  
I will make notes on the following: 
 
· Height; 
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· Drain areas; and 
· Deterrence. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
Electrified fencing 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Joule capacity; 
· Earth strands earthing method; 
· Connection to the RF Radio on dedicated zone; 
· Connection to a siren; 
· Arming and  disarming method; and 
· Energiser location. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………… 
Vehicle Gate 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
 
· Anti lifting devices; 
· Gate motor rack safeguarding; 
· Type of gate; and 
· Manual locking device. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Vehicle Gate Motor 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Anti Theft bracket; and 
· Connection to intruder alarm system. 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………… 
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CCTV 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Connection to monitor; 
· Power supply unit and backup facility; 
· Visibility during evenings; 
· Type of lens; and 
· Angles. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Lights 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Connection; and 
· Ignition Facility. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………… 
Palisade 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Penetrability; 
· Thickness; 
· Width between the palisade; 
· Deterrent ability. 
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Pedestrian Perimeter Gate 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Penetrability; 
· Locking facility; and 
· Power supply to magnetic/striker lock. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………… 
 
Electronic Keypad to Vehicle Gate Motor and/or the Pedestrian Gate Magnetic/Striker Lock 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Controller location; and 
· Power supply and back up facility. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………… 
INNER PERIMETER (GARDEN AREA) 
Infrared Beams 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Connection to the intruder alarm panel; and 
· Signal strength. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………… 
Floodlights 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Connection; 
· Ignition Facility; and 
· Visibility on inner perimeter and perimeter. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………… 
IMMEDIATE HOUSE AREA 
Door Locks  
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Penetrability; and 
· Backup facility. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………… 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  293 
 
Safety Gates 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Penetrability; and 
· Locking Facility. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………… 
 
Windows 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Locking Facility; 
· Burglar Proofing penetrability; 
· Type of glass; and 
· Penetrability. 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Intruder Alarm System 
I will need to make notes on the following: 
· Direction of the passives; 
· Location of door contacts; 
· End of line resistance location; 
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· Panel conceivability57; 
· Radio distance from panel; 
· Zone reporting ability; 
· Remote Panic receiver connection; and 
· Zone allocation (double up?). 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………… 
 
                                               
57 The conceivability of a panel refers to how the intruder alarm main panel is concealed. This is normally in a 
cupboard and also in a room where it is guarded by an infra red detector. 
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INTERVIEWER COMMENTS 
 
Interview Number………………………Identification Code………………………………….. 
Description of circumstances under which the interview has taken place 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
General Impressions (Co-operation, body language and communication) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
Summary of the interview with important aspects 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
Adoption of the question and theory 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………… 
Proposition: (Conformation, modification, rejection, new understanding, new areas to be researched 
and explored) 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  296 
 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………… 
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ANNEXURE 8 
DESCRIPTIVE MAPPING – PARKHURST AREA 
Drawing 4: Descriptive mapping with grid reference on the Parkhurst residential area 
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ANNEXURE 9 
DESCRIPTIVE MAPPING – WESTCLIFF AREA 
Drawing 4: Descriptive mapping with grid reference on the Westcliff residential area 
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ANNEXURE 10 
CODING SCHEDULE:  DOCKET ANALYSIS 
 
Day of week burglary was committed Frequency 
Day   
Monday   
Tuesday   
Wednesday   
Thursday   
Friday   
Saturday   
Sunday   
Time frame (measured in days) for burglary occurrence Frequency 
Over more than one day   
Same day   
Week days or weekends on burglary occurrence Frequency 
Weekends   
Week days   
Intruder alarm Coding Frequency 
Had an intruder alarm (True) 01   
Did not have an intruder alarm (False) 02   
Unknown 03   
Method used to get into immediate house Frequency 
Window frame removed   
Door forced open   
Unknown   
Breaking sliding door glass   
Security gate forced open   
Send child through the window   
Burglar proofing forced open   
Through open window   
Window broken   
Through open door   
Window forced open   
Sliding glass door forced open   
Climbed onto balcony   
Spare key used   
Through roof   
Garage door forced open   
Alarm cable disconnected   
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ANNEXURE 11 
CODING SCHEDULE:  VICTIM INTERVIEWS 
 
Question 1  
Type of Dwelling:  
Theme Coding 
Duet 01 
Single house 02 
Flat 03 
Duplex Town house 04 
Simplex town house 05 
Cottage 06 
Security Village 07 
Gated neighbourhood 08 
Not applicable 09 
  
Question 2  
Were you employed at the time?  
Theme Coding 
Employed 01 
Unemployed 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 3  
Employment status at the time of the incident  
Theme Coding 
Full time employee 01 
Part time employee 02 
Student 03 
Self employed 04 
Jobless 05 
Not applicable 06 
  
Question 4  
Were you working from home prior to the incident  
Theme Coding 
At home 01 
Away from home 02 
Not applicable 03 
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Question 5  
If employed, have any of the following personnel 
employed, or family members or lodgers, supposed 
to be on site at the time of the incident?  
Theme Coding 
Domestic help 01 
Child minder 02 
Lodger 03 
Retired partner 04 
Other family 05 
Gardener 06 
Building contractor 07 
Not applicable 08 
Domestic help and gardener 09 
Domestic help, gardener and partner 10 
Nobody 11 
Business partner 12 
 
Question 6  
Was there a patrolling neighbourhood watch?  
  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 7  
Were there any contractor works in the following 
areas?  
Theme Frequency 
In the immediate street area  
On the victim's property  
At your immediate neighbours  
In your suburb  
In your immediate residential block  
Not applicable  
Nowhere  
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Question 8  
Did you have CCTV installed?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 9  
If yes, was it recording any footage?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 10  
Did you have a perimeter fence which encircled your 
entire property?   
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 11  
If yes, what kind of perimeter fence?  
Theme Frequency 
Steel palisade  
Wooden Balustrades  
Precast cement slab walling  
Wire diamond mesh fence  
Brick wall  
Stone wall  
Not applicable  
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Question 12  
Did you attend to the following possible penetrable 
areas?  
Theme Coding 
Steel palisade 01 
Wooden Balustrades 02 
Precast cement slab walling 03 
Wire diamond mesh fence 04 
Brick wall 05 
No penetrable areas 06 
Not applicable 07 
 
Question 13  
Did you have electrified fencing?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 14  
How was your fence energiser switched on/off?  
Theme Coding 
Key 01 
Remote 02 
Keypad 03 
Neighbour control 04 
Not applicable 05 
 
Question 15  
How was your fence energiser monitored?  
Theme Frequency 
Siren  
Armed response RF radio link   
Remote keypad  
SMS   
Neighbour's fence  
Not applicable  
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Question 16  
How long before (in months) the incident did you 
install your electrified fencing?  
Theme Frequency 
1 - 12 Months  
13 - 24 Months  
25 - 36 Months  
37+ Months  
Not applicable  
 
Question 17  
Did you have a back up battery facility to the fence 
energiser replaced prior to the incident?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 18  
If yes, how many moths before the incident did you 
have the back up battery replaced?  
Theme Frequency 
1 - 12 Months 01 
13 - 24 Months 02 
25 - 36 Months 03 
37+ Months 04 
Never 05 
Not applicable 06 
 
Question 19  
Did you receive any calls regarding alarm violation 
signals from the armed response control room prior to 
the incident?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
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Question 21  
How many motorised vehicle perimeter gate areas did 
you have on the property?  
Theme Coding 
No motorised vehicle gates 00 
1 Motorised vehicle gate 01 
2 Motorised vehicle gates 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 22  
Were your vehicle gate(s) linked with your intruder 
alarm system?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 23  
Did you have an electronic key pad connected to the 
vehicle gate motor?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 29  
Was there anyone else, other than yourself, your 
children and your partner, who else had access to the 
vehicle perimeter gate motor in activating it to open 
and close?  
Theme Frequency 
Domestic help  
Gardener  
Building contractor  
Domestic help  
Children  
Nobody  
Not applicable  
Business partners  
Tenant   
 
 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  306 
 
Question 30  
Did you have a manual lock fitted to your vehicle 
gate?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 31  
Did anyone else, other than yourself had access to the 
keys locking and unlocking this manual lock?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 32  
If yes, who had access to these keys?  
Theme Frequency 
Domestic help  
Gardener  
Building contractor  
Domestic help  
Children  
Nobody  
Not applicable  
Business partners  
Tenant   
Neighbour  
Was not locked  
 
Question 33  
Did you have a back up battery supply to the vehicle 
gate motor?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
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Question 34  
If yes, how many months prior to the incident did you 
have the back up battery replaced?  
Theme Frequency 
1 - 12 Months  
13 - 24 Months  
25 - 36 Months  
37+ Months  
Never  
Not applicable  
 
Question 35  
Did you have any additional security feature(s) fitted 
to your vehicle gate motor that secured it?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 36  
If yes, please describe the feature(s).  
Theme Coding 
No additional security features  
Not applicable  
Anti theft bracket  
Manual locks on gate motor release system  
Remote switching intruder alarm off  
 
Question 37  
Did you have any pedestrian gates on your property?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 38  
If yes, how many pedestrian gates?  
Theme Coding 
No perimeter pedestrian gates 00 
1 perimeter pedestrian gate 01 
2 Perimeter pedestrian gates 02 
Not applicable 03 
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Question 39  
If yes, how did you lock the pedestrian gate(s)?  
Theme Frequency 
4 Lever lock  
Night latch  
Electrical striker lock  
Pad lock  
Mortise lock or Cylinder  
Not known  
Not applicable  
No lock  
 
Question 40  
Which of the following people had access to the 
locking systems on the pedestrian gate(s)?  
Theme Frequency 
Children  
Gardener  
Domestic help  
Friends  
Tenant  
Business partners  
Nobody  
Not applicable  
Previous owner  
 
Question 44  
If you had either an electrical sticker lock or magnetic 
lock, did you have a back up battery supply to the 
mentioned locks?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 47  
Did you have a gate closer fitted to the pedestrian 
gate?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
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Question 48  
Did you have a digital key pad connected to the 
electrical striker lock or magnetic lock?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 54  
Did you have any infra-red beams installed in the 
garden area?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 55  
If yes, please indicate where did you have infra-red 
beams installed?  
Theme Coding 
All sides of the immediate house areas 01 
Only one side of the house 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 56  
Have you removed any bushes, shrubs or other 
vegetation encroaching on the infra-red beam system, 
before the incident?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 57  
If yes, within how many days have you done this?  
Theme Frequency 
Full time  
1-2 days  
3-4 days  
5-6 days  
7+ days  
Never  
Not applicable  
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Question 58  
Did you bypass your beams before the incident?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 60  
Did you have security floodlights in the garden area?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 61  
If yes, were these lights operational at the time of the 
incident?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 62  
In what way were the floodlights activated?  
Theme Frequency 
Day/night photo sensor  
Motion detection  
No response due to daytime incident  
Manual switch  
Timer  
Not applicable  
 
Question 63  
Were all the external doors locked at the time of the 
incident?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
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Question 64  
Were any keys left inside (secure side of the doors) at 
the time of the incident of the external doors?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 65  
Did any of the following, if any, have access to the 
keys of any or all external door locks?  
Theme Frequency 
Children  
Domestic help  
Friends  
Gardener  
Tenant  
Family  
Neighbour  
Nobody  
Business partners  
Not applicable  
 
Question 66  
Did you have any safety gates in the following areas:  
Theme Frequency 
Between living and sleeping areas  
Front door  
Kitchen door  
Patio door  
None  
Not applicable  
Between garage and house  
Bedrooms doors  
 
Question 67  
Were there burglar proofing in front of external 
windows?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
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Question 68  
Was the burglar proofing covering all the windows in the 
following areas or only some windows or none?  
Theme Frequency 
All areas  
Some areas  
None  
Not applicable  
 
Question 69  
Were all the external windows closed?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 70  
If not, which windows were not closed and why?  
Theme Frequency 
Fresh air ventilation  
Forgot  
Not applicable  
Pet's routine  
Prefer windows open  
Locks not working  
 
Question 71  
Did you have all, some or any or none of the external 
windows covered with closed curtains during the day?  
Theme Coding 
All of the external windows 01 
Some of the external windows 02 
None of the external windows 03 
Not applicable 04 
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Question 72  
Did you have all, some or any or none of the external 
windows covered with closed curtains during the night?  
Theme Coding 
All of the external windows 01 
Some of the external windows 02 
None of the external windows 03 
Not applicable 04 
 
Question 73  
Did you have an intruder alarm?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 74  
If yes, did you arm it before the time?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 75  
If no, state your reason for not arming the alarm?  
Theme Frequency 
Faulty beam  
Irregular routine of other occupants  
Just into the premises  
Not applicable  
Not familiar with using it  
Was at home at the time  
Was not functional  
Used dogs as an interim  
 
Question 76  
Were the intruder alarm system connected to an armed 
response RF radio link?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
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Question 77  
If no, state your reason for not connecting the alarm to 
an armed response company?  
Theme Frequency 
Just into the premises  
Was still under previous owner's control  
Not applicable  
Intruder alarm not functional and connected  
 
Question 78  
Did you have your intruder alarm tested prior to the 
incident?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 79  
If yes, how long before the incident did you test your 
alarm?  
Theme Frequency 
Days  
Weeks  
Months  
Years  
Was new  
Not applicable  
Never  
By accident  
 
Question 80  
Were there any fixed panic buttons inside the 
residence?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
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Question 81  
Were there any remote panic buttons inside the 
residence?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 82  
If yes, please indicate which member(s) was/were in 
possession of a remote panic button(s)?  
Theme Frequency 
Not applicable  
Nobody  
Domestic help  
Responsible owner  
Children  
Responsible owner's spouse  
Gardener  
 
Question 83  
Did you have your remote panic buttons tested prior to 
the incident?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 84  
If yes, how long before the incident did you test your 
remote panic buttons?  
Theme Coding 
Months 01 
Annually 02 
Never 03 
Not applicable 04 
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Question 85  
Other than yourself and your partner, did anyone else 
have access to the code which was used to arm and 
disarm the intruder alarm system?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 86  
If yes, please who else had access to the code which 
was used to arm and disarm the system?  
Theme Frequency 
Business employees  
Children  
Domestic help  
Nobody  
Not applicable  
Owner's partner  
 
Question 87  
Was there any zones bypassed?  
Theme Coding 
Yes 01 
No 02 
Not applicable 03 
 
Question 89  
Since the incident, what in your neighbourhood has 
been enhanced in terms of security?  
Theme Frequency 
Bicycle patrols  
Foot patrols  
Dedicated armed response vehicle  
Boomed off area  
Surveillance cameras  
Establish a neighbourhood watch  
Not applicable  
No enhancements  
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Question 90  
Since the incident, what has been enhanced in terms of 
security with your perimeter?  
Theme Frequency 
Implementing electrified fencing  
Implementing wall spikes  
Implementing razor wire  
Implementing Palisade  
Implementing brick walls  
Not applicable  
Implementing new pedestrian gate  
Implementing wire diamond mesh fence  
No enhancements  
 
Question 91  
Since the incident, what security has been enhanced at 
your vehicle gate in terms of security measures?  
Theme Frequency 
Implemented gate release mechanism lock  
Connected digital keypad to gate motor  
No enhancements  
Not applicable  
Implement automation on garage door  
Changed remote button frequency  
Add additional height to vehicle gate motor  
Added wall spikes on top of vehicle gate  
 
Question 92  
Since the incident, what has been enhanced at the 
pedestrian gate(s) in terms of security measures at the 
pedestrian gate(s) area(s)?  
Theme Frequency 
Implemented backup battery to electrical 
striker/magnetic lock  
Implemented a gate closer  
Implemented an intercom  
Implemented manual lock  
Added height to existing gate  
Changed lock  
Added an additional safety gate  
Not applicable  
Reinforced gate hinges  
No enhancements  
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Question 93  
Since the incident, what has been enhanced in the 
garden area in terms of security measures within the 
inner perimeter area?  
Theme Frequency 
Implemented security floodlights  
Implemented infra-red detection beams  
Implemented dogs  
No enhancements  
Not applicable  
Connected existing security lights to intruder alarm  
 
Question 94  
Since the incident, what has been enhanced within the 
immediate house area in terms of security measures at 
the immediate house area?  
Theme Frequency 
Closed windows  
Changed door locks  
Implement burglar proofing  
No enhancements  
Implement safety gate between living and sleeping 
areas  
Implement intruder alarm  
Link intruder alarm to armed reaction monitoring 
facility  
Connect existing remote panic buttons to a dedicated 
panic zone on RF radio  
Separate user codes for intruder alarm  
Not applicable  
Implement extra locks on door  
Changed intruder alarm codes  
Closed curtains  
Upgraded intruder alarm  
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ANNEXURE 12 
CODING SCHEDULE:  DESCRIPTIVE MAPPING 
Quantifying burglaries committed at victims 
within a grid  
Theme Frequency 
One burglary  
Two burglaries  
Three burglaries  
Total burglaries committed within a grid  
Theme Frequency 
Burglaries committed within a grid  
Grid location in relation to community 
entertainment places, business property and open 
unoccupied property  
Theme Coding 
Present within same grid 01 
Present within one grid 02 
Present within two grids 03 
Present within three grids 04 
Present within four grids 05 
Present within five grids 06 
Quantifying victim location in relation to other 
victims within a grid  
Theme Frequency 
Immediate neighbour on either side  
Directly across the road  
Stand alone  
Grid location in relation to main access roads  
Theme Coding 
Present within same grid 01 
Present within one grid 02 
Present within two grids 03 
Present within three grids 04 
Present within four grids 05 
Present within five grids 06 
 
 
 
 
Grid location in terms of dead-end roads  
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Theme Coding 
Present within same grid 01 
Present within one grid 02 
Present within two grids 03 
Present within three grids 04 
Present within four grids 05 
Present within five grids 06 
Dead-end road descriptions within grids with 
dead-end roads  
Theme Coding 
Occupied property 01 
Controlled gate 02 
Palisade or brick wall 03 
Wire diamond mesh fence or non existent 04 
Quantifying victim location in relation with street 
location within a grid  
Theme Frequency 
On corner 01 
In middle of street  02 
Close to corner properties 03 
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ANNEXURE 13 
RESIDENTIAL SECURITY AUDIT CHECKLIST 
 
Area Hardware or procedure name Security discipline Security hardware or procedure Hardware or procedure description 
Neighbourhood 
Neighbourhood security 
initiative Physical security Guards Patrols 
    Management of guards 
    Guarding morale 
     
Perimeter  Perimeter types Physical security Brick walls No penetrable areas 
    
Wall height should be 2 meters and 
higher 
     
 CCTV Electronic security CCTV cameras Day night compatibility 
    Backup battery supply on PSU 
    Secured and anti tamper facility 
   CCTV recording Digital 
    30 day footage 
    10 to 20 frames per second 
    Backup battery supply to recorder 
   CCTV coverage Main entrances on perimeter 
    Face and number plate recognition 
     
     
 Electrified fencing Electronic security Electrified fencing energiser Linked to monitoring device 
    Earth loops to sensitize fence 
    Backup battery supply 
   Electrified fencing uprights Providing minimum of 6 strands 
    Tentioners tensioned properly 
     
Vehicle gate Vehicle gate Electronic security Vehicle gate motor Backup battery supply 
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  Electronic security  Electronic keypad 
  Procedural security   Keypad code change 
    Provided with lockable anti theft bracket 
    
Electronic keypad controller secured in 
gate motor housing 
    
Remote receiver frequency changed 
regularly and remotes reprogrammed 
regularly 
     
Pedestrian 
perimeter gate Pedestrian gate  Pedestrian gate lock Provided with backup lock 
   Pedestrian gate Solid gate 
    
Provided with intercom connected to 
phone line or cell phone 
   Pedestrian gate magnetic lock Provided with backup battery supply 
    Wiring secured and not exposed 
    
Gate monitor connected to intruder alarm 
system 
    Connected to electronic keypad 
   Electronic keypad Separate user codes 
    User codes changed regularly 
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Area Hardware or procedure name Security discipline Security hardware or procedure Hardware or procedure description 
Inner perimeter 
or garden  Infra-red beams  Infra-red beam location All sides of property 
   Infra-red beams Minimal false alarms 
    
On separate partition from house alarm 
hardware 
    
Report to monitoring device on dedicated 
beam zone 
   PSU 
Provided with own power supply and 
backup battery 
    Backup battery changed annually 
     
    Clear from vegetation or foliage 
 Security lights  Security light location Facing perimeter 
    Situated high on immediate house walls 
   Switching facility Day/night sensor 
    
Front lights also connected to intruder 
alarm system 
     
     
Immediate house Doors  Door locks Provided with backup dead bolt locks 
    
Cylinder type locks and not just 
traditional 4 lever locks 
   Keys 
Only owner or responsible tenant have 
access to keys 
     
 Safety gates  Safety gate locks Provided with slam locks 
   Safety gate Fully framed 
    
Frame bolts applied with anti tamper 
method 
    Reinforced horizontal and vertical bars 
     
 Windows  Glass type Normal 
   Concealment of movement Covered with curtains during day time 
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    Covered with curtains during night time 
   Monitoring Monitored by Infra-red beams 
    Monitored by glass break detectors 
     
 Intruder alarm  Keypads Separate user codes 
    Key pad panic enabled 
    Duress code enabled 
    User codes changed regularly 
    Zone descriptions clear and accurate 
     
   Interior passives Positioned from windows towards room 
    Cover all areas 
    Separately on each zone 
    Cleaned every six months 
    
Remote passive batteries changed every 
18 months 
    End of line resistance within passive 
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Area Hardware or procedure name Security discipline Security hardware or procedure Hardware or procedure description 
   Door monitors Located at each door 
    Cover all external doors 
    Separately on each zone 
    
Remote door monitor batteries changed 
every 18 months 
    
End of line resistance within door 
monitor 
     
   Monitoring 
Device monitored by a certified 24hr 
control room 
    24HR test reports sent every 24 HRS 
    
Report on various alarm signals and 
alarm condition 
   Control panel Backup battery changed annually 
    Panel serviced annually 
    
Endo of line resistance inside detection 
hardware and not panel 
   PSU 
Provided with own PSU and backup 
battery 
    Backup battery changed annually 
     
 Panic buttons  Key pads 
Connected to monitoring device and 
intruder alarm panel as dedicated panic 
   Remote buttons 
Connected to monitoring device and 
intruder alarm panel as dedicated panic 
   Fixed panics 
Connected to monitoring device and 
intruder alarm panel as dedicated panic 
   Location 
Every room supplied with either one of 
the above-mentioned 
   Remote buttons Batteries changed every 6 months 
   Testing Every week 
PDF created with pdfFactory trial version www.pdffactory.com
  326 
 
ANNEXURE 14 
SAPS DOCKET CHECKLIST WITH RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY COMPLAINTS 
Area Event Event description and details 
Complainant details and crime location Complainant Complainant name(s) 
  Complainant surname 
  Complainant maiden name 
  Complainant ID Number 
  Complainant Passport number 
  Complainant nationality 
  Complainant gender 
  Was the complainant working from home? 
  Was the complainant employed? 
  Describe employment status? 
Crime location Physical address Street Name 
  Street Number 
  Suburb 
  Town 
  Province 
  Country 
  Corner property? 
Perimeter Entry point 
Is the perimeter suspected to be an entry point and please provide reason in this 
regard? 
 Security measures What was present as security measures on the perimeter 
  Was the security measure(s) monitored by an armed response company? 
  Did the armed response company report on any alarm signals from the perimeter? 
  
Describe the alarm signals reported by the armed response company 
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Area Event Event description and details 
 Perimeter type Describe the perimeter type 
Vehicle gate Security measures What security measure(s) was in place with the vehicle gate 
 Vehicle gate motor Was there a vehicle gate motor in place 
  How is the vehicle gate motor normally activated 
  Any security measures in place with the vehicle gate motor 
  Was there a electronic keypad provided to open and close the vehicle gate motor 
 Entry point Is the vehicle suspected as an entry point and why? 
Pedestrian gate Lock Describe the locks on the pedestrian gate 
  Was there any backup battery supply to the electrical pedestrian locks? 
Inner perimeter and garden area Infra-red beams Were there any infra-red beams? 
  Did the infra-red beams cover all areas? 
  Describe areas covered with infra-red beams? 
  Was the infra-red beams linked to a monitoring device? 
  Is the monitoring device connected to an armed response company? 
  
Did the armed response company report on any alarm signals received from the 
infra-red beams? 
  Describe the signal description from the armed response company 
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Area Event Event description and details 
  Was there any infra-red beams bypassed and the reason for this 
  Was the infra-red beams armed and if not please provide a reason for this? 
 Security floodlights Was there any security floodlights? 
  Were the security floodlights operational? 
  Was the security floodlights switched on? 
  How was the security floodlights switched on? 
  Describe areas covered by the security floodlights 
 Dogs Was there any dogs? 
 Entry point Is the inner perimeter or garden area suspected to be an entry point and why? 
Immediate house area Doors Were all the external doors locked 
  Were all the external doors provided with safety gates 
  Describe doors not covered with safety gates 
 Keys Was there any keys left inside door locks? 
  Who had access to door keys? 
 Windows Were all the windows closed? 
  
Were all the windows covered with external or internal or integrated burglar 
proofing? 
  Describe windows covered with burglar proofing 
  Was all the windows covered with curtains during day time? 
  Was all the windows covered with curtains during night time? 
 Entry point Is the windows or doors suspected to be entry points 
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Area Event Event description and details 
  Please provide a reason to the response above on entry point. 
 Intruder alarm Was there an intruder alarm? 
  Was the alarm armed? 
  Please provide a reason for alarm not armed? 
  Were there any zones bypassed/isolated? 
  Please provide reason for zones bypassed or isolated 
  Which zones were bypassed/isolated? 
  Was the alarm linked to an armed response monitoring device? 
  
Did the armed response company report on any alarm signals received from the 
intruder alarm? 
  Please describe signals received from the armed response company? 
  Did the armed response company respond? 
  Did the armed response company had access and explain method of access? 
 Losses 
Please describe property removed illegally from each area eg. TV from Lounge, 
garden tools from shed and also the value of the property removed. 
 Suspects Please indicate if anyone one is suspected and provide a reason in this regard. 
 Date of the incident 
When was the last date you left the house and date you returned finding the house 
intruded 
 Time of incident 
When was the last time you left the house and time you returned finding the house 
intruded? 
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Area Event Event description and details 
 External weather conditions 
What was the weather conditions when you left the house and the weather 
conditions when you arrived at home? 
 Victims Was anyone at home at the time of the incident? 
  Who was at home at the time of the incident? 
  Any injuries sustained and describe areas injured? 
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ANNEXURE 15 
PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AS A RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY  
VICTIM 
 
The following section provides the researcher’s own personal experience in 2006 as a victim of 
residential burglary. 
 
RESIDENTIAL SECURITY MEASURES IMPLEMENTED 
The following security measures were implemented at the time of the incident according to the 
various areas: 
· Residential area; 
· Immediate residential block; 
· Perimeter; 
· Inner perimeter; and 
· Immediate house area. 
 
Residential area 
The residential area does have the visibility of armed response vehicles. There is though no 
road closures nor and boomed off areas or guarding companies.  
 
Community Policing Forums mainly exists in neighbouring suburbs. 
 
The suburb is surrounded by two major routes leading from the suburb to freeways, taxi ranks 
and bus terminals. 
 
There are many builder activities in the area and the area is fairly new in development also. 
 
Immediate residential block 
The immediate residential block had a group of concerned residents who wanted to start a 
security forum. The forum did not come about due to a lack of interest or commitment. 
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As mentioned earlier there is no closed off areas nor any boomed off areas or patrolling guards. 
There are many builder activities within the immediate residential block and neighbouring 
residential blocks. 
 
There is also open property adjacent to the victim location. 
 
Perimeter 
The perimeter consisted of a palisade fence in the front with a motorised vehicle gate. The rest 
of the perimeter had palisade fencing. The owner, wife and maid have access to the remotes. 
The motor is not DC and not connected to a keypad. The motor does not have an anti theft 
bracket. The gate is provided with a manual locking facility but not locked due to day time. 
The vehicle gate is not connected to the intruder alarm system. 
 
The perimeter also had electrified fencing along all sides of the perimeter and the electrical 
fencing is active. 
 
The energiser is not connected to an armed response company monitoring radio. 
 
There is no CCTV. 
 
Inner perimeter 
The inner perimeter has infra red detection beams covering three of the 4 sides of the house.  
 
Two beams were bypassed due to birds setting it off during day time. The front beam was 
activated. 
 
There is a security flood light in the back and there are three dogs on the premises. 
 
Immediate house area 
The house has door monitors on all the doors except the front door. The front door is covered 
with the external passive. 
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All the rooms and areas in the house are covered with infra red passives. The main panel is 
hidden away in an enclosed area and connected to an armed response company. The intruder 
alarm was armed at the time of the incident. 
 
There are safety gates on all the doors except the front door which is reinforced with a solid 
wooden door and 4 lever cylinder lock. 
 
The garage door is motorised and only the owner and wife has access to remotes to this area. 
 
METHOD OF ENTRY AND LOSSES 
The victim’s neighbour saw the perpetrators when they ran the victim’s intercom several times. 
The neighbour called the victim’s wife and the wife called the victim. 
 
The victim called the armed response company top respond immediately. 
 
The perpetrators forced the vehicle gate motor rack of the vehicle motor gear with a metal 
object through the palisade sections. 
 
The perpetrators left the scene for about five minutes according to the neighbour after forcing 
the vehicle gate open. The perpetrators returned after the five minutes and entered the front 
door by forcing the lock area open on the wooden side of the door frame. At the time the 
external passive already activated the alarm. 
 
The perpetrators removed items such as a PC, DVD player, VCR recorder and player, DVDs, 
Play station and discs, kettle, cooling fan, vehicle keys, jewelry, pocket knife, TV etc. The 
perpetrators took apparently 4 minutes and took off in one sedan. 
 
The armed response told the victim they could not gain access into the property due to a 
keypad. The victim advised the armed response they are not at the correct address if they have 
to use a keypad. The armed response officer acknowledged to the victim’s wife that he passed 
the perpetrators in the victim’s immediate street area and that his objective was to secure the 
victim’s house and not to pursue the perpetrators. 
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PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 
The following security measures were added to the existing security measures according to the 
following various areas: 
· Residential area; 
· Immediate residential block; 
· Perimeter; 
· Inner perimeter; and 
· Immediate house area. 
 
Residential area 
The victim met up with an armed response company to discuss the losses and proposed 
security measures that they can assist with.  
 
The victim asked for more visibility of armed response vehicles within the victim’s residential 
area due to the reoccurring residential burglaries prior to the victim’s house and also after the 
victim’s house. The victim asked for the control room to be advised that there are two streets 
within the residential area with the same name. 
 
Immediate residential block 
The victim arranges for guards to do patrols randomly at his own expense and inform 
neighbours if they want to contribute to cost. Their response is not in favour of contributing. 
 
The victim do random visits to the immediate residential blocks within his property and advise 
the armed response company on any suspicious vehicles or activities.58 The victim was already 
successful identifying vehicles that were used earlier in other incidents in neighbouring 
suburbs. 
 
Perimeter 
No enhancements to the perimeter except that the victim locks the vehicle gate also with a pad 
lock at the manual locking facility. This has a down side that the victim expose himself to 
being hijacked every time he needs to get out of his vehicle to unlock his vehicle gate. This is a 
                                               
58 Suspicious vehicles would be vehicles that drive aimlessly around in the suburb or park in street areas with 
occupants loitering. Suspicious activities would be pedestrians loitering and aimlessly walking around in the 
suburb, randomly ringing property intercoms.  
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short term solution where the victim will connect vehicle gate to intruder alarm system, having 
intercom dialing to Cellphone and having CCTV covering street area. 
 
Inner perimeter 
The victim is looking into duel technology beams, prone to birds and minimal false alarms. 
 
Immediate house area 
The front door will be changed with a door having a metal frame on the external door frame 
and also the immediate door itself to reinforce the lock area. The door will be connected to a 
door monitor. 
 
There is a safety gate now between living and sleeping area and to the areas where there is 
appliances such as TVs and PCs. 
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